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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation project is an ethnographic analysis of multi-leveled interactions 
taking place in the process of deliberation about plural coexistence in Manado, North 
Sulawesi, Indonesia. The focus of the dissertation is on how youth are socialized into 
ethical perspectives, and how they negotiate, implement, and circulate frameworks for 
approaching religious difference. As Indonesian society is becoming increasingly divided 
along religious lines, the pressing need for a viable consensus for national cohesion has 
heightened the importance attributed to civic and religious education in schools. The 
particular field site is a majority-Protestant region with a national reputation for success 
in modeling tolerance and inter-religious relations. 
Starting by mapping relevant institutions and organizations that shape the public 
conversation on questions of plurality and citizenship, I demonstrate how schools channel 
ethical dispositions toward difference through the curriculum and the everyday realities 
of the schools. I continually consider how these ethical perspectives articulate with the 
broader public sphere. I provide case studies in three educational institutions in North 
Sulawesi, Indonesia: a public high school, a private Catholic high school, and a public 
madrasah (Islamic high school). My theoretical perspective on ethical socialization links 
  ix 
education as “deliberation” (Varenne 2007) with the concept of “reflective freedom” 
(Laidlaw 2014) as intrinsic to ethics in order to demonstrate how educational institutions 
channel ethics and act as arenas for individual and public deliberation.  
 Furthermore, I consider how the ethical deliberations about difference at these 
schools are negotiated by youth. As young Indonesians navigate institutional policies and 
take classes in religious and civic education, they also make daily decisions, including 
whom to befriend, how to wear the school uniform, and what to eat for lunch. In doing 
so, they engage in ethical deliberation about difference. I argue that this ongoing and 
dynamic process is significant because of the consequences for how these actors 
understand the conditions of inclusion and exclusion in the national context, and in turn, 
shape the broader political context with which the analysis begins. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF ETHICS  
INFORMED BY THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS 
 
Learning Diversity  
 In September 2015, tenth grade students in the public madrasah of the majority-
Protestant city of Manado, Indonesia discussed the topic of diversity in their mandatory 
civic education course.1 The teacher, Ibu Aisyah, stood in front of her tenth grade class, 
energetically leading them through the material despite it being the last period of the 
school day.2 She proclaimed to her students, 
 “Diversity (keanekaragaman) is part of Indonesia. Indonesia is extremely plural 
 (majemuk) in terms of religion, tradition, culture – but these are all together in 
 one…Imagine if everything were just one color. Can you imagine if everything 
 were just white? That’s boring! If there’s a little red, green, and white, that’s 
 beautiful! Variation interests our eyes; it’s what makes a beautiful and interesting 
 view. InsyaAllah, the rest of the world will also see this as interesting.”3 
 
One student, Muhammad, had already expressed his conviction that Indonesia must value 
diversity, as the country’s standing in the international community hinges on its ability to 
do so. Others had nodded and echoed this sentiment, arguing that Indonesians must 
respect difference. 
                                               
1 In Indonesia, a madrasah (or madrasa) typically refers to an Islamic day school (as opposed to a 
boarding school) that offers instruction in general educational subjects (mathematics, science, 
etc.) in addition to religious subjects. For a history of madrasahs in Indonesia and a contrast with 
the traditionalist pesantren, see Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007:176-77.  
2 Ibu is the title of address for a marriage-age woman in Indonesian, and Pak is the title of address 
for a man. All names are pseudonyms unless a full name and title are provided.  
3 Italicized words are in Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia), the national language. Words in 
Manadonese (Bahasa Manado or Melayu Manado), a local form of Malay, are noted with the 
designation “Manado” preceding the italicized words.  
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 However, Ibu Aisyah’s follow-up question about how they can respect diversity 
and national unity as Indonesian citizens proved difficult for the students to answer. 
Though intended to check understanding of the material, her question has more 
significance than a simple textbook exercise with a pre-determined answer. Indeed, the 
same question has become increasingly relevant in the public sphere as debates about 
religious and national belonging in Indonesia are waged. The problematic of maintaining 
national cohesion has surged to the fore, and different visions of nation are linked to 
various frameworks for coexistence and approaches toward difference. In the midst of 
these debates, one necessary measure to ensure the future integrity of the nation is 
unanimous: Indonesian youth must be taught the importance of respecting and 
appreciating difference.  
 Back in the classroom as students struggled to respond to the question, a couple of 
hesitant suggestions were met with laughter from fellow students. “We can use 
technology to help us?” a student named Wahyu proposed, her transformation of a 
statement into a question belying her uncertainty. Another’s tentative remark that in order 
to respect difference, we must “pay attention to difference” (memperhatikan perbedaan) 
was equally sanctioned with laughter. Finally, Ibu Aisyah praised Rifqi, who argued that 
in order to respect diversity, national unity must be emphasized (menjaga kesatuan dan 
persatuan NKRI [Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia]). Several students then spontaneously recited the national motto, “Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika,” Unity in Diversity.  
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Goals of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation is fundamentally about the ethical dimension of living in a plural 
society, the deliberation about frameworks for coexistence taking place on multiple 
levels, and the place of educational institutions in the process of shaping individual and 
public ethical dispositions. The question of how to approach difference and incorporate 
diversity on various levels scaling up to and including the national framework, is an 
inherently ethical question that brings with it ideologies and practices of inclusion and 
exclusion.  
 Within the process of ethical socialization, schools are important institutions that 
aim to socialize citizens into particular national frameworks encoding perspectives on 
difference through the government-mandated curriculum. In addition, schools instill 
understandings of difference through their own policies and orientation toward dealing 
with diversity. Rather than locating schools as institutions within a faithful process of 
social reproduction, I emphasize the contingency of the educational process and the 
“deliberation” that occurs therein (Varenne 2007). Such an approach allows for a broader 
view of educational institutions that highlights their importance in ethical socialization in 
conjunction with other institutions and interaction at multiple levels. With the 
understanding that there is no singular foundation for ethics and ethical reasoning, I take 
schools as a point of departure for locating the streams of ethical normativities regarding 
religious difference that are channeled through them, connecting them to both their 
political context and their daily negotiation by youth. 
 
  
4 
Indonesia’s Challenges for Unity in Diversity 
 Indonesia’s extraordinary diversity has long attracted the attention of cultural and 
political observers. British civil servant and scholar J.S. Furnivall wrote of the 
Netherlands East Indies during the late colonial period as a prime example of a plural 
society, where “lack of a common will” among diverse social groups forbode instability 
and potential conflict (Furnivall 2010:447). In his analysis, Furnivall overlooked the 
extent to which colonization had created social distinctions within what had been a 
“canopied civilizational identity,” that was leveraged to the advantage of colonial rule 
(Hefner 2001:42). As a national project, Indonesia has largely been able to overcome 
difference to maintain unity, despite Furnivall’s skepticism regarding its potential for 
cohesion. However, the type of plural society Furnivall described indicated a stark 
separation of social groups, unlike contemporary societies characterized by an 
intermingling of people and ideas not bounded by clear, singular identities or territories 
(Hefner 2007:3). The discussion of plural society and possibilities for plural coexistence 
throughout this dissertation focuses on the varied and divergent ethical streams in the 
public sphere and their ramifications for visions of nation in modern, democratic 
Indonesia. 
 Indonesia, the world’s most populous majority-Muslim country, is a multi-
confessional state which recognizes six official religions.4 Following more than three 
decades of authoritarian rule under president Suharto, Indonesia has since 1998 
                                               
4 The Indonesian government recognizes Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and Confucianism all as official religions. See chapter three for a general outline of 
debates regarding the relationship between religion and state in Indonesia and a more detailed 
discussion of state policies toward religion. 
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undergone a successful democratic transition and consolidation to become the third-
largest democracy in the world (Künkler and Stepan 2013). Muslim intellectuals and 
mass organizations made major contributions to a public ethical culture able to support 
democracy, undergirded by a “civil pluralist Islam” (Hefner 2000:12). Despite the 
extraordinary ethnic and religious diversity found across the archipelago, Indonesia 
managed to maintain national unity during the transition, which included a major 
program of decentralization. However, outbreaks of sectarian and ethno-religious 
violence in various regions across Indonesia during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
(Duncan 2013; Sidel 2006; Wilson 2008) have placed issues of national cohesion and 
management of diversity at the center of public debate, highlighting communal tensions 
and challenges for plural coexistence. 
 Although the frequency and severity of large-scale conflicts have decreased, a 
serious challenge confronting Indonesian democracy and society is “intolerance, which is 
moving from the radical fringe into the mainstream” (Jones 2013:125). In contemporary 
Indonesia, religion is increasingly foregrounded in belonging and identity (Ricklefs 
2012), and debates about the role of religion within the nation itself are taking place. 
There is also growing indication that mainstream Indonesian Islam has been undergoing a 
“conservative turn” (Bruinessen 2013:3), proving a challenge for maintaining working 
consensus among various social groups. The extent of the conservative turn’s influence 
has become more apparent over the past several years, crystallizing in 2016 around a 
movement in opposition to Jakarta’s Christian and ethnic Chinese governor, Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama (known as Ahok). Ahok was ultimately charged with blasphemy against 
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Islam and sentenced to two years in prison for controversial comments that surfaced in a 
video during his campaign for re-election as governor of Jakarta. Protests against Ahok 
signaled the strength of conservative and hardline Muslim groups and their growing sway 
in the public sphere, effected by exploiting ethnic and religious divisions. 
 The pressing need for a viable framework for national cohesion has heightened 
the importance attributed to civic and religious education in schools (Hefner 2009). The 
situation in Indonesia is one where the relationship between religion and nation and the 
accompanying frameworks for accommodating religious pluralism remain unsettled. It is 
in this context that schools have faced increasing pressure to shape both religiously 
devout and inclusive citizens, stressing a discourse of unity and coherence in a society 
where religious difference is imbued with increasing social significance 
 
Coexistence in Manado, North Sulawesi 
 Amid the national developments described above, the majority-Protestant 
province of North Sulawesi and its capital city Manado claim to successfully model 
tolerance and inter-religious relations for the rest of Indonesia. The particularities of the 
province as a Christian stronghold which simultaneously asserts the importance of 
diversity offers an important perspective on the mediation of religious identity in the 
public sphere and deliberation about the contours of plural coexistence. Part of North 
Sulawesi’s unique position stems from its religious makeup compared to the country as a 
whole. While 87% of Indonesians profess Islam and 7% of Indonesians profess Protestant 
Christianity, the geographic distribution is such that Christians are a majority in North 
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Sulawesi. Protestants represent 63% of the population in North Sulawesi, whereas 
Muslims account for 31% and Catholics 4% of the province’s population.5  
 Discourses and performances identifying North Sulawesi in terms of its 
proclaimed success in religious harmony (kerukunan beragama) continue to circulate, 
framing conversations about diversity in the public sphere (Swazey 2013). Today, this 
important designation of being a region of religious harmony affords a local sense of 
purpose and identity among individuals of various religious and ethnic backgrounds. It 
simultaneously mediates and reinforces a sense of pride for a province that has 
proclaimed itself successful in achieving unity in diversity. Nonetheless, there is a lack of 
consensus about what guarantees peace in the region, and how to secure and maintain 
coexistence. 
 As I discuss further in the following chapter, the emergence of a regional identity 
based on religious harmony partially stems from North Sulawesi’s ability to maintain 
peace and resist being drawn into communal conflicts in neighboring provinces (Maluku, 
North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi) in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At this point in 
time, refugees were resettled in Manado and tensions ran high, as there was no sense of 
certainty that the region would come out unscathed. JAJAK (Jaringan Kerja Kasih), a 
government-supported NGO consisting of local religious leaders, intellectuals, and media 
declared both 2002 and 2003 as “The Year of Love” (Tahun Kasih), an exhortation to 
maintain religious coexistence in the region just as much as to celebrate it. A passage 
                                               
5 Percentages were calculated based on data from the 2010 census (BPS- Badan Pusat Statistik 
2010).  
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from a booklet produced by JAJAK in 2003 illustrates the serious concern for the 
situation at the time and represents an argument for peace: 
 “The promise and declaration of The Year of Love represents a response based on 
 the proposition of several elements from the community as well as the 
 government’s sensitivity in the effort to preserve the situation of security, peace, 
 and tolerance in the Land of the Waving Coconut Trees [North Sulawesi]. Over 
 the past three years, North Sulawesi has faced a difficult time in keeping peace 
 because of its position among conflict regions (Ambon, Poso, North Maluku) and 
 the turbulent separatist movements of Moro and Abu Sayyaf in the Southern 
 Philippines…Praise the All Loving God, for through the blessing of mutual 
 cooperation and vigilance, supported by the power of ‘prayer and fasting,’ North 
 Sulawesi avoided the threats and lived through 2001 peacefully…We must search 
 for a socio-cultural mechanism with a religious foundation that is strongly rooted 
 in the society of North Sulawesi, able to ward off violent conflicts and uphold 
 harmony and peace…” (Boroma and Alkartiri 2003).6 
 
The booklet was produced for the inauguration of the Hill of Love (Bukit Kasih), a 
monument intended to enshrine the religious harmony in the region, symbolized through 
miniature houses of worship for each of the official religions. The theme of the booklet, 
“From North Sulawesi, We Save Indonesia,” epitomizes the aspiration not only of 
maintaining peace, but acting as a model of coexistence for the rest of the archipelago. 
 In contemporary North Sulawesi, there remains a strong sense of pride in the 
province’s reputation for religious harmony (Sumampouw 2015). While there is 
agreement on the importance of maintaining religious coexistence, just as for the students 
in the madrasah from the example above, the answer for how to do so remains more 
elusive. Beyond the strong efforts toward inter-religious dialogue and the presence of 
strong regional organizations in place for inter-religious dialogue and cooperation 
                                               
6 The English is my own translation from the Indonesian. Unless otherwise noted, all translations 
rendered throughout the dissertation are my own. 
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dissemination of information, there is little agreement about what enabled the area to 
avoid violent conflict, and how to continue to do so in the future.   
 As religious belonging has become foregrounded in Indonesia more generally, 
there has been a strong effort to maintain a Christian atmosphere in North Sulawesi 
through political influence and a strong Christianization of the public sphere. Fears about 
the religious future of the province as a Christian stronghold also shape public 
discussions about religious tolerance, as there is a tension between efforts to promote 
religious harmony and efforts to leverage the majority-Christian population to secure a 
strong Christian environment and influence.7  
 Furthermore, many Minahasans assume causal linkages between the majority-
Christian population and the record of religious harmony in the region.8 Many of my 
informants speak of Christianity as a religion primarily promoting love, using Christian 
teachings and the majority-Protestant population as an explanatory mechanism for the 
strong tendency toward tolerance they observed in Manado. Some Minahasans invoke a 
Christian concept of brotherhood to support an exclusive approach prioritizing a secure 
                                               
7 Throughout the dissertation, I use the term Christian to refer collectively to both Protestants and 
Catholics, or to talk about a broader Christian ethic or identity that is neither exclusively 
Protestant or Catholic. This differs from the most common Indonesian usage of the terms, where 
Christian (Kristen) typically refers exclusively to Protestants, Catholic (Katolik) is used to refer to 
Catholics, and Protestantism and Catholicism are officially considered separate religions 
according to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. However, Indonesian Protestants and Catholics in 
North Sulawesi do often group themselves together when comparing themselves to Muslims, 
which is why in this case I discuss the attempt to promote a “Christian” atmosphere, as it is a 
more general opposition to what is perceived as the encroaching influence of Islam. 
8 Minahasans are the majority ethnic group in North Sulawesi, composed of several sub-ethnic 
groups. Minahasans are generally assumed to be Christian, although ethnic and religious 
identifications are not always coterminous. 
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Christian future for the region, while others use the same concept as a foundation for a 
broad, inclusive principle of coexistence.  
 Throughout the dissertation, I locate and discuss various frameworks for 
coexistence as they circulate through national and local debates, with the focus on how 
these discourses travel downstream and impact the possibilities for and actual process of 
ethical socialization in schools. If there is a lack of consensus in the broader society about 
how to respect and value difference within the national framework, how do the debates in 
the public sphere frame and impact the way that youth learn about and understand 
diversity? In order to address this question over the course of the dissertation, it is first 
necessary to elaborate on the theoretical and methodological approach that has driven the 
research. 
 
Theory and Method: Linking the Anthropology of Ethics to the Educational Process  
  In this dissertation, I first examine how frameworks for coexistence are 
deliberated in the broader public sphere by mapping out relevant institutions and 
organizations that are shaping the public conversation in Manado and North Sulawesi on 
questions of plurality and citizenship. I then demonstrate how schools channel particular 
ethical dispositions toward difference through the formal curriculum and the everyday 
reality of the school. In investigating the deliberation taking place in these educational 
contexts, I continually consider how these ethical perspectives articulate with the broader 
public sphere and current political situation. I provide case studies in three different 
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educational institutions in North Sulawesi, Indonesia: a public high school, a private 
Catholic high school, and a public madrasah.  
 Taking the analysis further, I consider how the ethical deliberations about 
difference at these three schools are negotiated by youth. As young Indonesians navigate 
institutional policies and take classes in religious and civic education, they also make 
decisions about what to wear, whom to befriend, what to eat for lunch, whom to date, and 
in doing so engage in ethical deliberation about difference. Probing everyday interactions 
elucidates the types of moral registers in operation among Indonesian students, and 
allows for a delineation of the frameworks of coexistence that they undergird. I argue that 
this ongoing and dynamic process of ethical deliberation is significant because of its 
potential consequences for how these actors understand the conditions of inclusion and 
exclusion in the national context, and in turn, shape the broader political context with 
which the analysis begins. 
 The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to facilitate and shape an 
ongoing conversation between the anthropology of ethics and the anthropology of 
education. I aim to accomplish this through an ethnographic exploration of the multi-
leveled interactions taking place in the process of ethical deliberation, specifically as it 
relates to religious difference and coexistence. 
 
Anthropological Approaches toward Education 
 Within the discipline of anthropology, the study of education has been 
surprisingly peripheral, particularly within a field that concerns itself with socialization, 
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subjectivity, and understanding the relationship of the individual to the collective. Emile 
Durkheim was concerned with the potential of a formal education system to contribute a 
sense of social solidarity, but this perspective was largely sidelined as the field of 
anthropology continued to develop. The relationship between social cohesion and 
education re-emerges as a theme through the studies on education and citizenship, 
interfacing with political anthropology in analyzing how individuals become socialized as 
citizens of nation-states. However, these studies often take an exclusively top-down and 
relatively mechanistic perspective on education. I point out insights from studies of 
religious education that have presented more nuanced analyses on how educational 
institutions articulate with the broader society, the agency of students beyond a resistance 
model, and processes of subject formation. Finally, I connect these with new 
developments in the anthropology of education that enable a recognition of the 
contingency of the educational process and justify my approach in understanding schools 
as places where normative visions of society are deliberated. This particular direction has 
the potential to enrich anthropological studies of education while also opening the 
possibility to interface with recent developments in the anthropology of ethics. 
 
Education and Social Cohesion 
 Emile Durkheim’s fixation on the relationship between formal education and 
solidarity was based on his assumption that there would be an emerging practical need for 
a new locus of solidarity and moral education to replace religious values in a secularizing 
society. He recognized the importance of the modern educational system as an 
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intermediary to teach students their relationship to the state, the values they must uphold 
as part of its moral system, and their position as citizens of a nation (Durkheim 
1961:230). Moral Education (1961) reads as guidance for a practical educational project 
in Third Republic France as much as it does a sociological theory of education. 
According to the republican project in late 19th century France, schools would transform 
mass education into a project of national centralization and integration through 
socialization into the French republican model of equality, conceived of as the erasure of 
certain forms of difference in the public sphere. 
 Durkheim’s broad questions about how individuals with different interests and 
dispositions can live together across difference were also taken up in the American 
context by John Dewey, philosopher and educational reformer who championed 
progressive education. For Dewey (1916), education acquires particular salience in 
modern, democratic societies because of the need to establish common social values, and 
the general need for citizens to participate intelligently in the democratic system. Schools, 
therefore, should function as forums for civic engagement and participation in public 
debate to establish consensus common interests. Involvement in the democratic process is 
the mechanism whereby difference is mediated, as citizens establish and strive for shared 
interests.  
 The analysis of the role of educational institutions in relation to social cohesion 
has been picked up as an important angle within the anthropological literature about 
citizenship and nation-building. For example, Benedict Anderson’s (2006) highly 
influential perspective on nations as “imagined communities” links the role of Western-
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style formal education (especially in former colonies) in contributing to a nationalist 
consciousness and forming native intelligentsias that would go on to spearhead 
nationalist movements. Dealing more directly with formal education and nation-building, 
Eugen Weber (1976) frames the historical shift brought about by education in socializing 
farmers speaking local patois into a French national culture, introducing them to new 
hierarchies and modes of belonging. Weber argued that formal schooling can provide a 
complementary or potentially counter-education when compared with local social 
education, “shaping individuals to fit into societies and cultures broader than their own, 
and persuading them that these broader realms are their own” (1976:330-1).  
 As anthropological debates about the specificities of nation-states in a globalizing 
context materialized within conversations about identity and citizenship in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, questions about socialization into various identities and communities of 
belonging again surged to the fore. During this period, ethnographies of education (Hall 
2002; Levinson 2001; Stambach 2000) have contributed to the understanding of how 
individuals become socialized not only as citizens of nation-states, but as members of 
local communities, ethnic or religious groups, into gendered social roles, and participants 
in global, transnational identities. Other analyses of citizenship have complemented these 
studies by recognizing how the consumption of media (Abu-Lughod 2005), participation 
in the economy (Ong 1999; Rudnyckyj 2010), cultivation of marginalized identities 
(Boellstorff 2005), and religious identity and participation (Bowen 2010; O’Neill 2009) 
interplay with processes of national identity and belonging. 
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Education and the Modern Indonesian State 
 Analyses of education in Indonesia, particularly during the New Order regime 
(1966-1998), have often overemphasized the power of the state in its ability to control 
educational programs and their outcomes. During the decades of authoritarian rule, a 
highly unified and controlled civic and moral education program was implemented by the 
state as an attempted mechanism of social control. The program was based on the 
elevation of the regime’s interpretation of national values of the state ideology, Pancasila 
(Nishimura 1995). In chapter three, I examine this program in detail, contrasting it with 
the contemporary civic education program in democratic Indonesia. I note that studies 
dealing with the moral educational program (Leigh 1999; Shiraishi 1997) tend to assume 
the unquestioned perpetuation of the regime’s version of national ideology under such 
strict control. However, it was the youth who had undergone this educational program 
who ended up playing a significant role in the push for democratic reform in the late 
1990s. The expectation that the consequences of civic education will yield the model 
loyal citizen, even under authoritarian control, is fundamentally flawed because it fails to 
consider the broader social context and the actual transmission and reception of these 
ideals, which are never guaranteed.  
 
Social Reproduction Theory in Analyses of Education 
 One influential theoretical orientation toward education within anthropology and 
sociology is that of social reproduction, which is often employed in order to understand 
how social relationships of domination are reproduced. Theorization of education as 
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social reproduction was initially in the vein of understanding the reproduction of class 
relations, especially how modern education both reflects and reproduces class difference 
in a capitalist society (Bourdieu 1971; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Bowles and Gintis 
1976; Willis 1977). Pierre Bourdieu outlines the function of cultural patterns transmitted 
through the educational system to act as mechanisms of class distinction. For Bourdieu, 
these patterns are transmitted less through the formal content and curriculum at school, 
and more so through implicit content of the “master patterns” (1971) that allow 
individuals with varying class background to attach different meanings to the same 
words, behaviors, and events, part of the “systemic miscommunication” that takes place 
in the classroom and serves to socialize students into their class positions (Collins 2009).  
 While social reproduction theory has been characterized as deterministic, it is 
important to recognize that it can allow for a measure of individual agency to feedback 
on the system and question an established hegemonic order. Broadly speaking, 
Bourdieu’s practice theory (1977) outlines a circuit model of social reproduction based in 
the habitus as a catalogue of generative schemes. This circuit explains how societies 
reproduce and sustain themselves, but also potentially leaves room for at least 
incremental change at various points within the circuit, as individuals will have varying 
dispositions and acquire different schemes through the process of socialization. However, 
social reproduction theory generally lacks an interactive view of socialization in its 
failure to account for individual dispositions and differences achieved through other 
means. 
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 Social reproduction theory has remained influential in the study of education, 
particularly within sociology, and has expanded its scope to look at the intersection of 
class divisions with racial and gender identities. In addition, there have been attempts to 
rework social reproduction theory as applied to education based on broader critiques in 
the field about the lack of agency in practice theory. Henry Giroux has criticized the 
overly mechanistic and deterministic aspects of reproduction theory, but equally criticizes 
those approaches which assume that student resistance is a given and is necessarily in 
response to social domination. He argues: “neither position provides the foundation for a 
theory of education that links structures and institutions to human agency and action in a 
dialectical manner” (Giroux 1983:261).  
 A subset of studies on education (Davidson 1996; Eckert 1989) has discussed the 
importance of adolescent identity and peer groups in fashioning orientations toward the 
school and toward the society and labor market more generally. These studies are 
centered on youth subculture and how their social dispositions interact—and especially 
clash—with, administrative aspects and policies of the school. Their insights make sense 
within a Bourdieusian framework on how aspects of resistance within schools that 
challenge the existing order ultimately serve to reinforce existing hierarchies and power 
differentials (Bourdieu 1991). In many ways their findings echo and further develop 
those of Willis (1977): that youth, through their oppositional identities, can contribute to 
their own domination and the reproduction of social class.  
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Insights from Studies of Religious Education 
 As described above, in anthropological studies of education, modern educational 
institutions are often seen either as simple extensions of the state or as mechanisms to 
reproduce entrenched class relations. The result has been a view of education that ignores 
the moment-to-moment contingency of education as a process. I suggest that there are 
several insights from anthropological studies of religious education—particularly Islamic 
education—that have presented more nuanced analyses of education and can inform the 
anthropology of education more generally.  
 Modern secular mass education, which is the main focus in theories of social 
reproduction, is often treated as a separate and isolated institution with regards to the 
surrounding community. However, studies of Islamic education have often paid attention 
to the surrounding context, portraying families, community members, and local political 
realities as important aspects of the learning process. In Eickelman’s description of 
Islamic education in early 20th century Morocco, the activities of religious scholars and 
students at the mosque were clearly enmeshed with the religious and cultural life of the 
surrounding community (1985:77). Similarly, Jonathan Berkey emphasizes the informal 
and flexible nature of Islamic education in medieval Cairo as being tied to persons rather 
than institutions (1992:18). This feature of education was partially due to the position of 
ulama (religious scholars) within Islam and the use of pious endowments to fund 
networks of religious schools that actually had minimal control over the way the 
institutions were run, leaving it up to individual religious scholars to oversee the 
education of the scholars (Berkey 1992:16). What emerges from these studies is renewed 
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attention to the social relationships that sustain the transmission of knowledge and the 
social and political context of educational institutions, recognizing that education is 
socially embedded.  
 Islamic education has been impacted by both the spread of mass education and 
religious reform movements throughout the Islamic world as it has negotiated its position 
in relation to modern mass education (Hefner 2007:12). Ethnographies of modern 
religious education have paid close attention to the interplay of political and religious 
interests. Starrett (1998) employs a modified reproduction theory to argue that Islamic 
knowledge and discourse has been incorporated into the Egyptian national curriculum in 
such a way that brings it under the state’s control and objectifies it as a coherent body of 
tradition. Part of his argument draws on the rich and varied traditions of Islamic 
education as a contrast to the state’s attempt to “functionalize” and flatten Islam and 
present it as a discrete tradition aligned with nationalist goals (Starrett 1998:18–19). 
 Ethnographies of contemporary Islamic education, in which these institutions are 
often in competition with secular state schools or under the purview of the state, also tend 
to contextualize its position within the educational field. Fida Adely’s account of 
education at an all-girls secondary school in contemporary Jordan puts forward a multi-
centered approach to education generally, asserting that “the socializing function of 
schools…is not hegemonic” (2012:20). Adely describes religious education beyond its 
status as a formal subject. Religious education occurs throughout the day as students chat 
in between classes, teachers couch other curricular subjects in an Islamic discourse, and 
students encounter religious lessons at home and from their communities. Ultimately, she 
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examines how students engage in “strategic compliance,” or how youth determine their 
own pathways and viewpoints within a range of given constraints (2012:164). Rejecting 
the idea that hegemonic discourses fully constitute student subjectivities, she 
demonstrates how students search for ways to conceive of and act upon the world that 
resonate with their own needs and concerns.  
 Rather than assuming that mass education serves as an arm of the state, 
ethnographies of Islamic education (Adely 2012; Brenner 2001; Starrett 1998) have 
tended to address the question of how religious and political institutions work to sustain a 
transmission of knowledge without assuming that their goals necessarily coincide or 
serve a singular interest. In addition, an examination of the development of Islamic 
education in Southeast Asia underscores how religious groups and associations in society 
exerted their strong influence in shaping modern Muslim education (Hefner 2009). 
Recognizing that education, even including schools in their modern and standardized 
forms, is fundamentally multi-centered is an important contribution to the study of 
schooling and education more broadly. The multi-centered character of education 
requires an ethnographic approach that is attentive to the varied and plural ethical streams 
in society, the institutions promoting them, and how they are discussed and enacted by 
youth themselves.  
 Another major insight from anthropologies of religious education is that all forms 
of education, whether classified as religious or secular, seek to shape subjects according 
to a set of moral values. Amy Stambach, who has written about Christianity and 
education in East Africa, argues that education cannot be studied as merely as a tool of 
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the nation state or as the activities that make up schooling, because it also encodes “moral 
disposition” (2010:12). Instead of assuming that the directionality is singular and 
necessarily clear, however, ethnographers should examine the process of education, 
because “moral cultivation, observed as process, cannot fail to see subjectivity as 
premised upon multifaceted and contradictory intentions” (Boutieri 2013:377).  
 This particular lens has led me to understand schools as sites of ethical 
deliberation and subject formation, the result of which can never be predetermined or 
assumed, but which must be examined as a process. Adely and Seale-Collazo also stress 
the insights that can be gleaned from studies of religious education: “Ethnographic 
analyses of religious education and its pedagogical methods…also sheds light on the 
moral projects that undergird all educational efforts” (2013:342, emphasis in original). 
Before elaborating on how such a perspective can bring fruitful conversation with the 
anthropology of ethics, I introduce the concept of deliberation in an educational context. 
 
“Deliberation”: A New Direction in the Anthropology of Education 
 Keeping in mind the ways in which researchers of religious education have 
brought attention to the contingency, the multi-centeredness, and the processual nature of 
education, I examine one recent development in the anthropology of education that 
provides strong potential to interface with the anthropology of ethics. Anthropologist of 
education Hervé Varenne has argued that education should be a central concern as the 
discipline works to explain and study cultural evolution (rather than conservation), 
asserting the “radical impossibility of reproduction” (2008:363). As part of this 
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perspective which emphasizes the process of education itself, Varenne (2007) proposes 
the concept of “deliberation” as a social, not a personal activity. The concept of 
deliberation is also taken up by Adely (2012) in her ethnography about how youth 
negotiate their understandings of what it means to be modern Muslim girls and Jordanian 
citizens.  
 For Varenne, deliberation is “the activity of people talking about something that 
happened outside their immediate setting; making practical decisions about what is to 
happen next; and then publicly reflecting on what just happened” (2007:1569). This 
definition opens up an alternative approach to the anthropology of education that avoids 
either top-down or resistance-based approaches to education and has the potential to shed 
light on education as a multi-centered process.  
 This particular definition, its intellectual genealogy based in liberal theories of 
education (Cremin 1976; Dewey 1916), represents an attempt to move on from overly 
deterministic accounts of education on a number of fronts. First, the definition recognizes 
that students are more than empty subjects waiting to be formed by a pre-existing 
discourse. In addition, it avoids making unfounded assumptions about the goals and 
intentions of the students themselves in relation to institutional structures. Finally, it also 
asserts that education is not restricted to formalized institutions, and that social forces 
outside the classroom are necessarily asserting themselves on the educational processes 
in schools and vice versa. 
 At the same time, its heavy emphasis on discourse and its linkages to liberal 
theories of education bears a Habermasian (Habermas 1989) undertone and risks 
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conveying that rational debate is the primary mechanism of education and formation of a 
public ethic. As I show in chapter two, the ability for certain frameworks of coexistence 
to be amplified in Manado is about more than rational debate. Rather, it is shaped by a 
number of factors, including the ability to promote a discourse which resonates widely, 
but also about the mobilization of resources and political clout. In addition, my 
ethnographic evidence also demonstrates that discourse is not always the mechanism of 
deliberation. In chapter seven, I look specifically at the process of deliberation about 
moral personhood in schools as it is mediated by school uniforms. At each of the schools 
where I conducted fieldwork, reading moral character and attempts at moral reform often 
occurred through adjustments to the school uniform and enforcement of policies relating 
to the school uniform rather than explicit discourse about reforming behavior.  
 I argue that approaches in the anthropology of ethics can help to develop this 
concept of deliberation, allowing for an understanding of schools (and all educational 
environments) as arenas for ethical deliberation about the normative visions of society, 
the nation, religious belonging, and difference. My dissertation is a study of situated 
ethical learning and practice where there are multiple normative visions of religious 
coexistence. Employing the lens of deliberation underscores the complicated, messy, and 
dynamic co-construction of education as opposed to a unidirectional internalization. It 
also draws in the entanglements at the level of the school, family, region, and nation, and 
the discourses driven by a complex set of institutional, political, and economic 
circumstances before entering into an individual’s lifeworld. 
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Ethics and Socialization 
 One of the areas within anthropology that has consistently paid attention to 
processes of ethical socialization is psychological anthropology, where concern for moral 
development and experience have provided an important foundation for the study of 
ethics. Studies regarding influence of cultural context on moral development and 
socialization (Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller 1987; Shweder and Much 1991), and also 
models of subjectivity in which individuals are constantly monitoring and revisiting their 
positioning vis-à-vis normative social frameworks (Kleinman 1988) both strongly inform 
the approach taken here. Through these references, I underline the process of ethical 
deliberation as a constant negotiation between multiple ethical frameworks.  
 
Locating Institutions in the Anthropology of Ethics 
 Recent debates and theoretical developments on ethics in the field of 
anthropology have caused for a renewed discussion about the foundations of ethical life 
and the practice of ethics. In some cases, however, there has been a lack of attention 
toward the important role institutions play in socializing ethical dispositions and their 
relationship to individual ethical positioning. The theoretical approach of “ordinary 
ethics,” (Das 2010; Lambek 2010) provides the insight that ethics and ethical reasoning 
emerges from everyday interactions, but risks a one-dimensional view of the institutions 
that play a role in disseminating various ethical frames. The theoretical approach 
recognizes that normative ethical work happens at “diffuse and tacit levels and not only 
in the terms set by the audit culture or with respect to what have been discursively 
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produced as largely, specific, and public ethical ‘problems’” (Robbins 2016). On the 
other hand, the approach of ordinary ethics also potentially ignores both how the framing 
of public ethical issues shapes ethics on a diffuse and interpersonal level, and how the 
interpersonal level might feedback on and interact with the institutional or public levels. 
 Webb Keane has brought an important angle to these debates through the 
consideration of much of the literature on child development in his treatment of “ethical 
affordances,” which he defines as “those features of human psychology, face-to-face 
interactions, and social institutions, that can be taken up and elaborated within ethical 
projects” (2016:32). Furthermore, his emphasis on the everyday social interaction that 
informs ethical processes draws attention to the inherently social (and far from 
exclusively introspective) nature of ethical life, providing a backdrop for understanding 
what deliberation in an ethical context might entail (Keane 2016:33). 
 
Reflective Freedom and the Practice of Ethics 
  Further elaborating the concept of ethical deliberation, I draw on James Laidlaw 
(2014), who argues for an understanding of ethics rooted in the concepts of freedom and 
responsibility. He fleshes out his theorization of “reflective freedom” (149) as intrinsic to 
ethics, which I argue provides an opportunity to understand how educational institutions 
channel ethical normativities, and how they act as arenas for individual and public ethical 
deliberation. The concept of reflective freedom is developed through a reading of 
Foucault’s “reflective thought” (Foucault 1997:117; Laidlaw 2014:177). The ability to 
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engage in reflective thought is precisely what “constitutes the human being as an ethical 
subject” (quoted in Laidlaw 2014:103).  
 Laidlaw points out Foucault’s important insights, namely that the particular forms 
that this reflection takes are “through socially instituted practices and power relations,” 
which leads to varied forms of ethical constitution (Laidlaw 2014:149). This perspective 
foregrounds pedagogical processes, positioning education—conceived broadly—as a 
critical site of ethical socialization. Laidlaw critiques the analyses put forth by Mahmood 
(2005) and Hirschkind (2006) in their respective studies of how people in modern Cairo 
undertake projects of ethical cultivation in reformist Islam, arguing that they fail to 
uncover the dynamics of both power and freedom in the pedagogical processes. 
Furthermore, his critique is also about the failure of the studies to recognize the 
inevitability of ethical pluralism. Living in light of ethical values or an ethical tradition is 
not about being inculcated in and internalizing values such that action according to the 
principles is automatic, but rather about “the ability to manage the conflicts between 
these and other demands through reflective and thoughtful self-direction” (Laidlaw 
2014:168). 
 
Ethical Pluralism 
 Some anthropologists have brought ethnographic flesh to the tension and 
uncertainty that ethical pluralism brings on a subjective level. Samuli Schielke, who 
critiques portrayals of religious individuals as singularly motivated by pious aspirations, 
examines how modern Cairenes anchor themselves to different “grand schemes,” and 
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how they navigate the “existential motivations and ambiguities of pursuing moral and 
spiritual perfection in an imperfect world” (2015:4). Similarly, Gregory Simon’s (2014) 
investigation of moral subjectivity in Minangkabau society demonstrates the tensions 
between perceptions of selfhood based on social expectation and from pious aspiration, 
which appear to conflict on the surface but emerge as coexisting cultural ideals. These 
contributions show the subjective experience of ethical pluralism, not always experienced 
as moral breakdown (Zigon 2008), or as a unique consequence of the modern experience 
(Berger 2014), but as central to the human experience (Ewing 1990; Hefner 2016).  
 The existence of seemingly contradictory moral registers at play should not be 
surprising, and is possibly even necessary for approaching complex, real-world 
situations. Self-representations may give an “illusion of wholeness,” but are ultimately 
inconsistent, contextual, and fleeting (Ewing 1990). Drawing on this perspective, Samuli 
Schielke (2009, 2015) has pushed for an increased analysis of the points of ambiguity, 
fragmentation, and contradictory aspirations that shape individual subjectivity. He argues 
that one should not expect to find people operating according to coherent moral systems, 
but rather an “incoherent and unsystematic dialogue of moral voices that exist parallel to 
and at times contradict one another” (Schielke 2015:53). His focus, however, is almost 
exclusively on what takes place at the level of individual subjectivity and how ambiguity 
and contradiction manifest there. I argue that these individual-level ethical concerns must 
be linked to institutions and the socialization into various ethical dispositions that may 
drive or channel some of the ethical frames that resonate with individual concerns. 
Ambiguities and contradictions exist on multiple levels—not just the level of individual 
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subjectivity—and analyses should focus on how these are socialized through institutions 
in particular political contexts as well as experienced by individuals. 
 
Methodology 
 To investigate these theoretical questions on the ground, I conducted ethnographic 
fieldwork in North Sulawesi, Indonesia during a preliminary field site visit in July 2014, 
and again during an extended research period from January 2015 through June 2016. I 
selected three different schools to serve as the main foci of my research: SMA Negeri 1 
Manado (public high school), SMA Lokon St. Nikolaus (private Catholic school), and 
MAN Model Manado (public madrasah).  
 As part of my approach to connect schools to broader debates about the religious 
difference in the public sphere, I also examined public debates engaging questions of 
plurality and interviewed religious and community leaders in Manado. This portion of my 
dissertation research was conducted under the scope of a joint project on “Scaling 
Pluralism” between Boston University’s Institute on Culture, Religion & World Affairs 
(CURA) and Universitas Gadjah Mada’s Center for Religious & Cross-Cultural Studies 
(CRCS). The project brought together researchers based at several field sites in Indonesia 
(Manado, Ambon, Tasikmalaya, and Yogyakarta) to investigate questions of religious 
plurality and coexistence. The research methods and vocabulary from this joint project, 
which I discuss in more detail in the following chapter, have been highly influential to 
my dissertation research as a whole in how I understand the role of institutions (including 
schools) engaging in normative work and relating to a public ethical culture. Each of the 
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researchers in the project analyzed “focal incidents” at their respective field sites that led 
to debates about citizenship, mapping out relevant associations, individuals, and 
organizations involved in scaling normative frames about plurality.  
 Zooming in to focus on daily activities at each of the three schools, I attended 
civic education and religious education courses regularly. While observing these courses, 
I took observational notes related to both the delivery of the course material and student 
responses and interaction. During the school day at times when I was not observing 
classes, I typically spent time in the teacher’s lounge or in the cafeteria to casually chat 
with teachers, with the unintended consequence of becoming perceived as an authority 
figure by the students. I attended numerous school events at each of the schools regularly, 
including flag ceremonies, worship sessions, parent-teacher meetings, morning 
announcements.  
 Getting to know students better (and dampening my appearance as an authority 
figure) was facilitated through participation in extracurricular clubs and activities that fell 
within the scope of my research, particularly religious clubs and retreats. In my 
interactions with students, I relied more heavily on informal conversation and observation 
as opposed to formal interviews. I paid special attention to situations in which students 
had to deal with theoretical and practical questions about inclusion and exclusion. As part 
of a classroom exercise, I asked students in all three schools to write down their 
experience interacting with someone of a different religion. This exercise was helpful in 
gaining a general understanding normative expectations for inter-religious interactions 
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among youth, and discussion of students responses is always done with the limitations of 
this exercise in mind. 
 Throughout my research, I lived on the campus of Lokon Catholic school, which 
is the only school of the three studied that requires students to board. I stayed in teacher 
housing, but also spent time at with students and staff at the dormitories in the evening, 
and ate dinner with students in the cafeteria. From time to time, I also assisted in English 
language courses in the high school and middle school (on the same campus), and for 
several months ran an after school English game activity with middle school students at 
the dormitory. 
 In between classes and after school, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
several religious and civic education teachers at each of the schools to better understand 
their philosophical approach to teaching their respective subject and perspectives on 
approaching religious difference within the scope of the course material and beyond. 
Interviews with school administrators were key in understanding the practical and 
theoretical frameworks operating within the school in regards to the place of religion 
within the school, approaches toward religious and moral education, and ways of dealing 
with religious difference.  
 I collected and took notes on religious education and civic education textbooks in 
circulation at the schools, as curriculum analysis remains an important tool for 
understanding the visions of nation and coexistence proposed as normative by the state 
and other organizations and institutions that are influential in curriculum development. 
Various privately-produced textbooks were in circulation at the schools in addition to 
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official government-supplied textbooks. In cases where I analyze textbooks (particularly 
in chapter three when comparing the current educational program to that during 
authoritarian rule), I draw my analyses specifically from the state-prduced textbooks. In 
cases where I discuss particular delivery of the curriculum in a classroom setting, I focus 
on the material presented in the classroom context, whether from privately produced or 
state textbooks.  
 In the educational milieu, I connected closely with universities in the region both 
as a window into contemporary developments in education. These linkages also proved 
useful in fostering relationships with religious communities and leaders. As a local 
sponsor of my research, the civic education department at state university UNIMA 
(Universitas Negeri Manado) was central in facilitating my relationship to the high 
schools where I conducted research. I met with the lecturers at UNIMA, who were able to 
update me on the national trends regarding civic education from the perspective of those 
responsible for training and mentoring future civic education teachers.  
 Spending time at different universities with religious affiliations in the region 
allowed me to access individuals and groups active in the inter-religious dialogue circuit 
and meet professors and lecturers who are considered local religious leaders. I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with many of these individuals to better understand inter-
religious relations in the region and organizations active in the public sphere with an 
impact on the public ethic toward difference. I also participated in an inter-religious 
“exchange” program facilitated by several religious universities, which allowed me to 
experience first-hand approaches to teaching and learning about religious difference. 
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 From my contacts at these universities, I was able to expand my network and 
gained the opportunity to engage with additional religious organizations, community 
leaders, politicians, women’s organizations, local traditional organizations, among others. 
In addition to interviews conducted with leaders and participants, I attended public events 
(both religious and non-religious) of these organizations. 
 Throughout my research, I focused heavily on processes of religious and civic 
education in schools, but continually made an effort to follow these processes both 
upstream and downstream, recognizing that schools are but one of many potential sources 
contributing to education and socialization. This particular methodological approach was 
developed with an eye toward moving beyond an ethnography of the classroom through 
the examination of schools as arenas for deliberation, where a plurality of discourses are 
present. I connect these processes to the debates taking place in the public sphere to 
examine attempts toward a public ethic, asking how formal education links up with and 
contributes to these processes.  
 
Chapter Overviews 
 In this first chapter, I have outlined the major goals of the dissertation and 
reviewed the relevant anthropological literature on both education and ethics. In this 
section, I have also introduced my theoretical contribution through a discussion of the 
concept of “deliberation” as central to the pedagogical process, linking it to the concept 
of “reflective freedom” in the anthropology of ethics. I argue that it provides insights into 
understanding the ways that schools (and other social institutions) fit into the multi-
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leveled interactions taking place in the educational process by disseminating particular 
normative frames, and how youth approach and make sense of them, especially in how 
they conceive of and act upon religious difference.  
 The remaining body of the dissertation is divided up into three major sections. 
The first of these sections (including chapters two and three) is dedicated to examining 
the public societal deliberation about religious belonging and plurality in the nation, on 
both a regional and national level. In chapter two, I examine broad public debates about 
plurality and citizenship in Manado and its environs, paying particular attention to the 
contested frames of coexistence that are scaled up by schools and other organizations and 
institutions. The analysis shows that public deliberation is not exclusively about rational 
argumentation in the public sphere, but about having a message that resonates with social 
groups and organizations. In addition, having resources to scale this message, 
disseminating it through religious communities and leaders, mass organizations, 
politicians, and schools, proves important as well. I demonstrate, through social mapping 
and an analysis of important focal incidents, how the city of Manado projects an identity 
based on being both an exemplar of tolerance and a majority-Protestant area, and how 
appeals to religious pluralism are sometimes made based on the assumption that the 
region will remain majority Christian with broad Christian influence in the public sphere.  
 In chapter three, “Debates about Religion, Nation, and Politics of Difference 
through the Lens of Education,” I address the literature on secularism and education by 
arguing that the existing position of religion within the nation—and the politics of 
difference that emerge in that context—do not necessarily constitute an emergent public 
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ethical culture. In this examination of public deliberation which takes a different angle 
from the preceding chapter, I establish how education and schools become arenas for 
debate about the national framework and the role of religion within it, which has 
consequences for how an understanding of religious difference and coexistence manifest. 
To accomplish this, I step back to a national scale, comparing how conceptions of the 
religion-state relationship and the accommodation of diversity were mobilized through 
the educational system during the authoritarian period (1966-1998) and in present-day 
democratic Indonesia. Current debates about the role of education and resulting revisions 
to the national curriculum indicate not one clear direction or framework for plural 
coexistence within the nation, but several being deployed at the same time as schools are 
called upon to emphasize religious principles as the foundation of good character and 
address a growing intolerance facing Indonesian society. 
 The next section of the dissertation (chapters four, five, and six) takes individual 
schools in Manado as arenas of deliberation about religious belonging, nation, and the 
accommodation of religious difference. These chapters demonstrate deliberation in action 
both at and around the schools, shaped by the regional political context and changes in 
the national direction of education. Within each school, there are varied attempts to 
realize a particular vision of how religion fits within the national framework, and 
consequences for the treatment of religious difference. I examine the ways in which these 
frameworks emerge through school policies, civic and religious education classes, 
dormitory life, extracurricular activities, and socializing, and how youth take up different 
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ideas about what it means to be Indonesian citizens, to live in North Sulawesi, to be 
religious, to be tolerant, and to be modern.   
 In chapter four, the focus is on a public high school in Manado whose atmosphere 
reflects the tensions around religious belonging present in the public sphere (discussed in 
chapter two). At this public institution, the importance of religiosity is strongly 
emphasized and policies toward various religions are officially neutral. However, in 
practice, there is strong influence by the Protestant majority in creating a Christian 
atmosphere at the school. Lessons in the religious and civic education curricula support a 
measure of diversity and celebrate difference, but practical examples given by teachers 
and discussions among students indicate the inhabiting of different roles shaped strongly 
by majority and minority religious positioning.  
 The next chapter (chapter five) addresses the same questions within a private 
Catholic boarding school near Manado that is geared toward elites and able to attract a 
multi-religious student body. I show how the school is explicitly oriented toward a 
multicultural vision that is projected through a universal Catholic lens, shaping the 
implementation of religious and civic education and the framing of dormitory life. I do so 
with a historical perspective, explaining the shifting place of North Sulawesi and its 
relationship to the rest of the archipelago from colonial times to the present. The 
historical perspective combined with the contemporary ethnographic data elucidates how 
the multicultural vision also coincides with a focus on educating youth from eastern 
Indonesia and producing Christian elites who can influence the future of a democratic, 
multi-confessional Indonesia. 
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 I then delve into the daily lives of teachers and students at a public Muslim high 
school (madrasah) in chapter six, where teachers and students take pride in the identity of 
the region as religiously tolerant and harmonious. Conversations about tolerance are rare, 
however, as the school is much more focused on providing Muslims with a proper 
religious foundation (in a regional context where they represent a religious minority) that 
is assumed to allow students to enact tolerance in the broader society. In interactions at 
the school, the surrounding society is simultaneously projected as a negative influence on 
youth and also one that will allow them to enact religious tolerance by virtue of their 
strong religious foundation. 
 The last section of the dissertation focuses more explicitly on how youth navigate 
the multiple and sometimes ambiguous normative frameworks they encounter and 
deliberate about in school. Chapter seven, “Wearing your moral character on the sleeve 
of your school uniform,” shows that deliberation does not take place exclusively on a 
discursive level, but can involve complex negotiations mediated through self-presentation 
and performance via school uniforms. I argue that the way students wear their uniforms is 
used to index inner moral state and has ramifications for perceptions of moral 
personhood. Within the chapter, I also explore the ways in which sameness and 
difference are mediated by the school uniform, which unites students as part of a 
perceived moral community, but can also differentiate them based on (Muslim/non-
Muslim) religious belonging.   
 Chapter eight, “Christian-Muslim Relationships: Navigating the Ethics of 
Boundaries,” presents an analysis of the ambiguity shaping orientation toward religious 
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difference on multiple levels, through the lens of inter-religious marriage. Manadonese 
youth face a complex conjunction of normativities, with ambiguities on many levels as 
they consider possibilities of inter-religious friendship, dating, and marriage. There is a 
strong tension between a Manadonese identity as pluralistic on the one hand, and the fear 
of religious mixing, contamination, or conversion via intermarriage on the other hand. In 
this context, schools, religious organizations, and the government provide mixed 
messages about the need to accept differences in a framework that remains premised on 
the importance and recognition of religious boundaries.  
 Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the ramifications of the dissertation findings 
for an understanding of ethics, modes of subjectivity, and pedagogical processes, 
revisiting the theoretical points of the introduction in light of ethnographic evidence 
provided throughout the dissertation. In addition, I consider how the dissertation sheds 
light on the linking of interpersonal ethical deliberation to the emergence of a public 
ethical culture.  
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CHAPTER 2: SCALING PLURAL COEXISTENCE:  
WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO REMAIN BROTHERS? 
  
 The majority-Protestant province of North Sulawesi, with its popular motto “We 
are all brothers” (Manado: Torang Samua Basudara), is often praised as a model of 
plural coexistence for Indonesia. In 2017, the province’s capital city of Manado was 
named the most tolerant city in Indonesia according to the Setara Institute for Democracy 
and Peace. Manado’s reputation as an exemplar of coexistence is related to the ability of 
the city to remain peaceful even as conflict broke out in other regions during Indonesia’s 
process of democratization and decentralization that started with the Reformasi 
movement in 1998.  
 In the early 2000s, nearby Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and North Maluku became 
embroiled in ethno-religious conflicts, and significant numbers of Christian and Muslim 
refugees fled to Manado (Duncan 2005). Tensions ran high and many feared that conflict 
would spread to majority-Protestant North Sulawesi. The ability of the region to 
ultimately remain peaceful during such a turbulent time, made possible through the 
proactive attitude of the local government and their cooperation with police and 
community and religious leaders (Panggabean 2017), was an important affirmation of 
coexistence across ethnic and religious lines. This historical trajectory has played a role 
in shaping current public debates about issues of religious plurality in Manado, but the 
social and political situation remains dynamic, and maintaining coexistence requires 
continuous work.  
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Project Background 
 The research for this chapter was undertaken as part of a larger joint project on 
“Scaling-Up Pluralism” (Bagir and Hefner, forthcoming) part of the Contending 
Modernities program at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the 
University of Notre Dame. The project brought together field researchers at several sites 
in Indonesia (Ambon, Yogyakarta, Tasikmalaya, and Manado) to investigate the varying 
approaches toward coexistence in a highly plural society. Here I seek to contextualize the 
research for the chapter and provide a background on the terms and methodology, which 
originate from the joint project.  
 To approach the main questions of the research project, researchers began with 
social mapping to locate and become familiar with influential organizations and actors 
(both state and non-state), and “ethico-religious communities” at our respective field 
sites. We then selected particular focal incidents, events that brought up major debates 
regarding plurality and citizenship, to understand how these influential actors engage in 
public reasoning to justify their positioning. In particular, we focused on the normative 
frames that they employed in public reasoning and in practice in order to locate the terms 
and limits of coexistence. Finally, we considered the influence of varying streams of 
plural coexistence by exploring potential avenues for scaling up these various 
frameworks. For example, in my own research I approach civic education as a significant 
avenue for scaling models of coexistence.  
 In this chapter, I focus on the normative work that is being done by various 
organizations, actors, state officials, ethico-religious communities, and educational 
  
41 
institutions relevant to religious plurality in Manado. By paying specific attention to the 
kinds of “public reasoning” (Bagir and Hefner, forthcoming.; Bowen 2010) these various 
actors are engaged in and the potential mechanisms of scaling they use to communicate 
their positioning on issues that are relevant to coexistence, I locate the contested frames 
of plurality and citizenship. In Manado, North Sulawesi, a public discourse of religious 
harmony has become normative to the extent that actors with highly varied agendas 
invariably invoke the discourse and indicate their praise of and general agreement with 
the principle. Rather than signaling a general consensus about how to enact religious 
coexistence, the different uses of this discourse and the stances that accompany it actually 
reflect varied and contested responses to the question of how to live together in religious 
difference. A closer examination of several focal incidents and their local impact on ideas 
about plurality and lived citizenship will serve to outline the various normative frames 
that are being applied by different social actors, the ethical currents they are drawing on, 
and how different interpretations of the discourse are scaled up. 
 In the dissertation as a whole, I am concerned with the role of educational 
institutions in providing normative frames for living in plurality. In order to assess how 
they articulate within the broader community and to what extent they are contiguous with 
the public sphere, it is important to first provide a social mapping of organizations and 
the kind of public reasoning taking place in Manado. In later chapters, as I discuss 
schools as arenas for debate about the conditions of religious plurality and citizenship in 
the region, the major themes from this examination of focal incidents and broad debates 
in contemporary Manado re-emerge. The analysis demonstrates the ways in which 
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particular discourses about plurality have been mobilized within educational institutions, 
while others have failed to move farther downstream. 
 The ongoing public debates in Manado demonstrate the varied approaches to 
managing plurality in a context where a discourse of commitment to religious harmony is 
required for legitimacy in the public sphere. Manado is building up an identity focused 
both on being a majority-Christian city and a place of religious harmony and tolerance. In 
some interpretations of this vision for the city, clear societal limits of inclusivity and 
tolerance have become apparent. Some organizations and individuals who appeal to 
religious pluralism do so under the assumption that the province will remain majority-
Protestant, with a broad Christian influence in the public sphere. Focal incidents that 
triggered significant discussion about living in religious plurality occurred when the 
future status of Christians as a dominant majority in the province or the rights of 
Christians in other areas of Indonesia were perceived to be threatened.  
 I begin the chapter with an introduction to major institutions and organizations in 
Manado. Then, I analyze these ethico-religious communities and the public reasoning 
they engage in about religious diversity through the discussion of several focal incidents. 
These incidents include responses to national cases where houses of worship in other 
provinces were destroyed: a mosque burning in Papua in July 2015 and a church burning 
in Aceh in October 2015. I also include discussion of a local focal incident in Manado 
beginning in 2015 over plans to build a religious theme park in the city to enshrine its 
commitment to religious harmony, and how the future of a local mosque ended up at the 
center of the debate. Then, I consider the mechanisms of scaling to understand the 
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avenues used by institutions and organizations to make their normative work public. 
Finally, I consider the major issues that come through in these public debates and contrast 
the approach of Minahasan (the majority ethnic group in North Sulawesi) traditional 
organizations and women’s organizations in the principles they appeal to and the avenues 
they use to scale up their positions on living in religious difference. 
 
Mapping Ethico-Religious Communities in Manado 
 Manado is a coastal city and the provincial capital of North Sulawesi. As of 2014, 
the population of Manado was 423,257 (BPS Kota Manado 2014). The city is known for 
being both religiously and ethnically diverse. According to the 2010 census, 62.6% of the 
city’s inhabitants are Protestant, belonging to various denominations discussed below. 
Muslims make up 31.5% of the city’s population, and Catholics account for 5.1%. The 
rest of the city’s population is Buddhist (0.5%), Hindu (0.2%), and Confucian (0.1%) 
(BPS Kota Manado 2010). Ethnically, the majority of Manado’s inhabitants are 
Minahasan (which comprises several sub-ethnic groups). Other ethnic groups represented 
in Manado include Sangir-Talaud, Bolaang-Mongondow, Gorontalo, Chinese, Bugis, 
Ternate, Maluku, Batak, and Javanese (Pomalingo 2004:58). Ethnic Minahasans are 
generally assumed to be Christian, although ethnic and religious identifications do not 
always neatly overlap, and the conjunction of ethnic and religious identities is 
significantly more complex and often contested. 
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Figure 1: Partial Map of Indonesia, with the Island of Sulawesi and City of Manado 
 
Inter-Religious Organizations 
 In Manado, there are branches of two major organizations for inter-religious 
dialogue that mediate between religious communities and the government in North 
Sulawesi. While the existence of these institutions certainly does not guarantee inter-
religious tolerance, it does provide institutional support for inter-religious communication 
about social issues. In general, the organizations take a highly proactive approach, calling 
meetings in the face of any event (local or national) which could potentially motivate 
religious conflict.  
 One major organization that is specific to North Sulawesi and often cited as a 
contributor to the peaceful situation of the province is the Committee for Inter-Religious 
Cooperation (BKSAUA- Badan Kerja Sama Antar Umat Beragama). In 1969, North 
Sulawesi Governor H.V. Worang founded the BKSAUA as an independent body to act as 
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his advisor on religious and social issues (Pomalingo 2004:64). The history of the 
BKSAUA is significant because it was a locally driven initiative that predates similar 
national inter-religious initiatives. The organization includes representatives from five 
official religions (Protestantism, Islam, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism) and 
exists from the provincial to the village level, connecting a network of influential and 
well-respected religious figures. In 2000, the BKSAUA was awarded the status of an 
official advisory board for the governor (Swazey 2013:115). 
 The BKSAUA currently exists alongside the Inter-Religious Harmony Forum 
(FKUB- Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama), a semi-official governmental inter-
religious body that was created in each province of Indonesia as a result of Joint 
Ministerial Decisions from the Minister of Religion and Minister of Home Affairs in 
2006. In North Sulawesi, the FKUB exists on the provincial and the city/district 
(kabupaten) levels, compared to the BKSAUA which also has representatives at the sub-
district (kecamatan) and village (desa) levels. The FKUB allocates representatives based 
on the proportion of religious followers in the population, and includes representatives 
from the Confucian religion. As discussed below, the FKUB is also required to give its 
recommendation to the local government on the allocation of building permits for houses 
of worship.  
 Both the FKUB and BKSAUA currently act as mediators between the 
government and religious communities in Manado. They are geared toward mediating 
social issues, rather than engaging in theologically driven dialogue. When local or 
national issues have the potential to incite conflict, representatives make official 
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statements reminding the public and their particular congregations not to be provoked by 
these issues and to allow legal action to be carried out by the proper authorities. 
 
Figure 2: The Governor of North Sulawesi Addresses FKUB Inductees in 2016 
 
Religious Communities and Organizations 
 The Christian Evangelical Church in Minahasa (GMIM- Gereja Masehi Injili di 
Minahasa) is the largest Protestant denomination in North Sulawesi, and in 2015 claimed 
791,807 members in its area of ministry (GMIM 2017).9 GMIM was founded as an 
indigenous Protestant denomination in 1934 as the synod gained independence from the 
Dutch controlled Indische Kerk, Protestant Church in the Dutch East Indies (de Jonge, 
Parengkuan, and Steenbrink 2008). GMIM, a member of the national ecumenical 
organization of the Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI- Persekutuan Gereja-
gereja di Indonesia), is active in the social and educational sectors and politically 
influential in Manado and North Sulawesi. The private Christian university UKIT 
                                               
9 GMIM’s area of ministry includes three cities (Manado, Tomohon, Bitung) and four regencies 
(Minahasa, North Minahasa, South Minahasa, and Southeast Minahasa).  
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(Universitas Kristen Indonesia-Tomohon), is affiliated with GMIM and trains pastors and 
religious-education teachers, but it also has several other faculties and fields of study.   
 Because of its size, influence, and significance in the community, representatives 
from the GMIM church are active in inter-religious organizations. In the year 2015, 
GMIM pastors held the position of chairman in both the BKSAUA and the FKUB. 
Several religious leaders I spoke with noted that this seems to be an implicit rule or 
pattern that is expected in a majority Christian area where GMIM is the largest 
denomination. Despite this involvement, GMIM pastors who are active in inter-religious 
dialogue expressed concern that as a whole, the church is becoming increasingly 
isolationist and less active in ecumenical and inter-religious dialogues. GMIM pastors are 
active not only through the church, but also visible in the political sphere, and are 
involved in both women’s organizations and mass organizations which embrace varying 
normative frames on the question of how to live in a religiously plural society.  
 In addition to the other indigenous Protestant denomination in North Sulawesi, the 
Union of Minahasan Protestant Churches (KGPM- Kerapatan Gereja Protestan 
Minahasa), there are also numerous Pentecostal and Evangelical denominations active in 
Manado. These include the Pentecostal Church in Indonesia (GPdI- Gereja Pantekosta di 
Indonesia), Indonesia Bethel Church (GBI- Gereja Bethel Indonesia), and the Assembly 
of God Church (GSJA- Gereja Sidang Jemaat Allah), among others. Many of these 
denominations have seminaries or religious institutions of higher education to train 
pastors and/or religious education teachers in North Sulawesi. The Seventh Day 
Adventist Church (Gereja Masehi Advent Hari Ketujuh) also has significant membership 
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in Manado, and Universitas Klabat, an Adventist university, is located in North Sulawesi. 
In Manado, there is also a state-run Christian institute of higher education (STAKN- 
Sekolah Tinggi Agama Kristen Negeri) with students and professors from various 
Protestant denominations. Participation in the FKUB and BKSAUA is one way in which 
representatives from some of these Pentecostal and Evangelical denominations have been 
involved in strengthening ecumenical and inter-religious relationships in North Sulawesi 
(Tahun 2014:166).  
 The bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Manado, as part of the ecclesiastical 
structure of the church, is a member of the national Conference of Indonesian Bishops 
(KWI- Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia). The KWI has formed the Commission on 
Inter-Religious and Inter-Faith Relations (Komisi HAK- Komisi Hubungan antar Agama 
dan Kepercayaan), which also exists at the diocesan level. The Komisi HAK of the 
Diocese of Manado is involved in locating and training potential Catholic representatives 
for inter-religious organizations like the BKSAUA and FKUB. Several highly regarded 
Catholic schools are located in Manado, attended not only by Catholics but also by 
Protestants and students from other religious backgrounds, in part due to the prestige and 
quality of the institutions, as has been the case historically in the region (Steenbrink 
2007:273).  
 Islamic institutions in Manado include local branches of the largest religious 
associations in Indonesia (and in the world), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. 
Local figures from both organizations are active in the city and provincial level FKUB 
and BKSAUA, and also in the local branch of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI- 
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Majelis Ulama Indonesia). Other active Islamic organizations present in Manado are 
Sarekat Islam, Mathla’ul Anwar, and youth associations such as the Muslim Students’ 
Association (HMI- Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) and Islamic Youth Movement (GPI- 
Gerakan Pemuda Islam). The state-run Islamic institute of higher education in Manado 
(IAIN- Institut Agama Islam Negeri) provides education in several different faculties, 
including in religious training, education, and economics. In Manado, Muhammadiyah 
runs a training institute and degree program for health professionals (STIKES- Sekolah 
Tinggi Ilmu Kesehatan Muhammadiyah). Many Islamic organizations in Manado, 
especially NU and its sub-organizations, have been involved in promoting discussion 
about the relationship between Islam, national values and principles, and the promotion 
of social harmony in a plural society. 
 
Minahasan “Adat” Organizations 
 Many groups that have been visible and vocal in the public sphere on the question 
of religious coexistence are relatively new Minahasan organizations labeling themselves 
as adat organizations. Derived from Arabic, adat is a term used throughout Indonesia to 
refer to “customs” or “traditions,” typically of particular ethnic groups. In contemporary 
Minahasa, many traditional adat rituals are opposed by the mainstream GMIM Church as 
deviant practices. Rituals, which may be performed for a variety of reasons, involve a 
ritual leader (tona’as) mediating between the human and ancestor world, who must 
become possessed by the ancestor spirit(s) (opo). The tona’as needs an assistant, because 
the spirits speak through him/her in their own language which needs identification a nd 
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interpretation. Some argue that these rituals do not conflict with a Christian worldview 
because of their worship to a supreme God, Opo Empung Walian.  
 The proliferation of these organizations in Manado and North Sulawesi beginning 
with the Reformasi era can be understood in part as related to the general national trend 
of “adat revivalism” during this same period (Henley and Davidson 2008). Many adat 
organizations in Manado were initially formed as paramilitary organizations in the early 
2000s when there was significant fear that inter-religious conflicts in nearby provinces 
could spread to the region. In particular, concern that radical Muslim organizations, such 
as Laskar Jihad or Abu Sayaaf, might infiltrate the region and incite violence was one 
major factor that triggered the formation of local militias (Jacobsen 2004:84).10 Many of 
the organizations formed at that time have since disbanded. But many new ones have also 
been created, and those still existing have rebranded themselves in the context of the adat 
movement (Swazey 2013:174). Several promote a Minahasan identity strongly 
intertwined with Christianity, though none currently have official affiliations with 
Christian churches or denominations. 
 Brigade Manguni was formed in 2002 as a regional organization that some have 
labeled as a paramilitary group or a Christian militia.11 Since its establishment, it has 
undergone organizational changes that have included the development of a quasi-national 
structure, Brigade Manguni Indonesia (BMI). BMI now exists in several provinces of 
Indonesia and touts nationalist goals; its membership now is also not restricted by 
                                               
10 Laskar Jihad is a Muslim militia based in Java whose members mobilized and became involved 
in the communal Christian-Muslim conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi and in Maluku province 
(Sidel 2006). Abu Sayyaf is a Muslim separatist group in the Southern Philippines (Duncan 2005).  
11 Manguni is the Minahasan word for “owl,” a sacred bird in Minahasan tradition. 
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religion, though it is unclear how many members are actually non-Christian (Swazey 
2013:174). It is also considered an adat organization, and some of the members do 
perform traditional Minahasan rituals. Another organization formed in 2002 that still 
exists and has rebranded itself through the frame of adat is Milisi Waraney, which 
restricts itself to Christian members.12 The group’s logo features a Minahasan owl 
superimposed on a Star of David and a cross, providing a visually symbolic linkage of 
Minahasan identity and Christianity. 
 
Figure 3: A Milisi Waraney Banner outside the Secretariat Office 
 
 Many other groups formed in the early 2000s have dissolved or no longer exist, 
while other new organizations continue to be formed or fracture. In early 2016, Laskar 
Adat Manguni Indonesia (LAMI) formed as a splinter group from BMI. Aliansi 
Makapetor was formed in 2015 as an alliance drawing together members from other 
major adat organizations, and has been quite vocal in local politics.13 Membership in all 
                                               
12 Waraney is a Minahasan term referring to a warrior, or “someone elected in the Minahasan 
cultural order to guard or protect” (Tambayong 2007:359) 
13 Makapetor serves as an acronym for Masyarakat Kawanua yang Peduli Toleransi (Minahasans 
Who Care about Tolerance) 
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of these groups is both fluid and variable in number. Individuals may take part in 
activities of multiple adat organizations, but might not be officially registered as a 
member in any.  
 The nationalist frames employed by adat organizations in public debates about 
plurality and citizenship typically focus on Indonesia’s national ideology, Pancasila, or 
principles of religious freedom. However, in many cases their discourse and actions also 
reinforce the linkage between Minahasan adat and Christianity, sometimes conflating 
ethnic and religious identity. Both adat and Christianity as normative frames are central 
in the ways in which social actors respond to focal incidents leading to public discussion 
about the limits of tolerance in religiously plural Manado. 
 
National Focal Incidents: Houses of Worship 
 Houses of worship are often the focal point of practical public discussions about 
managing religious plurality and preventing conflict in Indonesia, and cases can quickly 
achieve a national profile due to their sensitive nature. In 2006, Joint Ministerial 
Decisions from the Minister of Religion and Minister of Home Affairs provided new 
regulations for building houses of worship. These new requirements were presented as a 
reform to the previous 1969 regulations, which had been opposed by Catholics and 
Protestants as discriminatory due to practical difficulties they faced in establishing 
churches in majority-Muslim areas (Crouch 2014:25). In addition to requiring approval 
from the local government and the district representatives of the FKUB (whose creation 
was mandated through the same Ministerial Decisions), the 2006 law requires signatures 
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from at least 90 congregation members and 60 surrounding community members who 
support the establishment of the place of worship.  
 In practice, these requirements introduce significant difficulties in establishing 
houses of worship for religious groups who are local minorities (Lindsey 2012:55). When 
religious tensions rise, accusations about the existence or validity of building permits for 
houses of worship, especially churches, have been a strategy for hardliners to mobilize 
support and threaten minority religious groups. Following the transition to democracy, 
inter-religious disputes, including over houses of worship, have become increasingly 
judicialized (Crouch 2014:171), rendering them more visible and susceptible to becoming 
national-level issues.  
 Here, I compare the local response in Manado to two major national focal 
incidents regarding the destruction of houses of worship: the burning of a mosque in 
Tolikara, Papua in July 2015 and the burning of a church (and closing of several others) 
in Aceh Singkil in October 2015. Both of these incidents occurred in relatively remote 
areas of the Indonesian archipelago, but quickly escalated to national level news. 
Although tensions over houses of worship are relatively common, the actual destruction 
of houses of worship is less common. While the Tolikara case was not discussed among 
the broader public beyond a few localized dialogues and public statements made by 
Islamic organizations in Manado, the church burning and closings led to significant 
public outrage and demonstrations that made use of a nationalist frame and appealed to 
the values of religious freedom and anti-discrimination. Public leaders and inter-religious 
organizations became involved, imploring the people of North Sulawesi not to become 
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provoked by the burning of the church in a distant province, as it would only endanger 
local religious harmony. In contrast, Minahasan adat organizations highlighted the 
position of Christians as a national minority, with some groups going so far as to also 
leverage their position as a local majority to implicitly but publicly threaten local 
mosques. The way in which these actors shifted between regional and national frames is 
key to understanding how adat-based groups were able to become so audible and 
maximize their presence in the public sphere. 
 
Manado’s Response to the Tolikara Mosque Burning 
 On July 17, 2015, the day of the Muslim Eid al-Fitr holiday, a dispute broke out 
between residents of Tolikara, Papua, as Muslims gathered for prayer in the field of a 
local military command center, worshipping using loudspeakers, (IPAC 2016:9–10). The 
local Protestant denomination Gereja Injili di Indonesia (GIDI) in Tolikara had circulated 
a letter on July 11th forbidding public celebration of the end of the fasting month and 
forbidding women from wearing headscarves in public during the church’s own youth 
revival conference at that time (IPAC 2016). GIDI youth reportedly threw rocks at the 
worshippers, and the police responded by firing warning shots. While the remaining 
sequence of events is disputed, an unidentified shooter fired a second round of shots that 
left twelve GIDI youth wounded, one of whom later died. A group of GIDI members 
subsequently set fire to nearby kiosks and the local mosque (IPAC 2016:10–11).14 News 
                                               
14 It remains unclear whether or not the building had the legal status of a musholla (a prayer 
room) or a masjid (mosque). The IPAC report contains a more detailed discussion of a history of 
GIDI attempts to prohibit houses of worship from other Christian denominations or religions 
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of the incident spread rapidly on social media platforms, and through various national 
media outlets. The national government appeared to respond quickly to condemn and try 
to contain the event, and the Ministry of Religion quickly assembled a team to send to 
Papua to investigate the conflict.  
 There was little audible response to the Tolikara mosque burning from the 
government, religious communities, and other social actors in Manado. The head of the 
North Sulawesi provincial branch of the national Islamic organization Mathla’ul Anwar 
released a statement to local press condemning the incident, encouraging the government 
and police to take action against those responsible and asking Muslims not to be 
provoked. Similarly, the provincial leader of a national Islamic organization for youth, 
BKPRMI (Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Remaja Masjid Indonesia) condemned the 
incident, asked the government to take action, and gave a reminder that the constitution 
guarantees freedom of worship.  
 Following the incident, the mayor of Manado, Vicky Lumentut, promptly met in 
private with several religious leaders and urged them to take steps so that their 
congregations would not respond to the incident in such a way that might incite a local 
religious conflict. The meeting was not publicized and did not lead to any official public 
statements from the provincial or city government, or from the provincial FKUB or the 
BKSAUA. In other words, there was little public response to the event from the 
government and religious communities in Manado, though there were certainly steps 
taken by political and religious leaders, organizations, and communities to discourage 
                                                                                                                                            
from being built in Tolikara, and objections to the building being referred to as a mosque (IPAC 
2016:7) 
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provocation. National religious organizations with local branches or members in North 
Sulawesi, including the Muslim organization NU and the Protestant PGI, gave official 
statements condemning the events in Tolikara and calling for official investigation and a 
peaceful resolution. 
 By itself, the mosque incident hardly constitutes a “focal” one, as there was little 
public response in Manado, and it did not trigger public debates about living together in 
religious plurality. If anything, the public statements about the event localized it as a 
Papuan separatist issue in which religious communities in Manado need not become 
involved. However, the lack of response becomes much more significant when compared 
to the local reaction to the burning of a church in the province of Aceh several months 
later, which brought up serious questions and challenges for managing religious diversity 
on a local and national level. 
 
Manado’s Response to the Aceh Singkil Church Burning 
 On October 6, 2015, demonstrators in Aceh Singkil Regency from the Islamic 
youth organization PPI (Pemuda Peduli Islam) renewed protests against the existence of 
nineteen churches and chapels without proper building permits.15 The protesters gave 
local government officials an ultimatum to take action and demolish the churches, or the 
protesters would tear down the churches themselves (Kamal 2016:130). The local 
government signed an agreement on October 12, 2015, committing to tear down ten of 
the nineteen churches without proper permits starting on October 19th (US Bureau of 
                                               
15 As in the previous case, there is disagreement about the legal status of the buildings as either 
churches (gereja) or chapels (undung) (Kamal 2016:127–29).  
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Democracy 2015). Despite this promise from local officials, protesters still gathered on 
October 13, 2015, armed with bamboo spears, knives, and Molotov cocktails, and 
proceeded to set fire to one of the churches slated for demolition. Police and military 
personnel formed a blockade as protesters attempted but did not succeed in advancing 
toward a second church guarded by local villagers (Kamal 2016:135). A group of more 
than 4,000 Protestants and Catholics temporarily fled the regency in the aftermath of the 
incident (Amnesty International 2016). 
  News of the church’s destruction spread quickly across Indonesia. On a national 
scale, President Joko Widodo, Muslim religious leaders from the mainstream Islamic 
organizations Muhammadiyah and NU, Christian religious leaders, and various civil 
society organizations issued public statements condemning the incident (US Bureau of 
Democracy 2015). Despite these condemnations, the local government in Aceh Singkil 
ultimately continued with its controversial plans to close and tear down the remaining 
churches (Kamal 2016:139). In contrast with Tolikara, the incident in Aceh sparked 
strong reactions from groups and individuals in Manado, and led to public debates about 
the limits of religious coexistence in North Sulawesi. 
 Nearly one week after the incident, the interim Governor of North Sulawesi, Soni 
Sumarsono, met with BKSAUA representatives. On the same day, the representatives 
publicly released a statement requesting cooperation from religious communities in the 
province to continue strengthening the religious harmony of North Sulawesi and not to 
become divided by groups that attempt to divide or break it. Sumarsono, who is Javanese, 
publicly expressed his concern as a Muslim and as the interim governor of the province 
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about the potential of the incident to destabilize Indonesia. He addressed the church 
burning and closings in Aceh in conjunction with the Tolikara incident, asking the people 
of North Sulawesi not to let anyone threaten religious harmony in the province. 
 BKSAUA representatives also met with the provincial FKUB and released a 
message stressing the importance of protecting North Sulawesi from the potential spread 
of conflict, asking the people of North Sulawesi to avoid provocation and preserve 
religious harmony for the sake of national unity. The response of the FKUB and 
BKSAUA was more an attempt to manage the local situation and to discourage any 
negative reactions than a response to the incident itself.  
 The local press reported on the official meetings and statements made by 
politicians and the FKUB and BKSAUA, but the coverage given to them was minimal 
compared to coverage given to local protests led by Minahasan adat organizations. On the 
same day the Governor met with the BKSAUA, hundreds of protesters from a loose 
alliance of adat organizations gathered at the North Sulawesi Governor’s office and the 
regional parliament building to protest the church burning in Aceh and the government’s 
lack of response. The protesters came from a range of Minahasan adat organizations, 
including Aliansi Makapetor, Brigade Manguni Indonesia, Milisi Waraney, and Waraney 
Puser in Tana. Dressed in red and black, they conducted a motorcycle procession around 
the area, waving their organizations’ flags and shouting the Minahasan war cry “I Yayat 
U Santi!” (literally, “Lift up your sword!”).  
 Aliansi Makapetor had posted photos of their members at the provincial police 
office to gain permission for their protest the day before the demonstration. The 
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commentary of the post relates to national religious harmony: “Together, let’s condemn 
the actions that have occurred in the archipelago; let’s guard Pancasila and the 
Constitution as the foundation of inter-religious harmony in the Republic of Indonesia.” 
Rather than focusing on the need to preserve local religious harmony, however, a national 
frame was used throughout the protest to draw attention to the situation of Christians as a 
national minority in Indonesia and to call for action. During the protest, the organizations 
also leveraged their position as a local religious majority as they threatened to close any 
local houses of worship without proper building permits, a threat implicitly understood as 
directed at local mosques. After the demonstration, Aliansi Makapetor summarized its 
position on its Facebook page: “Minahasa rejects discrimination. If in Aceh, churches are 
destroyed because they don’t have a building permit then we will do the same in 
Minahasa!! Minahasans will close all houses of worship that don’t have a building 
permit.”  
 The demonstrators shifted the normative frame by using the argument of national 
unity to advocate for Christians as a national minority, leveraging their position as a 
regional majority to take action. This response clearly differs from the inter-religious 
bodies that appealed to nationalist principles and religious harmony to deter the spread of 
conflict and its potential provocation rather than focusing on addressing the incident 
itself. In addition to threatening to take matters into their own hands, Minahasan adat 
organizations also asked the provincial government to make a statement and take an 
active role in rejecting discrimination against minorities in Indonesia. The organizations 
were seeking some form of justice in making sure that the government would attempt to 
  
60 
investigate the situation and condemn the perpetrators as they had for the Tolikara 
incident. One group, Waraney Puser In Tana, gave statements echoing those of Aliansi 
Makapetor, calling for an end to discrimination against minorities, and an end to 
discrimination against Christians in building houses of worship and gathering to worship.  
 While the protesters used nationalist reasoning in attempt to underscore their own 
alignment with national values, they also appeared to question the commitment of 
Muslims to these national values by arguing that Muslims are not being active enough in 
condemning the destruction of Christian churches. The demonstrators were received by 
two members of the regional parliament who reminded them not to be provoked by the 
incident in Aceh and stated that proper legal action from the government and police must 
be taken against those involved in the church burning. Otherwise, there was no direct 
public response from politicians or other organizations to this mass protest. On this point, 
it is important to note that a lack of response from politicians is not exclusively because 
of the organizations’ appeals to nationalist ideals, but also because of the unofficial 
patronage that many of them enjoy from local politicians. Ultimately, the adat 
organizations did not ultimately conduct the “sweeping” of (Muslim) houses of worship 
to check building permits that they had previously threatened.  
 In both of these national focal incidents, it was the local religious minority whose 
house of worship was destroyed. However, in responding only to the church burning and 
reacting to discrimination against Christians (framed as a national minority), groups 
publicly threatened the houses of worship of the local Muslim minority in Manado, 
without any audible public response or rejection of their argumentation. The chairman of 
  
61 
Milisi Waraney, an adat organization that limits membership to Christians, later 
explained that protest was about ensuring that legal action would be taken against those 
who were responsible, just as it had in the Tolikara case. Framing their protests in terms 
of seeking justice based on national principles, these groups demonstrated in such a way 
that was ultimately threatening to local religious coexistence, going against the appeals of 
the BKSAUA and the interim governor, but received no clear public response to their 
actions. 
 Following the incident, there were also additional demonstrations, such as the one 
from GMIM youth, who called for the national government to revoke the 2006 
Ministerial Decisions regarding the building of houses of worship, and to rebuild the 
destroyed church. Such protests were on a smaller scale and did not receive significant 
media attention compared to those of the adat organizations. Another response, which 
came from university students who were already active in promoting interfaith initiatives, 
was an inter-religious dialogue among university students to discuss the local impact of 
the incident. The dialogue, which brought together approximately 25 participants, took 
place before the major demonstrations at the Governor’s office in Manado. At this 
particular event, students and the invited speakers often coupled the Tolikara and Aceh 
Singkil cases together, seeing both cases as proof of a larger systemic problem of 
growing religious intolerance in Indonesia. During the dialogue, the students struggled to 
come up with an action plan to combat growing religious intolerance in Indonesia. 
Although activism was encouraged, and an invited speaker called on all of the 
participants to be “provocateurs for peace,” the main call for action was for the 
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participants to continue taking part in inter-religious dialogues and to invite friends to 
join. 
 One of the thematic foci of this dissertation is the process of sociocultural scaling, 
or the normative and organizational mechanisms various groups utilize to advance their 
ethico-political positions and the kinds of social resonances and consequences these 
might have. In this particular debate, adat organizations were extremely visible and vocal, 
advancing their views in local news reports and actively sharing their views and actions 
on social media. By this measure, it is clear that the demonstrators were much more 
effective in having their voices heard than the university students participating in inter-
religious dialogue in their event covered by one local media outlet. The BKSAUA and 
FKUB gave public statements calling on the people of North Sulawesi to remain calm 
and not be provoked, but they also engaged in less visible but significant scaling through 
collaboration with religious leaders and communities in Manado to communicate this 
message to their congregations. 
 After the church burning incident in Aceh, social media were an important avenue 
for people in Manado to seek information. At the inter-religious dialogue, several 
university students expressed concern about the incendiary posts they had seen on social 
media in the event’s aftermath. While the public events and statements employed a 
mostly nationalist frame and emphasized the rights of citizens and religious minorities, 
many Facebook posts took a more sectarian tone. Criticism of the central government for 
its slow response to this incident was also widespread in social media and was contrasted 
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with the government response to Tolikara, portrayed as a quick and concerted effort to 
serve justice and punish the perpetrators.  
 
Local Focal Incident: A Religious Theme Park 
 An incident regarding a local house of worship in Manado has also become the 
center of a public debate about living in plurality. Al-Khairiyah mosque in Manado was 
thrust into the spotlight in early 2015 after Mayor Lumentut indicated he would continue 
with long held plans to build a religious theme park on government-owned land to 
celebrate the religious harmony of Manado, on a site where the mosque also stands.16 The 
religious theme park, an intended tourist site, was planned to include miniature houses of 
worship for the six official religions in Indonesia, although there was significant 
confusion as to whether they would be built around the already existing mosque or 
whether the mosque would require rebuilding (possibly in smaller dimensions). While the 
mayor had moved forward with the project in 2012 with the request for the required 
permits, the project had stalled since then, apparently due to competing claims over the 
land from the mosque officials. In early 2015, tensions rose again over allegations that 
the mosque had expanded in a way that was inconsistent with the plans for the theme 
park, and without the proper permits. The escalation of these debates, detailed below, is 
turning into a test of the multiculturalism that Manadonese claim as part of their vision 
for the city, and that, ironically, the theme park is meant to enshrine. While the BKSAUA 
                                               
16 Because the religious theme park issue is still unresolved at the time of writing, there are still 
many competing narratives about the history of the mosque and the religious theme park project.  
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and FKUB have been heavily involved in the search for a peaceful solution, the issue 
remains unsettled as of August 2018.  
 One religious theme park already exists in North Sulawesi: the Hill of Love (Bukit 
Kasih) monument in Minahasa Regency, with five miniature houses of worship built on 
the side of a volcano in 2002 as a government project undertaken by North Sulawesi 
Governor A.J. Sondakh. The theme park was part of the agenda for the “Year of Love,” 
declared by the government with support from the GMIM Church upon recommendation 
from JAJAK (Jaringan Kerja Kasih). The JAJAK was a network of journalists in 
Manado (with the support and participation of Muslim and Christian religious 
organizations) advocating for peace as surrounding provinces in eastern Indonesia were 
experiencing violent conflicts (Thufail 2012:364).  
 The sentiment behind these types of religious theme parks remains popular in its 
public affirmation of what most people in Manado see as an integral part of their identity: 
peace, “a norm believed by the activists of Minahasan culture to have lasted for centuries 
and constitute the core value of Minahasan identity and subjectivity” (Thufail 2012:366). 
Bukit Kasih theme park is currently in a state of disrepair and is no longer a popular place 
of recreation. But proud residents of North Sulawesi still cite the park as physical proof 
of the province’s peaceful situation, with houses of worship sitting side by side. 
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Figure 4: Bukit Kasih in Kawangkoan, North Sulawesi 
 The location for the new planned religious theme park is near the center of 
Manado in an area formerly known as Kampung Texas. In 2007, Mayor Jimmy Rimba 
Rogi began the project to “clean up” the area by evicting those who had settled on the 
government-owned land and tearing down the buildings in the area, with the exception of 
the mosque. This work was undertaken with plans for a religious theme park in mind, and 
the intention that other houses of worship would be built next to the mosque. Mayor 
Vicky Lumentut continued the project, and by 2012 the local government had applied for 
the land certificate for the area and necessary building permits. The project had slowed to 
a standstill for several years, until early 2015, when controversy emerged after the Al-
Khairiyah mosque was accused of expanding beyond the land allotment officially set 
forth for each house of worship in the plans for the religious theme park.  
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 A meeting between the mayor and representatives from the BKSAUA and FKUB 
on March 10th, 2015 produced a new plan that would make use of the existing mosque 
by turning its ground floor into a library for all religions and the top floor as a place of 
worship for Muslims. With the remaining land, they planned to build a multi-story tower 
and accord one floor to each religion, and one additional floor for the BKSAUA and 
FKUB.   
 By March 2015, the Minahasan adat organization, Aliansi Makapetor, had been 
organized largely in response to the Kampung Texas issue. On March 23, 2015, dozens of 
its members came to demonstrate at the regional parliament building in Manado, shouting 
“I Yayat U Santi!” (literally, “Lift up your sword!”) until they were received by 
parliamentary representatives. The organization called for the land to be used for its 
originally “intended function,” referring to the religious theme park, and for all 
construction of buildings without proper permits to stop, a clear reference to the mosque. 
The rally coordinator threatened that the group would take matters into its own hands and 
stop construction of any building without proper permits if the government did not take 
action. The group reassembled for a demonstration and traditional ritual on March 29, in 
the center of the city, though police prevented the group from advancing toward 
Kampung Texas. The city government intensified meetings with the BKSAUA and the 
provincial FKUB, as well as with important Islamic institutions, including the Manado 
MUI office; eventually the meetings culminated in the agreed plans to move forward with 
the multi-story religious tower.  
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 The city government held an official groundbreaking ceremony for the new tower 
on June 8, 2015, sparking renewed demonstrations from, Aliansi Makapetor. They called 
once more for realization of the original plans for a religious theme park and “destruction 
of the building that is not in accordance with the land allotment in ex-Kampung Texas,” 
referring implicitly to the mosque. By June 25, 2015, the mayor’s office had announced 
that it would stop construction on the religious tower, pending further discussion with the 
regional parliament and police.  
 From the standpoint of the BKSAUA and FKUB, the two major bodies involved 
in inter-religious dialogue and mediation, the handling of the Kampung Texas case in late 
2015 was seen as a success. The outcome was applauded as proof of these organizations’ 
ability to mediate between the government, local religious communities, and 
organizations like the Aliansi Makapetor. The head of MUI Manado cited the incident as 
a test of Manado’s religious harmony, but one that, as a result of their intense 
communication with and support from the government, they were able to mediate. The 
MUI became involved in discussions with government officials and the FKUB and 
BKSAUA to clarify the situation and find a reasonable solution. 
 However, the Kampung Texas debate flared up again as Aliansi Makapetor, 
working with LAMI and other adat organizations, organized a demonstration with 
hundreds of protestors on October 26, 2016. Members from the groups condemned the 
“illegal buildings” that were impeding progress on the religious theme park. However, 
the ambiguous reference to “illegal buildings” left the local media speculating over 
whether they were referring to Al Khairiyah mosque or the cafes that had started to pop 
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up on the perimeter of the land intended for the park. The sudden revival of the debate 
about the religious theme park was almost certainly influenced by national political 
events, in particular the accusations of blasphemy against Jakarta’s Christian and ethnic 
Chinese governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), and the sectarian religious and 
political displays that have followed. The connection between national and local events 
was publicly discussed at an event held by the provincial Lesbumi (a sub-organization of 
NU) on October 31, 2016 at which several invited speakers talked about regional tensions 
potentially related to Jakarta’s gubernatorial race, including Al Khairiyah mosque, and 
how the ethics of Pancasila can help to meet these challenges (Syafieq and Alawi 2016). 
 In November 2016, Mayor Lumentut held meetings to address issues related to 
the religious theme park with leaders of the mosque and officials from Manado’s 
Department of Religious Affairs, and later with the Governor of North Sulawesi. As the 
case’s national profile continued to rise, the Indonesian National Commission on Human 
Rights (Komnas HAM) came to Manado in November 2016 to meet with the mayor and 
representatives from several adat organizations in an attempt to work toward a consensus 
about the future of the intended religious theme park and Al Khairiyah mosque.  
 This case demonstrates the strong impact that the protests had on rejecting a 
decision that had been reached by the government in conjunction with the inter-religious 
bodies of the city, and the lack of public voices in response to the demonstrations. 
However, the perceived silence following the protests and demonstrations of the adat 
organizations reflects the refusal of religious organizations and leaders to engage in 
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public debate with these groups to avoid increasing tensions and upsetting the religious 
harmony of the city.  
 The case of the religious theme park in Manado aptly demonstrates the existence 
of a hegemonic normative frame that requires social actors to indicate their agreement 
with religious harmony as an important ideal in order to be taken seriously in the public 
sphere, even as the practical ends these groups pursue might in some ways challenge 
these dominant ethical norms. After the protests in June 2015, Aliansi Makapetor held a 
press conference in Manado, in which their leader Decky Joice Tumar attempted to 
clarify the goal of his organization. He claimed that far from trying to cause conflict or 
bringing up issues related to SARA, their organization is dedicated to protecting religious 
harmony in Manado from those who try to destabilize it.17 While the group was 
effectively calling for the dismantling of a mosque, the aim was not expressed directly, 
but by way of a more legalistic reference to “the building that is not in accordance with 
the religious theme park design.” Using this frame, they positioned themselves as the 
defenders of religious harmony struggling so that the religious theme park could be 
realized and, as they saw it, equal importance could be accorded to all religions. 
 Though the group’s name Makapetor, which stands for “Minahasans who care 
about Tolerance” highlights its official commitment to tolerance, the group’s strategy 
clearly also pushes a normative frame that represents threats to local tolerance as 
necessarily originating from “outside.” The group’s strong focus on Minahasan adat (and 
                                               
17 SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-golongan): Acronym referring to discrimination based on 
ethnicity, religion, race, or political affiliation  
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its assumed links to Christianity), also implicitly defines Islam as foreign to Manado. The 
fear that Manado and North Sulawesi are becoming increasingly Muslim is often invoked 
to encourage Christians to take action. The organization Aliansi Makapetor, like many 
others, has publicly voiced objections to North Sulawesi as a potential destination under 
the government’s transmigration program, which brings large numbers of indigent 
settlers from Java and other central Indonesian islands to less heavily populated territories 
like North Sulawesi. Many Christians, not only those belonging to more radical 
organizations, privately express their fear that a government transmigration program to 
North Sulawesi would mean the end of a Christian majority in the province. A clear limit 
to tolerance is often drawn when the future of Manado and North Sulawesi as a majority 
Christian place is potentially threatened. This kind of threat is not experienced only 
through the statistics of religious affiliation, but also through the use of public space for 
religious worship and expression.  
  
Scaling Models for Plurality: Inter-Religious Organizations  
 These focal incidents have provided a window to the varied positions groups have 
taken in public debate regarding how to live in a religiously plural society. In addition to 
the positioning and public reasoning of these actors, it is necessary to evaluate the 
mechanisms of scaling of these normative frames.  
 The FKUB and BKSAUA are charged with promoting inter-religious dialogue, 
mediating between religious communities and the government, and helping prevent 
conflict in North Sulawesi. These organizations have a strong potential for scaling 
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frameworks on how to live in a plural society and are in a position to mediate between 
state and society on such issues. The local and national focal incidents discussed above 
all launched the FKUB and BKSAUA into discussions and dialogue with the local and 
provincial government. Representatives from both bodies stress the importance of their 
roles in communicating information to their religious communities, especially to 
discourage their congregations from becoming provoked by local, national, and 
international events that could raise inter-religious tensions.  
 Critics of the two inter-religious organizations claim that their actions are merely 
symbolic and ceremonial, lacking substance. Another general concern about the 
effectiveness of these bodies is the dominance of the GMIM Protestant Church, not only 
in the strong influence it has within these organizations, but also in its ability to work 
around them through close connections with local and provincial government officials. 
While the FKUB and BKSAUA do have strategic positions for scaling, it cannot be 
assumed that religious communities will follow what their elite representatives say and 
do as members of these organizations. Furthermore, it is clear through the focal incidents 
that adat organizations bring a significant challenge to the authority of the inter-religious 
organizations and their ability to negotiate public conflicts in such a way that will be 
accepted as legitimate by all major public actors. 
 
Religious “Exchange” Program in Manado 
 One active attempt at scaling pluralism in Manado is a local inter-religious 
initiative coordinated among several religious institutions of higher education. The 
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participating universities, all of which have programs to train religious leaders and 
teachers, support students in planning and implementing an annual student religious 
“exchange” program (pertukaran mahasiswa). This program allows university students 
studying to become religious leaders and/or teachers to spend a week at a different 
religious university, attending and observing religious activities and classes at their host 
university. The goal is that students will begin the life-long process of dialogue with 
those from different religious communities, so that as future religious leaders they will be 
motivated to continue building relationships with other religious leaders. Rather than 
focusing on a theologically based or even exclusively religious dialogue, the goal in the 
exchange program is to build dialogue through spending time together in daily activities, 
referred to as a “life dialogue” (dialog kehidupan). 
 
Figure 5: Religious Exchange Program Participants with Seminarians 
 The exchange program was started in the 1970s, initially between the GMIM 
affiliated Protestant university UKIT and the Catholic seminary STF in Pineleng. Over 
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the past decade, the program has expanded to include the state-run Muslim institute of 
higher education IAIN Manado, the state-run Protestant institute STAKN Manado, and 
the Pentecostal theological school STT Parakletos. The exchange program is a local 
initiative for scaling approaches to religious coexistence geared toward building the 
foundation for inter-religious relations among the future generation of religious leaders. 
 
Minahasan Adat Revival: Scaling through Motorcycles and Muscle 
 In its numerous permutations across Indonesia, one of the notable characteristics 
of the contemporary adat revival has been the flexibility and paradoxical nature of the 
concept of adat, deployed in ways that are “by turns progressive and reactionary, 
emancipating and authoritarian, idealistic and manipulative” (Henley and Davidson 
2008:835). In Manado, adat politics have become increasingly visible in the public sphere 
during the post-Suharto era, and have emerged in locally specific ways based on the 
strong association between Minahasan adat and Christianity. The paradox, however, 
emerges in the simultaneously inclusive and exclusive claims put forth by various adat 
organizations and the ambiguity of what actually constitutes adat from their perspective. 
While for some, adat refers to pre-Christian traditional rituals, for others it implicitly 
refers to Christian traditions that have displaced earlier rituals. Furthermore, adat is not 
only about rituals but about the complex relationship between ethnic and religious 
identity. 
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Christianity Subsumes Adat 
 In March 2016, at a café in Manado, down the street from the headquarters of the 
Milisi Waraney, I sat down with one of the organization’s nine “commanders” 
(panglima), a key advisor, and several others involved in running the organization. Milisi 
Waraney was founded as an exclusively Protestant Christian militia in 2002, and like 
many former paramilitary groups or militias in Manado, it has rebranded itself as an adat 
organization. My discussion with those involved in Milisi Waraney demonstrates an 
entanglement of Minahasan adat and Protestant Christianity that exists within many of 
the major self-labeled adat organizations active in North Sulawesi today. Although the 
organization’s panglima and advisor are at odds about the performance of adat rituals and 
their relevance for the organization, they both clearly agree on an unquestioned link 
between Minahasan identity and Christianity. 
 The Milisi Waraney panglima, who kept on his dark Prada sunglasses for the 
duration of our discussion, explained that the goal of their organization is to guard against 
threats from outside and inside the region. He added that while other similar local 
organizations, such as Brigade Manguni are “mixed”—referring to the fact that members 
from different religious backgrounds are allowed—Milisi Waraney is “pure” because it 
allows only Protestant members. When I inquired about the relationship between 
Christianity and Minahasan adat, the advisor quickly jumped in to say that “none of the 
Minahasan ancestors became walisongo.”18 In other words, most Minahasans did not 
become Muslim, but instead converted to Protestant Christianity, a transition that mostly 
                                               
18 Walisongo are figures (sometimes referred to as saints) who played a role in the spread of Islam 
in Java in the 14th century. 
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occurred in the late 19th century. Some contemporary Minahasan adat organizations 
perform adat rituals, despite the disapproval and resistance from the indigenous 
Protestant GMIM. The Milisi Waraney advisor began sharing some anecdotes about 
some members with the ability to perform traditional rituals involving spirit possession, 
but the panglima was clearly bothered.19 He reached into his polka dot V-neck shirt to 
pull out a large silver crucifix necklace and expressed his disapproval toward 
participating in these pre-Christian adat rituals. While grasping the crucifix necklace, he 
proclaimed to those around him: “Once you have this, you cannot be defeated.” 
 
Regional Comparison 
 In this case, it is interesting to compare the current adat movement in Manado, 
which was able to remain peaceful in the early 2000s, to nearby provinces like Maluku 
and North Maluku, where violent conflicts broke out and evolved to take on a religious 
frame and narrative, pitting Muslims against Christians. Birgit Bräuchler, who has written 
about the post-conflict reconciliation process in Maluku, argues that adat and the village 
alliance system it enshrines can provide the integrative push necessary for reconciliation 
by encompassing the entire Moluccan society and overcoming religious divisions 
(Bräuchler 2009:888). Christopher Duncan, who has conducted research on the conflict 
in North Maluku, has noted that the religious framing of the conflict itself has led to a 
                                               
19 I witnessed several adat rituals during my fieldwork, including one that integrated the use of the 
Bible, with the entranced Tona’as (ritual expert) opening to specific pages and pointing to Bible 
verses, then read by his assistant (who was wearing a Brigade Manguni shirt) as part of a healing 
ritual for a sick family member. For more in-depth information about traditional Minahasan 
rituals, see Renwarin (2006:306–19) . 
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tendency of some local organizations to seek reconciliation and the prevention of future 
violence through the promotion of an adat-based identity, “one that forefronted cultural 
identities rather than of religious ones” (2013:15). In the search for cultural practices that 
have historically supported coexistence in these post-conflict regions, the potential of 
adat to overcome other kinds of social divisions has been recognized. 
 In North Sulawesi, there is an ongoing public debate about Minahasan adat and 
religious identity that is proving significant for the future of the region and its ability to 
accommodate plurality. The range of actors mobilizing in the name of adat is large, with 
numerous understandings of what adat means, and different methods of scaling. Kelli 
Swazey has argued that the contemporary movements dedicated to re-discovering 
Minahasan adat have opened up space for its conceptual separation from Christianity, and 
the potential to reshape regional notions of Minahasan ethnic identity and regional 
belonging to be more inclusive (2013:24).  
 For example, prominent GMIM pastor and BKSAUA chairman Richard Siwu 
explains that the Minahasan ethnic group was formed through the uniting of different 
sub-ethnic groups, which provides a framework that can be elaborated to serve the 
purpose of accommodating diversity in a contemporary plural society. His vision is based 
on the idea that Minahasa, which literally means “being united” (Renwarin 2006:60), did 
not emerge from a natural process or single origin, but from a collaborative effort to unite 
as several groups living in the same region. Reiner Emyot Ointoe, an active Muslim 
intellectual and cultural observer, sees the coexistence between Minahasans and the 
Muslim Javanese who were exiled to North Sulawesi by the Dutch colonial government 
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as a historical model of coexistence that can be harnessed to avoid the sectarian bent 
present in North Sulawesi today.20 There are movements in Manado to harness the 
integrative potential of adat, seeking out local cultural frameworks to address the 
challenges of living in a religiously plural society. 
 On the other hand, many of the adat organizations that have been visible and 
vocal in the public sphere actually have little consensus on what constitutes Minahasan 
adat. They define their organizations’ goals in reference to national ideologies and 
principles, such as Pancasila and religious freedom, which is effective in mobilizing 
followers and legitimizing these organizations in the public eye. However, as a result of 
their concern with the place of Christians and the religious freedom of Christians in the 
country, their actions tend to reinforce the link between Christianity and Minahasan adat, 
and may ultimately threaten the position of local Muslims. Sven Kosel has remarked in 
regards to Minahasan adat organizations, “paradoxically, the ethnically and religiously 
exclusive ways chosen to make a plea for pluralism tend to undermine tolerance and 
alienate minorities within the province” (2010:292). In looking out for Christian interests 
and religious freedom, these groups often advance exclusivist claims that ultimately 
threaten local religious minorities and local religious harmony.  
 Strengthening the link between Minahasan adat and Christianity, and conflating 
Minahasan ethnic identity with religious affiliation, has the effect of positioning Muslims 
as outsiders. In doing so, the adat organizations reinforce the common assumption that 
religious harmony in the region is guaranteed by the Christian majority. However, many 
                                               
20 Kampung Jawa Tondano, where Kyai Modjo and his male followers were exiled by the Dutch 
colonial government in the 1830s and married local Minahasan women (Babcock 1981). 
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of the adat organizations define their role as “protecting the Minahasan homeland” and 
lack a framework for addressing diversity and social complexity. Most groups continue to 
define their social mission in terms of protecting the region from outside threats, 
particularly hardline Muslim organizations. For example, both BMI and Milisi Waraney 
justify their existence by referring to the need to protect the region from groups like the 
Islamic Defenders Front (FPI- Front Pembela Islam), a hardline Muslim organization 
known for its vigilante-style violence (Bamualim 2011; Wilson 2008). BMI also held a 
“show of force” demonstration in Manado in April 2015 to denounce ISIS and 
demonstrate BMI’s readiness to protect the region from terrorism.  
 The focal incidents discussed above demonstrate the growing strength and 
influence of adat organizations, which often take on a religious tone and use religious 
symbols in their logos. Many of the organizations have a reputation for being made up of 
drunken motorcycle “gangsters” (preman), an image which some of the groups have tried 
to change, through their claims of dedication to principles like religious freedom and 
harmony, their sponsorship of debates, and the inclusion of women within their ranks. 
Local opinion on these groups varies greatly. The majority of Christians praise or at least 
tolerate their existence, interpreting their efforts as the reason why the FPI has not been 
able to establish itself in North Sulawesi. Others privately remark that the groups amount 
to the Christian version of the FPI, and Muslims report feeling intimidated by the 
existence of security posts run by adat members, such as the posts set up relatively near 
the state Islamic university (IAIN) in Manado. 
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 The influence of groups like BMI and Milisi Waraney is bolstered by their strong 
ties to local politicians. Although they are not official or public political links, they often 
involve financial patronage to particular individuals rather than parties. Because of the 
ability of these organizations to mobilize thousands, they comprise core support groups 
for particular candidates during election time. While the actual impact of adat 
organizations on the regional elections in December 2015 may have been minimal 
(Jaffrey and Ali-Fauzi 2016), the analysis of focal incidents demonstrates the enormous 
influence they have been able to exercise in the public sphere on issues related to plural 
coexistence. The response of adat groups to both the church burning in Aceh and the 
local Kampung Texas issue dominated local media. Also, in the Kampung Texas case, the 
organizations have thus far succeeded at stalling the plans that were agreed upon by the 
city government in conjunction with the BKSAUA and FKUB. Although they have been 
involved a somewhat ambiguous deployment of adat, lacking a framework for addressing 
local religious diversity, their public reasoning positions them as defenders of religious 
harmony, making it difficult for other groups to speak directly against their agendas.  
 The highly polarizing Jakarta gubernatorial race and the trial and sentencing of 
the former Christian governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) for blasphemy against 
Islam have raised uncertainty among Minahasans about the position of Christians in the 
future of the country. This fear has further emboldened Minahasan adat organizations to 
express their opinions publicly through demonstrations (Pinontoan 2017). In May 2017, 
several days after a peaceful public vigil was held on the streets of Manado in solidarity 
with Ahok, adat organizations led a protest at the airport. The demonstration was against 
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the scheduled visit of Fahri Hamzah, deputy speaker of the Indonesian People’s 
Representative Council. Hamzah, a member of the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS- Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), had been openly supportive of the demonstrations 
against Ahok in Jakarta during the election. Adat groups publicly condemned Fahri 
Hamzah as an intolerant figure and refused his visit based on rumors that he was coming 
to North Sulawesi to attend the induction of FPI leaders in nearby Bitung. The protesters, 
some of whom were dressed in traditional clothing and armed with swords, overwhelmed 
airport security and succeeded in making their way to the runway. By that time, Fahri 
Hamzah had already arrived and been received by the Governor of North Sulawesi, and 
was able to leave Manado that same evening without incident.  
 The protest at the airport, which made national news, indicates adat organizations 
have become increasingly invigorated and emboldened in the highly polarized identity 
politics that have emerged following Jakarta’s gubernatorial race and Ahok’s trial. The 
political climate has made these organizations appear as a strong potential avenue to 
advocate for the rights of Christians, still using strong nationalist rhetoric about Pancasila 
and religious freedom to legitimate their position and demands. 
  
Women’s Organizations: Appealing to Social Justice 
 Several women’s organizations in Manado have foregrounded an approach to 
working towards plural coexistence by addressing issues of social injustice impacting the 
broader society. The leaders of Swara Parangpuan, a locally founded women’s NGO, 
and PERUATI (Persekutuan Perempuan Berpendidikan Teologi di Indonesia), a national 
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Protestant organization for women educated in theology whose current leader is from 
Manado, have taken similar approaches to promoting inclusivity and religious 
coexistence by attempting to address humanitarian issues and inviting collaborations 
across religious lines in the process. These groups scale up their ideas about coexistence 
(not only across religious lines, but also gendered ones) through commitment to social 
justice and broader social issues that impact everyone.  
 The founder and leader of Swara Parangpuan, Lily Djenaan, is Muslim, but 
recognizes that social issues cut across religious lines. Accordingly, she believes that the 
organization needs to be prepared to respond to victims of domestic and/or sexual 
violence from varying religious backgrounds. The founder works with a religiously 
diverse staff and strives to build her organization’s reputation for working toward social 
justice in helping all women who have become victims of violence and abuse. In 
addition, Swara Parangpuan has collaborated with various religious organizations and 
communities for educational and preventative programs, including the Catholic KWI, 
Protestant PERUATI, and university students active in the Muslim students’ organization 
HMI. They have also worked with the national Indonesian Women’s Coalition (Koalisi 
Perempuan Indonesia), and have implemented anti-violence educational programs at 
several local public high schools. Swara Parangpuan’s mission encourages its members 
to collaborate with leaders from different religious communities and associations in order 
to have a broader impact. The organization also does normative work through the cross 
cutting partnerships it has made with actors in both state and society, and the kind of 
social impact they have had on local women’s issues.  
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 PERUATI is another women’s organization that has sought to make a difference 
by tackling humanitarian issues, including women’s issues (in collaboration with Swara 
Parangpuan), and environmental issues. The head of the national organization 
PERUATI, Ruth Wangkai, a GMIM pastor from North Sulawesi, argues that an effective 
way for religious communities to mobilize the grassroots and model plural coexistence is 
to work together to solve pressing social issues. While these groups do not receive the 
same amount of local media attention as the adat organizations, the normative work they 
are promoting through collaborations across the state-society and religious divides is an 
alternative approach to scaling frameworks for plural coexistence. 
 
Conclusion 
 As this chapter’s discussion of focal incidents in Manado illustrates, public 
debates in the region are characterized by a broad and consistent appeal to the normative 
discourse of religious coexistence. These appeals to coexistence are given shape by 
varied ethical currents, some of which look to religious and nationalist principles to 
support a working model of coexistence. However, a more exclusive frame put forth by 
many adat organizations positions ethnic Minahasans as “insiders,” whose Christian 
religion above all else guarantees the peace of the region. The same discourse implicitly 
positions Muslims as “outsiders” whose loyalty to nationalist principles is suspect. The 
debate taking place about the nature of Minahasan adat and its relation to Christianity 
demonstrates vividly the tension between the desire to maintain the reputation of the area 
for its relatively peaceful inter-religious relations, as well as a push to guarantee the 
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Christian majority of the province in the future. Some respected religious figures have 
sought to develop the integrative potential that adat could serve in supporting some 
measure of religious coexistence in the region. The majority of adat organizations, on the 
other hand, look to national principles of religious freedom to advocate for the position of 
Christians within the national framework, pushing an exclusivist version of adat that has 
the potential to endanger local religious relations. The local developments following 
Ahok’s trial and sentencing have served to thrust existing tensions into further relief, as 
Minahasans are trying to negotiate their position a highly polarized national climate while 
still advocating for the religious freedom of Christians within the Indonesian nation. 
 Although this chapter has been more heavily focused on Christian actors and 
organizations, it is important to note that most Muslims in Manado also take significant 
pride in the region’s reputation for tolerance, and many Muslim organizations (as well as 
Christian ones) promote inter-religious dialogue and strive to maintain religious 
harmony. Despite these specific incidents, which highlight the tensions and possible 
limits of coexistence, the ideal of religious harmony continues to garner widespread 
support among both Christians and Muslims in Manado. There is general agreement on 
the positive aspects of the region’s stability and its reputation for religious harmony. 
However, as the focal incidents discussed above indicate, there are competing frames on 
how this reputation has been secured, how to maintain it, and where its limits lie. A major 
limit appears when the influence of Christianity in the public sphere (often conceived of 
in terms of houses of worship) is questioned, and the future of the province as majority 
Christian is perceived as threatened. 
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  A major focus of this chapter has been on mechanisms for scaling, as it is critical 
for understanding how some frameworks for plural coexistence have become prominent 
in the public sphere. One of the examples of scaling given was through the adat 
organizations through their promotion of a Minahasan identity strongly linked to 
Christianity and their ability to draw a large number of members or informal supporters 
by projecting their goals through a nationalist lens, ultimately reinforcing local exclusion. 
Religious communities and inter-religious organizations also play an important role in 
scaling, especially in the case of focal incidents like those above, as they play the role of 
major mediators and communicators who provide a narrative of these major social 
debates on plurality and citizenship to their congregations. It is also important to 
highlight the approach of women’s organizations in Manado because of their ability to 
crosscut religious lines in pursuit of social justice, and working with various religious 
communities to implement their programs. While there are significant challenges and 
limits to religious coexistence in Manado, there is also a vibrant effort from religious 
leaders and communities, inter-religious organizations, educational institutions and local 
and national humanitarian organizations to provide models for religious coexistence to 
address the dynamic challenges of living in plural society.  
 Civic and religious education also represent important avenues for scaling, 
particularly in the context of Pancasila revival and use of religious teachings to provide 
frameworks for understanding diversity. In the next chapter, I establish the importance of 
educational institutions and projects when considering the negotiation of the place of 
religion within the nation and in the public sphere, and the potential impacts on the 
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accommodation of diversity. Later in the dissertation, consideration of three case studies 
at different high schools in Manado further demonstrates how the transmission of these 
intended messages is constrained by the local situation of Manado, the atmosphere of the 
school, and the assumptions of the teachers. 
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CHAPTER 3: DEBATES ABOUT RELIGION, NATION,  
AND POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE THROUGH THE LENS OF EDUCATION 
 	 In the previous chapter, the close attention paid to debates regarding religious 
plurality in the public sphere brought to light contested frames of coexistence and the 
organizations, institutions, and individuals that play a role in scaling them. It is clear that 
in order to make plural democracy work, organizations and ideals consistent with values 
of pluralism and democracy have to be “scaled up” and established through practice 
(Hefner 2005:76). In this chapter, I focus on the place of religion within the national 
imaginary and the approaches to religious difference therein, establishing schools as loci 
for deliberation regarding this relationship. First, I examine the literature on secularism 
and introduce the religion-state relationship and its linkage to a public ethic toward 
religious difference. Ultimately, I maintain that the religion-state relationship or the 
establishment of a democracy does not necessarily create a normative hegemony as the 
ideal for citizens of a particular nation, asserting that constitutional arrangements are 
neither purely the source nor the product of an emergent public ethical culture.  
 Through my research, I approach the question of the place of religion within the 
nation empirically, taking into account both the historical trajectory and the variety of its 
contemporary normative understandings. I argue that public deliberation about education 
and its goals have ethical consequences for how national imaginaries and approaches 
toward religious difference manifest. In this process of continuous negotiation, the realm 
of education and educational institutions themselves become critical loci of deliberation. 
Anthropologist Amy Stambach has shown through her work how “debates about 
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education provide a lens into social life beyond classrooms. They help us understand the 
connections people make between textbooks and the wider society” (2000:2). I 
continually draw these connections as I move across time, comparing and contrasting 
educational approaches to religion and diversity during authoritarian rule to new 
directives on the topics in contemporary democratic Indonesia, also shifting between the 
regional and national levels. Under the New Order regime (1966-1998), education played 
a central role in the state’s deployment and dissemination of discourses on diversity 
within the national framework. I compare and contrast the discourses to those in current 
civic and religious education textbooks in Indonesia, demonstrating the tensions within 
and among the textbooks that link to major debates in the broader society regarding the 
place of religion in the nation and the accommodation of religious diversity.  
 
Secularism and the Politics of Religious Difference 
 Over the past several decades, the social sciences have engaged in a critical re-
evaluation of the process of secularization, revising previously normative assumptions 
that religion will wane and/or be reduced to the private sphere. This interrogation has 
occurred in light of both a global religious resurgence and a recognition of the historical 
specificity of the Enlightenment and Western Christianity (Casanova 1994). Empirically 
based evaluations of the multiple varieties of secularism have demonstrated that a strict 
separation of church and state is not a precondition for democracy and the guarantee of 
religious freedom (Stepan 2011). Here, I draw on relevant literature and debates on 
secularization and secularism as an ideology in order to assess the religion-state 
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relationship and its linkage to the formation of a public ethic, particularly in regards to 
religious pluralism. 
 A closer evaluation of the emergence of secularism reveals its potential to re-
organize social domains such that religion becomes differentiated in its own sphere, with 
the potential to challenge and create friction with other spheres (Casanova 1994, 2006). 
Philosopher Charles Taylor (2007), in his investigation of the historical circumstances 
within Western Christendom that enabled the emergence of secularism, critiques the 
mistaken assumption that as religion declines or becomes confined to the private sphere, 
other social spheres remain unaffected (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 
2011:11). For Taylor, Western modernity and the slew of processes that it entails – 
including secularization – have contributed to the emergence of a space conceived of as 
the public sphere, and a range of possible social imaginaries (Taylor 2002). 
 The manifestation of secularism, which involves a reorganization of the religion-
state relationship, does not necessarily result in the privatization of religion understood as 
atomized individual practice. Indeed, it potentially leaves room for and the strong 
involvement of religion in public life through civil associations, and through the ethical 
resources religion affords regarding not only individual piety but public order (Casanova 
1994; Hefner 2000). For Casanova, the deprivatization of religion means that religion can 
still figure in debates about politics, education and economics, to “challenge the very 
claims of secular spheres to differentiated autonomy exempt from extrinsic normative 
constraints” (2006:14). Particular manifestations of secularism can, however, impact the 
treatment of religious diversity and the guarantee of religious freedom. 
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 Talal Asad arrives at a different understanding of what secularism entails and its 
consequences for religion and public ethical culture through his genealogical evaluation 
of the concept of the secular as well as the political doctrine of secularism. Asad, who 
understands the secular as an epistemic category, remains skeptical of the ability of the 
political doctrine of secularism to mediate particular identities (including religious ones) 
and guarantee any kind of principled distance that can act as the basis for tolerance (Asad 
2003:5,8). He responds to Casanova’s claim about the place of religion in public debates 
by countering that the public sphere is organized by power, and that only religions 
perceived as compatible with modern, liberal principles are able to enter the realm of 
public debate (Asad 2003:183). 
 Asad is highly critical of the ability of secularism to guarantee tolerance because 
of its link to the rise of capitalist nation-states where violence is still enacted but is 
legitimized through its role in the guarantee of liberal principles (Asad 2003:7). Because 
secularism is tied to the modern nation-state, the identity and history of which may be 
equated with a particular religious and/or ethnic group, its enactment also inevitably 
defines those outside of that religious identity as “religious minorities” (Asad 2003:7–8). 
Saba Mahmood (2016), in her study on the state’s role in production of religious 
difference and the category of “religious minority” in the Middle East, is also critical of 
the promise of secularism to guarantee religious freedom and act as a framework for 
religious pluralism. Both Asad and Mahmood analyze secularism not exclusively as a 
political doctrine, but as part of the hegemonic project of modernity that also impacts 
individual experience of the categories of the secular and the religious.  
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 However, I argue that one cannot assume that the existing religion-state 
relationship necessarily creates a normative hegemony and shapes the emergent public 
ethical culture. It is for this reason that I take an ethnographic approach to determine the 
various ways in which the religion-state relationship is being re-imagined in 
contemporary Indonesia. To this end, understandings of secularism from a political 
science perspective provide an emphasis on how secularism as a doctrine has been 
advanced in practical terms: often in a piecemeal fashion and through on-the-ground 
coalitions. Jonathan Fox’s (2008) analysis of religion-state relationships throughout the 
world demonstrates the variation in the kinds of arrangements between states and 
religious groups. His findings indicate that very few states have what is assumed to be 
secularism’s basic tenet—a separation of religion and state—and that states have even 
become increasingly involved in regulating religion on questions of religious 
discrimination against minorities, regulation of the majority religion, and religious 
legislation (Fox 2008:313).  
 Further research regarding the multiple varieties of secularism across political 
arrangements have underscored the many formations secularism can take in varying 
kinds of political regimes (Stepan 2011). Ahmet Kuru (2009) has examined the historical 
contingencies and coalitions that have resulted in the many forms of separation between 
religion and state all referred to as “secularism” in the United States, France, and Turkey. 
These particular approaches demonstrate how secularism operates in a practical sense as 
a constitutional arrangement of legal neutrality regarding religion, rather than as a 
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pervasive normative hegemony that necessarily reflects or produces an ethical frame 
among the broader public.  
 
Indonesian Nationalism: Religious or Secular?  
 Although Indonesia is often described as a “secular” nation because the 
constitution does not establish an Islamic state or privilege Islam, it is more accurately 
described as a multi-confessional or multi-religious nation. The state ideology of 
Pancasila privileges the position of religion generally by affirming belief in a supreme 
God, but does not allocate a special position to Islam. This agreement was reached in part 
because the main nationalist faction against an Islamic state was not advocating for a 
strict privatization of religion, but tended to envision the possibility for religion to play a 
public role (Hefner 2000:237 n3). The state is highly involved in the support and 
regulation of religious affairs, including the business of defining religion. The Indonesian 
government recognizes six official religions (agama): Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Some traditional belief systems (aliran 
kepercayaan) are recognized, though they are given a different legal status and are 
regulated by the Ministry of Education and Culture rather than the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs. 
 Accounts of the rise of nationalism, particularly but not exclusively in the case of 
Indonesia, have tended to emphasize secular factors in developing a sense of 
connectedness through the spread of language, administration, and print media (Anderson 
2006). Anderson’s influential account of nations as “imagined communities” in former 
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colonies such as the Netherlands East Indies is centered on the importance of the colonial 
administration, the provision of education, and modern forms of organizations and 
associations in laying the foundation for a nationalist consciousness.  
 However, as Michael Laffan highlights, a secular-focused narrative of the rise of 
the nation and nationalism ignores its religious foundations, such as the role Muslim 
institutions and networks in the Netherlands East Indies that paralleled those of the 
colonial elite. Muslim religious networks were an integral part of the Indonesian 
independence movement, shaping a vision of Indonesian nationalism with “deeper roots 
in an Islamic ecumenism within archipelagic Southeast Asia” (Laffan 2003:3). For both 
Protestant and Catholic personages belonging to the emerging class of colonial educated 
Christian elites, religion also impacted their effort for the nationalist cause. Van Klinken 
(2003) demonstrates how a unique combination of religious background, middle-class 
status, and educational opportunity produced Christian elites who contributed to the 
nationalist movement.  
 Supporters of the multi-confessional and Islamic visions of nation both 
contributed to the independence struggle, but the split between the contending multi-
confessional and religious nationalism still persisted in 1945 when Indonesia declared its 
independence. The committee tasked with providing a blueprint for the independent 
Indonesia “deadlocked on the thorny issue of Islam’s role in the state” (Hefner 2000:41). 
Sukarno, the multi-confessional nationalist who would become Indonesia’s first 
president, introduced the doctrine of Pancasila as a compromise between secular and 
Islamic nationalism. The doctrine is composed of five major principles: commitment to 
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belief in one supreme God, just and civilized humanitarianism, national unity, consensual 
democracy, and social justice.21 Muslim nationalists offered one draft version that 
included the Jakarta Charter, a clause added to the first pillar stating an obligation for 
Muslims to carry out shari’a (Islamic law). The clause disappeared under somewhat 
murky conditions, though certainly in part due to concerns that the majority Christian 
areas of eastern Indonesia would withdraw their participation from the national project 
(Lindsey 2012:38). The drafting of the constitution in Indonesia played an important role 
in establishing a multi-confessional rather than Islamic state, though its future as such 
was far from guaranteed. 
 During Indonesia’s democratic transition that started with the Reformasi 
movement in 1998, the question of the role of Islam in the nation was posed once again. 
As part of the process of constitutional review and revision, the legislative body of the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) formally considered a proposed amendment that 
would have reintroduced the Jakarta Charter, obligating Muslims to adhere to shari’a. 
Ultimately, the vote by the democratically elected MPR representatives in 2002 rejected 
the proposal, re-affirming the multi-confessional basis of the state established at the time 
of independence (Lindsey 2012:48). The decision to found Indonesia as a multi-
confessional nation at the time of independence, and the re-affirmation of this status 
during the period of democratization represent what Kuru terms “critical junctures,” or 
                                               
21 Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab, Persatuan Indonesia, 
Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan dan perwakilan, 
Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia. 
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periods in a nation’s history that provide a measure of path dependency with regard to the 
relationship between religion and state (Hefner 2018:5; Kuru 2009:23). 
 
Indonesian Nationalism: The View from Minahasa 
 Looking at this national history from a regional perspective, it becomes clear that 
the role of Islam in relation the state remains a charged subject in particular ways for 
places like North Sulawesi, where Islam is not the majority religion. As mentioned above, 
at the time of independence, there was concern that majority-Christian areas of eastern 
Indonesia like North Sulawesi would abandon the national project if an Islamic state were 
established. While there were many Christians active in the nationalist movement, 
including the Minahasan Sam Ratulangi, their status as minorities and as elite Christians 
made their relationship to the nationalist movement more “problematic” (van Klinken 
2003:2). Among other reasons, this was because their religious status positioned them 
more closely with the colonial order, and more ambiguously in relationship to the 
mainstream nationalist movement.  
 In the particular case of Minahasa, while the nationalist movement ultimately 
crystallized around the intent to join the Indonesian nation, there was an assumption that 
the national model would be more federal than unitary (Henley 1996:142). In chapter 
five, I discuss in more detail the shifting position of Minahasa and North Sulawesi within 
the national imaginary over time from the “twelfth province of the Netherlands” to being 
considered part of eastern Indonesia, or the “outer islands.” Although the decentralization 
that has taken place since the fall of the New Order has offered new possibilities for the 
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position of regions outside Java in the national framework, it has also led to new 
uncertainties. 
 Anxieties regarding the place of Islam in the nation and the consequences for 
North Sulawesi were particularly heightened in the early 2000s, before the vote on the 
proposed amendment regarding the Jakarta Charter. Considering the possibility that 
Indonesia could become an Islamic state, political figures and Protestant religious leaders 
in Minahasa organized a congress, named the Kongres Minahasa Raya, the Great 
Minahasan Congress. The unofficial congress lacked legal authority, yet drew the 
participation of prominent leaders in the region who publicly discussed the possibility of 
secession if Indonesia were to become an Islamic state. On August 5, 2000, the lieutenant 
governor of North Sulawesi, the regent (bupati) of Minahasa, along with several youth 
representatives closely linked to the mainline indigenous GMIM church and 
representatives of each of the Minahasan sub-ethnic groups, issued a declaration from the 
congress (Kosel 2010:302).  
 At the congress, the participants proclaimed the commitment of Minahasa to the 
nation of Indonesia based on the 1945 Constitution. They rejected sectarian politics based 
on religion and any “attempts to divide the unity and togetherness of the Indonesian 
nation by incorporating the Jakarta Charter or any similar formulation into the 
constitution.”22 Furthermore, they asserted that if the commitment of the constitution 
                                               
22 “Menolak segala kecenderungan dan usaha yang hendak memecah-belah keutuhan dan 
kebersamaan bangsa Indonesia di dalam NRI dengan cara memasukkan gagasan ‘Piagam 
Djakarta’ dan bentuk-bentuk sejenisnya dalam bentuk apa pun ke dalam UUD 1945.” Text of the 
recommendations from the Kongres Minahasa Raya (2000) were accessed from the personal 
archives of Bode Grey Talumewo, Minahasan historian 
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were to be revised in any way on this matter, the “Minahasan people” (rakyat Minahasa) 
would separate from Indonesia and withdraw their commitment to the Indonesian nation. 
Though it is not clear from the document whether or not the “Minahasan people” is 
intended as an ethnic or geographic marker, the statement is clear in its rejection of an 
Islamic state and conditional threat of secession. 
 The declaration made by the Minahasan congress also condemned the communal 
violence that had broken out in many regions across Indonesia and called on the national 
government to take action. However, it was clear from their recommendations that they 
were speaking on behalf of Christians in their call for the government to pull Laskar 
Jihad and any police or military personnel implicated in the conflicts in Maluku, Poso, 
and other regions of Indonesia, and to prosecute “perpetrators of the slaughter of 
Christians” (para pelaku pembantai umat Kristen).  
 Movements advocating the possible secession of Minahasa or North Sulawesi 
have continued to emerge from time to time in different permutations, ranging from being 
relatively mainstream (as with the first Kongres Minahasa Raya) to remaining on the 
fringe. Still before the proposed vote on the Jakarta Charter, a second Kongres Minahasa 
Raya was held in 2001. President Abdurrahman Wahid (known as Gus Dur), just prior to 
his impeachment and removal from office, attended the congress as a guest of honor, 
praised by Minahasans for his commitment to a multi-religious Indonesia (Kosel 
2010:303–4). In 2006, the Movement for Minahasan Independence (Gerakan Minahasa 
Merdeka) was founded by Dolfie Maringka, who later organized a pro-Bush rally the 
same year to show support and solidarity with the USA (Kosel 2010:292).  
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 As tensions have risen during and after Ahok’s trial and the Jakarta Gubernatorial 
race in 2016-17, there have been renewed conversations about the possibility of 
secession, though they have remained largely outside of the mainstream. Protests 
organized at the governor’s office in December 2016 and May 2017 called for the 
implementation of a “Referendum Minahasa Raya,” or a referendum about the possibility 
of secession. Those involved in the call for the referendum insist that it is not a separatist 
movement, but aims to assess the possibility of breaking from Indonesia through legal 
avenues because the country has failed to uphold the Pancasila principles upon which it is 
based. 
 The declaration that came from the first Kongres Minahasa Raya establishes a 
commitment to an Indonesia based in Pancasila, yet also clearly speaks from a particular 
religious (Christian) perspective. The positioning evident in the declaration demonstrates 
one way that Protestant Christianity “mediates Minahasan ethnics’ participation in 
national culture, playing a role in their expression of their version of the local” (Swazey 
2013:16), an idea which I will revisit through ethnographic data about the visions of 
nation being presented and debated in the schools of North Sulawesi. Looking at the 
enactment of nationalism mediated through religious identities is a way to understand 
how the contours of the state-religion relationship are being reimagined, yet also brings 
up important questions about how to guarantee religious freedom and provide space for 
religious pluralism within these frameworks. 
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Education: Arena of Debate about the Religion-State Relationship 
 Education often becomes an arena of debate for negotiating the religion-state 
relationship, and as a result, for circulating permutations of frameworks for national 
belonging. Civic education and religious education are both required subjects for 
Indonesian students, and represent a potential forum for dialogue regarding social debates 
on living in plurality. Robert Hefner’s analysis of Islamic schooling in Indonesia 
demonstrates its resemblance to a social movement because of its ability to “draw social 
actors into organizations and projects that extend well beyond the school yard” 
(2009a:71). In my analysis of the kind of scaling and normative work entailed in civic 
and religious education in several of Manado’s high schools, I demonstrate how schools 
act as loci of deliberation about the religion-state relationship, and its consequences for 
approaching religious difference. I also indicate the ways in which they are shaped by 
larger public conversations taking place about religious diversity, as well as their 
potential to feedback on these issues. 
 I have intentionally chosen to analyze these debates from the perspective of 
education because of its tendency to become a major site of negotiation and deliberation 
regarding the place of religion within the national framework. As discussed above, even 
in secular liberal democracies there is ongoing contestation about the extent to which 
religion can be involved in the public sphere, and the extent to which the state can 
regulate religion. In Kuru’s analysis of the manifestations of secularism in the United 
States, France, and Turkey, he discerns education as the main arena public debates about 
state policies on religion (Kuru 2009:8). Amy Stambach has also called attention to the 
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way in which schooling is often theoretically associated with the secular nation-state 
project, but explains how a recognition of the recursive relationship between religion and 
education “opens up a conceptual locus and mode for analyzing how the public realm is 
being newly transformed” (2006:2). In addition, Charis Boutieri shows how, in the case 
of Morocco, lines between secular and religious education can become blurred through 
state-produced narratives emphasizing “cultural unity accomplished through the shared 
experience of Arabo-Islamic morality” (2013:366). Not only does a focus on education 
give insights about the shifting relationship between religion and state, it also indicates 
how this relationship is being transformed into moral imperatives and dispositions for the 
future generations of the nation (Stambach 2006:9).  
 The contours of the religion-state relationship have ramifications for the possible 
frameworks to accommodate religious pluralism. On this front, schools are important 
institutions for “transforming experiences of ‘the everyday’…into categories of social 
differentiation and identification (Stambach 2006:10). As institutions, schools also 
engage in a project of “normative work” that orients toward possible frameworks of 
coexistence in a plural society (Hefner 2014:131).  
 One major mechanism for engaging in this normative work is the formal 
curriculum presented in schools. The curriculum remains an essential resource for 
understanding the approach to the state project of nation-building and the normative 
vision(s) of nationhood and coexistence conveyed (Doumato and Starrett 2007). This is 
not to say that the curriculum presents a unified state vision of nationhood and a unitary 
moral code for enacting it. Rather, the finalized curriculum must be seen as the state-
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approved product of a complex process of curriculum formation involving input from 
religious organizations and various interest groups. With this framework in mind, I 
analyze Indonesian civic and religious education approaches to questions of diversity and 
the role of religion in the nation. For comparison, I analyze both the educational project 
and textbooks of the New Order regime (1966-98) and the most recent curriculum 
overhaul, the 2013 Curriculum, that has taken place since the democratic transition.  
 State efforts to control the curriculum, even under an authoritarian regime, cannot 
fully control their reception or the interpretations that are drawn from them (Coe 2005; 
Starrett 1998). The analysis of the curricula in this chapter is instructive on the shift in the 
imagined contours of religion and religious coexistence in relationship to the national 
framework in Indonesia. In the chapters that follow, an ethnographic analysis of the 
schools and classrooms that bring these messages to life is demonstrative of the wide 
variation in interpretations and implementation of the curriculum.  
 
Religion and Diversity under the New Order Regime 
 In Indonesia, the New Order regime (1966-98) under President Suharto was 
established on the heels of an attempted leftist coup that was attributed to the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) and the subsequent violent anti-communist campaign that 
resulted in the killing of an estimated half-million Indonesians (Hefner 2000:16). The 
New Order government sought to combat left-wing ideologies partially through a 
“functionalization” (Starrett 1998:9) of religion in service of state development goals. 
However, at the same time, the regime was wary of political Islamism and sought to 
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bring religious organizations under clear state control. In walking this line, the New 
Order strongly controlled Muslim political parties but allowed and indeed provided 
strong support for social initiatives from Muslim organizations (Hefner 2000:92). The 
initiatives positioned religion and religious organizations as apolitical and clearly 
subordinate to the state and its development-oriented agenda. 
 Ideological control was enacted largely through the elevation of Pancasila, which 
was the “New Order’s answer to the problem of opposition and political conflict,” 
presented as a necessary ideological alternative to communism, Western liberalism, 
political Islam, and any other ideologies considered anti-state by the Suharto regime 
(Weatherbee 1985a:134). One concrete legal step taken to ensure the supremacy of 
Pancasila was the asas tunggal (sole foundation) legislation, requiring all organizations – 
including social and religious ones – to recognize Pancasila as the sole foundation of their 
organization (Weatherbee 1985a). In addition, the ideology was intended to convey a 
national Indonesian culture able to encompass limited expressions of a regional or ethnic 
form of difference. 
 Under Suharto, an authoritarian effort toward repression and domestication of 
difference was enforced to promote nation-building through a variety of discourses 
emphasizing national unity across cultural groups. The national motto Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika, “Unity in Diversity,” transformed diversity into a state-managed project that 
involved foregrounding aspects of static and non-threatening cultural representations, 
creating something of a “national standard upon difference” to provide a measure of unity 
(Spyer 1996:26). Tania Li (2000) has detailed how New Order era development projects 
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aimed at integrating indigenous groups often involved forced resettlement programs or 
transmigration to physically impose a tangible measure of integration. Manifestations of 
difference were largely suppressed in public discourse, and the taboo categories were 
widely known through the acronym SARA, referring to ethnicity, religion, race, and the 
catch-all category of inter-group relations (Bowen 2005:154). Forms of difference 
available for public expression served the purpose of integration through their abstraction 
and projection into a national identity. 
 The Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park (TMII), a theme park that was 
conceptualized by Ibu Tien Suharto, the Indonesian First Lady, is an apt representation of 
the state project delimiting the acceptable forms of difference and their relation to 
national unity as they were conceived under the New Order (Bowen 2005; Li 2000; 
Pemberton 1994; Spyer 1996). The theme park, opened in 1975 and still in operation 
today, includes a Pancasila Monument as the main attraction that visitors are led directly 
toward after entering the park. In addition, the large pond in the center of the park 
contains man-made islands as a re-creation of the Indonesian archipelago in miniature. 
Miniature houses of worship for official religions and miniature representations of 
regional houses and dress (one selected to represent each province) are on display. The 
various regional houses surround the pond such that it “captures on its shimmering 
surface the varied reflections of the mini houses, which thereby are cast as manifestations 
of the same underlying unity” (Spyer 1996:26). In this version of nation-building, where 
the state clearly plays a significant role in mandating the framework for unity, cultural, 
religious, and ethnic differences are displayed in a non-threatening material form that 
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ultimately casts the differences as aesthetically beautiful, and also superficial, in the face 
of national unity. However, in these representations of the authoritarianism of New Order 
projects to control regional identities, their effectiveness is often exaggerated, with a lack 
of attention to how these state directives were interpreted and implemented on a local 
level and by individual citizens. 
 Suharto’s broad strategies for managing the relationship between religion and 
state, and in the management of diversity through the frame of Pancasila were also 
translated into educational programs. An analysis of the regime’s intensive focus on 
expanding education and the deployment of particular frameworks for understanding 
religion and diversity in the national context serves to further develop this analysis. In 
addition, the analysis is instructive in terms of how the principles were presented in the 
curriculum, and how they were meant to be internalized by Indonesian youth. In this 
case, it also becomes clear that previous studies of the moral education program 
implemented by the New Order regime failed to take into account the reception of these 
ideals and overestimated the power of the state. 
 
Education during the New Order 
 The significant expansion of education under the New Order regime was enacted 
in tandem with development, investing funds from economic growth in education to 
develop an increasingly skilled workforce to continue acting as the motor for 
development. State revenues from the oil industry were funneled into the construction of 
primary schools to work toward the fulfillment of universal primary education. By 1987, 
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levels of primary school enrollment were ten times the 1945-6 levels (Leigh 1999:42). 
Accordingly, rates of literacy among the population increased significantly from 40% of 
the population in 1965 to 90% by the year 1990 (Hefner 2000:119). The language of 
instruction in schools was (and remains) Indonesian, an important symbol of the unity of 
the country carrying with it a valence of progress and development (Leigh 1999:44). 
Furthermore, New Order classrooms were designed to function as a space of socialization 
into a nation modeled on the structure of the family, with Suharto cast as the paternalistic 
“Father of Development” (Bapak Pembangunan) (Shiraishi 1997).  
 Development of religious education allowed for the state to encourage piety 
among its citizens while imposing some control on the versions of religious orthodoxy 
promoted in schools. Because of its importance as a protective against communism, 
religious education (instruction in one’s professed religion) became a required subject in 
the national curriculum from elementary school through higher education in 1966 
(Suhadi et al. 2014:10-11). As part of the New Order’s efforts to de-politicize religion 
and religious organizations, in the late 1980s, existing student religious organizations 
were banned from operating inside schools and replaced with the alternative religious 
extracurricular clubs based on religious belonging (Suhadi et al. 2014:40–41). The basic 
structure of these religious clubs, referred to as spiritual organizations (organisasi 
kerohanian; such as the Muslim students’ club Rohis and the Christian student club 
Rohkris), still exists as part of the extracurricular offerings of schools, though today there 
is typically little control on their affiliation to outside religious associations. 
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 Although the analysis in this chapter focuses most heavily on the intended state 
goals and directions of education, it is important to remember that the educational arena 
at this time was still a sphere in which various interest groups sought to impart their 
visions for the future of the nation. As was the case in many domains, Christians worked 
with secular and Pancasila-oriented Muslim nationalists to counter those pushing for a 
strong Islamic influence (Mujiburrahman 2006:207). One major result of this tension, 
present from the time of independence, was the creation of a dual administration whereby 
public schools and universities were placed under the Ministry of Education and Culture, 
and state-run Islamic schools were placed under the Department of Religion 
(Mujiburrahman 2006:223). Although there were attempts to unify this system during the 
New Order era, mutual suspicions and power struggles between Pancasila-minded 
Christians and Muslims and those favoring a stronger role for religion in the state and 
education system impeded this agenda. The government did take steps to streamline 
education to some degree by requiring Islamic schools to implement the secular state-
mandated curriculum in addition to any religious subjects (Mujiburrahman 2006:226). 
 Furthermore, as mentioned above, religious education became mandatory in 
public schools, where students were required to take a course according to their professed 
religion. The provision of religious education in private schools became a thorny subject 
during this time as well. Many private Christian schools offered only Christian religious 
education courses for religiously diverse student bodies, a practice denounced by Muslim 
groups as proselytization (Mujiburrahman 2006:244). Many of these issues, from the dual 
structure of educational administration to the provision of religious education in private 
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schools, remain controversial in contemporary Indonesia as various interest groups 
attempt to shape the system according to their respective goals. 
 
Education for the Development of a Pancasila Nation 
 One of the major attempts to educate youth to be loyalist and nationalist was 
enacted through the Suharto regime’s development and implementation of a moral and 
civic educational program, Pancasila Moral Education (PMP- Pendidikan Moral 
Pancasila). In 1975, PMP was instituted as a required component of the curriculum at all 
educational levels for at least two hours each week in the classroom to educate students 
in the national ideology (Nishimura 1995:311). The curriculum was intended as a 
technology to shape citizens who were loyal not only to Indonesia in general, but to the 
Suharto government in particular. The government intended for PMP to replace religion 
education within the national curriculum, but the proposal was met with opposition from 
Islamic groups and led to the compromise that both PMP and religious education would 
be part of the national curriculum (Mujiburrahman 2006:230). PMP was engaged in 
fashioning and disseminating a particular vision of nation, intent on using the educational 
system to reproduce the beliefs and norms of that particular vision of nation in the next 
generation.  
 The foundational component of the PMP moral and civic education program was 
the Pancasila as laid out in its five major principles detailed in the 1945 Constitution. 
Because of its symbolic weight as the multi-confessional (rather than Islamic) basis of 
nation, it served as the basis for national unity amidst religious and ethnic difference 
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(Rudnyckyj 2010:191). The principles were reinterpreted and turned into the basis of an 
educational program training citizens to implement and enact them in their daily lives, 
with the assumption that knowledge about the principles would be transferred to the 
moral character of students (Nishimura 1995:310). This emphasis on enacting rather than 
just believing is linked to the regime’s strong focus on development that required action 
and sacrifice from all citizens. Complicity or shared belief was considered insufficient to 
unite the country around and drive the economy forward. An example of this focus on 
enacting Pancasila principles can be seen in PMP’s teaching of gotong royong (mutual 
assistance). Under the New Order, national values were cast as reincarnations of 
traditional indigenous values of social harmony that provide guidance for self-conduct in 
all social relationships in a plural society (Weatherbee 1985:188). 
 Prior to 1980, PMP course textbooks were not standardized, and several versions 
were produced and approved by the state for implementation within schools. One version 
of the textbook in use prior to official approval by the state led to significant controversy 
in its highly Islamic interpretation of the first pillar of Pancasila, belief in Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa (The One Almighty God). The textbook included the statement that 
“God does not have a father and mother. God does not have a son and is not labeled as a 
son,” openly repudiating the Christian doctrines of the trinity and the incarnation (quoted 
in Mujiburrahman 2006:231). Enacting a further measure of control over the curriculum 
and its presentation in textbooks, the state later entrusted the PMP curriculum developing 
to the Pancasila Laboratory at the Teacher Training Institute in Malang, East Java. The 
Laboratory had been established in 1967 to further elaborate on the doctrine of, collect 
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public opinion about, and develop educational materials based on Pancasila (Song 
2008:176). 
 Education in the Pancasila principle of belief in the One Almighty God, covered 
at all grade levels, also encoded normative stances toward religion and religious 
difference within the national framework. Religious difference was clearly mentioned 
and pointed out through differences in houses of worship and religious holidays in the 
PMP curriculum. Ultimately, difference was framed in the curriculum as easily 
overcome, with a focus on how all religious believers (and followers of the state-
approved traditional belief systems) are united through their belief in The One Almighty 
God. Such portrayals of difference, however, were met with backlash and critique from 
modernist Muslims circles. For example, the Islamic PPP party even responded to one 
government-produced civic education textbook, claiming its portrayal of religious 
difference was un-Islamic. One junior high school textbook in circulation that angered 
modernist Muslim groups had instructed that religions take different paths, but are all 
leading toward God, using the metaphor of different modes of transportation (train, bus, 
ship) enabling one to arrive at the same destination (Mujiburrahman 2006:232).  
 The PMP curriculum was intended to provide instruction in Pancasila values 
suited for each grade level, which in practice meant that the same themes were 
continually stressed and re-introduced at each grade level. As is also true for the 
elementary school PMP textbooks, the first chapter of the tenth grade PMP textbook is 
about building up one’s life based on belief in “The One Almighty God” (Kemendikbud 
1983a). It includes sections about the obligation of Indonesians to believe in God, the 
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requirement to value followers of other religions, and the meaning of religious holidays. 
At this grade level, students are required to read about the legal basis for the principle of 
belief in a supreme God from the constitution and other important sources. Exhortations 
to enact religious tolerance are prominent within the textbook and defined by examples of 
allowing others to celebrate their respective religious holidays, with the clarification that 
tolerance does not involve the mixing of religious teachings. Furthermore, religious 
harmony is positioned as a necessary attitude and behavior in service of national 
development: “With the behavior of mutual respect and honor, a life that is harmonious, 
orderly, and peaceful will be created so that national development can be accomplished” 
(Kemendikbud 1983a:7). 
 Discussions of regional and cultural differences in the context of integration were 
also part of the PMP curriculum geared toward teaching students how to implement the 
third pillar of Pancasila: national unity. In the twelfth grade PMP textbook, the 
relationship between regional and national identity is directly addressed, with the 
assertion that regional culture is the foundation for national culture. Students are told that 
they must recognize and honor religious, ethnic, cultural, and regional differences and are 
reminded of the national motto “Unity in Diversity,” which they would have certainly 
memorized by this point in their education. Students read that the Indonesian nation is 
made up of many different ethnic groups, and that consequently, “we should not 
foreground our ethnic groups because that will lead to our disintegration” (Kemendikbud 
1983b:49). The wealth and beauty of difference within the country is continually 
emphasized in the chapter, with regional dances discussed as a model form of cultural 
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difference that students should contribute to by understanding and maintaining their 
performance. 
 Rather than creating educational programs exclusively geared toward the young 
generation, the regime also sought to indoctrinate government employees and public 
figures through the implementation of the “Training for the Application and Realization 
of Pancasila,” referred to in Indonesian with the abbreviated name P4 (P-empat). The 
program was first instituted in 1978, and was required for all civil servants, including 
teachers, and employees of state-owned corporations. Government employees were 
required to undertake the two-week P4 training every five years, and their performance 
was recorded and taken into consideration for promotions (Rudnyckyj 2010:196–97). At 
its inception, the goal was to ensure that all Indonesian citizens would be exposed to the 
Pancasila training at some point, and the expansion of the program was carried out over 
time. By 1984, the scope of trainees also included religious leaders, and by 1985 P4 was 
launched in junior and senior high schools, where PMP was already a part of the standard 
curriculum (Weatherbee 1985b:188). Many social organizations and associations also 
undertook P4 training voluntarily as a way to unquestionably signal their alignment with 
the politics of the Suharto regime (Morfit 1981:838).  
 The methodology used to teach PMP and P4 programs reflect the state’s attempt 
to use Pancasila as a “corporatist system of state control” rather than simply promoting 
the national ideology (McGregor 2002:47). The educational programs, beyond teaching 
national values, implicitly introduced an acceptable range of action or belief, anything 
outside of which could be deemed anti-state or anti-Pancasila. The state education 
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programs position the individual in relationship to “a curriculum that demands overt, 
unquestioning acceptance” (Leigh 1999:52). However, accounts of the state-run moral 
education programs tended to focus on their intended purpose, rather than a careful 
ethnographic account of educational process. As a result, many assume that the programs 
were effective, without examining the potential interpretations that could be drawn from 
them.  
 There was clearly a strong interest on the part of the regime in maintaining as 
much authority as possible over the curriculum and its transmission. Apart from the state 
control over the development of textbooks and educational materials, educators 
themselves were required to undergo P4 educational programs. Therefore, those who 
were in charge of teaching PMP in schools were required to participate in a training 
program in the same principles they would be required to teach to their students. In 
addition, the PMP curriculum promoted an environment where the textbook, and not the 
teacher, was meant to be the authoritative source of knowledge (Leigh 1999:46-7). 
Ethnographic observations by Lyn Parker (2002) and Pam Nilan (2003) indicate that 
teachers often enthusiastically relied on textbooks, teaching by reading directly from the 
textbook, and students learning by memorizing or copying down sections of the text. The 
existence of a national examination testing encourages students and teachers to rely 
heavily on the material as presented in the state-produced textbooks.  
 The official goals of the PMP and P4 educational programs were to inculcate a 
framework for enacting Pancasila in daily life, and to combine moral and civic education 
to cultivate moral attitudes and instill a sense of nationalism. The implicit goals of the 
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educational program, however, show that the understanding of the national values 
promoted one specific vision of nation, of which the Suharto regime was understood as 
both the exemplar and protector. 
 The methodological control that was attempted over the PMP educational 
program indicates an attempt to monitor many aspects of the program and prevent 
alternative interpretations of the material from arising at several levels. This authoritarian 
level of surveillance led many to assume that education under the New Order functioned 
as a hegemonic instrument, unquestioningly effective in the transmission of national 
values from the level of state ideology directly on to students’ characters (Leigh 1999; 
Shiraishi 1997). However, the same youth who had been exposed to the national civic 
and moral education programs throughout their educational careers became a major 
driving force in the pro-democracy movement of the late 1990s, directly challenging the 
Suharto regime (Aspinall 2005; Parker 2002).  
 Thus, an analysis of educational programs remains an important tool for 
understanding the visions of nation and coexistence presented as normative by the state 
and other organizations which influence curriculum development (Doumato and Starrett 
2007; Kaplan 2006). Such a project must be done with the recognition that state efforts to 
control curriculum, even under authoritarian conditions, cannot fully regulate the 
understandings drawn from them.  
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Reformasi and Democratization: Redefining Pancasila  
 Within the pro-democracy Reformasi movement that swept Indonesia and forced 
authoritarian President Suharto to step down from power, Indonesian youth—particularly 
university students—played an important role in galvanizing public support for their 
increasingly critical and confrontational political stance. Although the New Order regime 
had attempted to de-politicize college campuses through the Campus Normalization law, 
youth were able to position themselves as a moral rather than political force with the aim 
to correct, not challenge, the regime (Aspinall 2005:118). After Suharto’s resignation, the 
role of youth was diminished in the pro-democracy movement as other civil society 
actors led the way in demanding democratic reforms. However, youth in Indonesia 
remain extremely significant today as they experience the effects of social changes 
brought on by democracy and the reforms of an educational system now intending to 
shape moral, pious, democratic citizens. Against this backdrop, youth are negotiating 
various frameworks for national cohesion and a new politics of difference that has 
consequences for the future of the nation. 
 In contemporary Indonesia, the terms of the nation itself and the resulting 
consequences for religious pluralism are still under negotiation. The shift from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic government where freedom of expression is possible 
has led to new manifestations of identity politics. Religious resurgence over the past 
several decades has led to an increasing social and cultural emphasis on piety and 
morality, at the same time as restrictions have been lifted on the manifestations of 
religious identity in the public sphere. Limits on the foundation of political parties were 
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removed, and religion has increasingly become a mobilizing factor. Furthermore, this 
emergence of new forms of identity politics has taken place during the process of massive 
decentralization.  
 One of the most devastating manifestations of identity politics that emerged was 
the ethnic and religious violence that broke out in various regions of the archipelago in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Indonesia as a national project is challenged by the 
incorporation of profound ethnic and religious diversity, but this sudden escalation and 
boiling over of tensions elicited questions about the future of a national project with a 
historical legacy of pluralism that had previously seemed more or less settled. Many 
Indonesian observers have suggested that rising levels of intolerance are strongly related 
to a new social climate where religion is foregrounded in belonging and identity. Michel 
Picard has described the communal tensions of the post-Suharto era, largely organized 
around oppositional religious identities, as due to the fact that the “Pancasila state 
ideology gave way to confrontational identity politics” (2011:17). Such a characterization 
bring up an important question about the contemporary role of Pancasila in a state where 
an interpretation and indoctrination of the ideology has built up a normative framework 
for organizing religious relations. 
 
Pancasila in Post-Suharto Indonesia: What Does it Stand for? 
 The question of how Pancasila is being redefined in contemporary, democratic 
Indonesia is important in understanding whether the framework it provides for organizing 
the relationship between religion and state and the relationship among religious 
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communities retains any legitimacy. Political scientist Alfred Stepan argues that in 
principle, Pancasila provides a model for a “multivalued” secularism because it enabled 
the rejection of an Islamic state and gives a positive value to diversity of religion, an 
essential condition for the ability of the state to provide respect and support for all 
recognized religions (2011:130). Stepan maintains that democracy does not require a 
strict separatist variety of secularism, but does require “twin tolerations,” defined as: “the 
minimal degree of toleration that democracy needs to receive or induce from religion and 
the minimal degree of toleration that religion needs to receive or induce from the state for 
the polity to be democratic” (Stepan 2011:116). 
 Pancasila has strong purchase power as a “guarantor of traditional social and 
religious pluralism innate to the Indonesian nation” (Lindsey 2012:49). Because of its 
history, Pancasila also stands for the rejection of an Islamic state in favor of a multi-
confessional nation. However, its authoritarian interpretation during Suharto’s New 
Order regime (1966-98) complicates its ability to serve as a contemporary rallying cry for 
religious pluralism and freedom in contemporary democratic Indonesia. 
 As discussed above, although the possibility of an Islamic state was considered 
during the process of reviewing and amending the constitution during the democratic 
transition, the vote by the legislature ultimately re-affirmed the multi-confessional nature 
of a state based on Pancasila. However, the way in which the ideology had been turned 
into a vehicle for state propaganda and control under the New Order regime had left it 
largely discredited as a meaningful ideology in the public sphere (Lindsey 2012:45). The 
MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) even issued a statement that the Suharto regime 
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had misused Pancasila, and that it “should become a national ideology that is ‘open to 
discussion for the future of Indonesia’” (quoted in Lindsey 2012:45). Serious 
consequences have resulted from the shift, even in terms of legal interpretations of the 
doctrine and the relationship between religion and state that it encodes. On the other 
hand, there has been a strong effort in recent years to revive and revitalize Pancasila, 
visible not only in political circles but also in popular discussions and in the civic 
education curriculum. 
 The re-affirmation of a multi-confessional nation and the adoption of a 
constitutional amendment to reaffirm and uphold principles of freedom of religion and 
worship are positive indicators of the strength and extent of democratic commitment to 
citizens’ rights on issues of religion. However, Pancasila also been used as legitimation 
for strong state involvement in religious affairs by citing the upholding of piety as within 
the purview of the state, thereby “facilitating a state role in Islam and vice versa” 
(Ricklefs 2012:448) that is not compatible with strong twin tolerations in practice. The 
strength of movements calling for the implementation of shari’a based legislation 
(especially at the provincial level in the context of decentralization), increase in legal 
action against religious groups labeled as heterodox, and increase in high-profile 
blasphemy cases illustrate this trend. While those opposed to the adoption of shari’a 
based legislation have rallied around and in some ways revived Pancasila, it is also 
important to note that pro-shari’a actors are often working within the democratic system 
to enact legislation (Lindsey 2012:3). Even more significantly, many of the groups in 
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favor of shari’a legislation argue that the principles of Pancasila do not conflict with legal 
Islamization (Bowen 2013:157). 
 This discussion of legal debates and questions related to Pancasila exhibits the 
importance of the various meanings given to the national ideology and its social and 
political consequences. It is clear that religion and religious institutions play a prominent 
role in contemporary Indonesia, though the public debate continues about what the 
religion-state relationship should look like and what it means for a deeply plural society. 
To examine these issues, I turn to education to once again to glean the different 
normative answers to these questions being proposed through the national curriculum, in 
particular religious and civic education. 
 
Education for Democratic Citizens 
 As Indonesia began the process of democratic transition, the national curriculum 
required an overhaul to educate a new generation of Indonesian citizens in democratic 
attitudes and values. The MPR passed legislation to stop the P4 program after Suharto’s 
resignation in 1998 (Lindsey 2012:45). As a new civic education curriculum was in 
development, Pancasila-based civic education was replaced by a new subject, 
“Citizenship Education” (PKn- Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan) (Fearnley-Sander and 
Yulaelawati 2008:115). The national ideology, which had lost currency after being used 
as a tool of control under the New Order regime, was de-emphasized not only in the new 
curriculum developed for democratic civic education, but also more generally in the 
public sphere (Lindsey 2012:45). A major challenge during the process of 
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democratization has been the reinvention and reinterpretation of Pancasila to make it a 
suitable basis for democratic citizenship education (Gaylord 2007:48). Among civic 
educators in Indonesia, today there is significant support for implementing a more 
strongly Pancasila-centric democratic civic education curriculum. First, I discuss some of 
the changes that have taken place within the educational system, followed by evidence 
regarding the renewed interest in Pancasila-based civic education. 
 The 2003 National Education Act was intended to overhaul the educational 
system in light of the democratic transition. It declared the objective to educate 
democratic citizens who are pious (beriman dan bertakwa kepada Tuhan Yang Maha 
Esa) and of noble character (berakhlak mulia), indicating both a commitment to 
democracy and state-endorsed religiosity (Syafruddin 2011:27). The act also enshrined a 
national commitment to education in the country with the requirement that the national 
and provincial governments allocate a minimum of 20% of their budget toward 
education, a goal which was achieved in 2009 (Suryadarma and Jones 2013:6). The act 
does not explicitly address a concern for multicultural education or practices, though 
some articles of the law could be interpreted in support of an approach that educates 
students about cultural diversity (Raihani 2014:66). Since the passing of the 2003 
National Education Act, however, there have been two major rounds of curriculum 
changes that have presented new visions for the best way to educate democratic citizens 
and live together in a plural society. 
 The first comprehensive curriculum overhaul was the 2006 School-Based 
Curriculum (KTSP- Kurikulum Tingkat Satuan Pendidikan). Against a backdrop of 
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massive government decentralization and ongoing democratization, KTSP intended to 
allow schools to play a greater role in developing curricular materials (Suhadi et al. 
2014:21). In other words, schools could have more autonomy in choosing how to 
implement broad directives in accordance with local needs, availability of resources, 
training level of teachers, etc. However, before the new curriculum had even been fully 
implemented across the country, a new round of curriculum development ensued, 
promising once again major changes, development of new textbooks, and new rounds of 
teacher training regarding implementation. 
 A revised version of the national curriculum, referred to as the “2013 Curriculum” 
(Kurikulum 2013) was developed for implementation in schools across Indonesia. The 
curriculum sought to address two major concerns: the poor performance of Indonesian 
students on math and science assessments, and the perceived increase in moral failings 
among Indonesian youth. In backing the 2013 Curriculum, the government argued that 
the earlier KTSP curriculum and its methods of evaluation were overly focused on 
cognitive performance, and that the increasing prevalence of violence and corruption 
across the nation needed to be addressed through an education program which focuses on 
character development (Suhadi et al. 2014:24).  
 The 2013 Curriculum requires three hours of instruction per week for senior high 
school students in the subject of Pendidikan Agama dan Budi Pekerti (Religious and 
Character Education) according to one’s professed religion, intended to emphasize the 
moral aspect of religious education. Although the subject’s name uses the Indonesian (by 
way of the Javanese language) term “budi pekerti,” which has the connotation of moral 
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values related to custom and politeness, the foundation for morality is assumed to be 
religion (Suhadi et al. 2014:33). In addition, the curriculum requires two hours per week 
of instruction for senior high school students in Pancasila and Citizenship Education 
(PPKn- Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan), with renewed material on 
Pancasila, also for the purpose of harnessing its potential to impart moral values.  
 One of the most significant changes in the curriculum for senior high school 
students, however, is in the required competencies for each grade level and each 
individual course subject, and the central position given to religious and moral values. 
Each grade level and each subject has a spiritual competency requirement, and students 
are evaluated on their application and realization of religious teachings based on their 
professed religious beliefs. For example, one of the spiritual core competencies for the 
subject of Indonesian history for tenth grade requires that students “live up to the 
example of leaders in inter-religious tolerance and practice it in everyday life” 
(Kemendikbud 2013:62).23  
 Students are also evaluated on social competencies in each subject, including 
honesty, cooperation, politeness, and tolerance. While subjects like religious education 
and civic education often do explicitly address these topics in the curriculum, many other 
subjects do not. Thus, the extent to which these competencies are emphasized in class, 
and particularly how they are evaluated depends significantly on individual teachers. 
Furthermore, it is possible that teachers have a different religious background than their 
                                               
23 “menghayati keteladanan para pemimpin dalam toleransi antar umat beragama dan 
mengamalkannya dalam kehidupan sehari-hari” 
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students, which makes it unclear how students are actually evaluated on their spiritual 
competencies.  
 The question of how to grade students on their spiritual and social competencies 
was often posed in local teacher-training events based on the practical difficulty it 
presented for teachers. At an in-house curriculum training put on by the regional 
education office at the state madrasah in Manado (MAN), the speaker explained that 
teachers must observe and evaluate students on their behavior. He detailed the kinds of 
actions teachers should look for: Do students pray to begin class? Do they regularly 
sholat, perform the five daily prayers required in Islam? Do they always greet teachers? 
Do they leave without permission during class? He proceeded to present a series of 
PowerPoint slides with a dizzying array of tables as a model to organize the grading and 
evaluation of students, claiming that grading in accordance with the new curriculum is 
simple.  
 During the training at MAN, one science teacher turned around and leaned over 
the table to talk to me about her exasperation with the extensive evaluation that the 2013 
Curriculum requires. She summarized her feelings with her declaration that “it gives me a 
headache!” (bikin pusing). She takes the process seriously, but finds it exhausting. When 
a student greets her appropriately outside of school—at the market or the mall, for 
example—she tries to remember the name and class of the student so that she can later 
record the encounter and add points to his/her grade. Indeed, the speaker at the training 
had explained that the spiritual and social competencies are not limited to a student’s 
performance within that particular course subject, or even on school grounds, but also 
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includes observation of students outside of school related to their confidence, curiosity, 
discipline, cooperation, and concern for the environment.  
 
Figure 6: Lokon Catholic School Dormitory Report Card 
 
 At Lokon private Catholic school, students receive a behavioral grade as well as 
an academic grade for each subject, and are required to achieve higher than a ‘C’ letter 
grade in behavior in order to pass (as long as the academic grade also meets the D 
minimum). When students misbehave in the civic education class, the teacher Ibu Sandra 
reminds students that they are graded on their behavior as well as their academic 
performance. Because the school is a boarding school, students also receive marks from 
the dormitory staff in three areas, delineated by the school’s motto: Veritas, Virtus, Fides 
(Latin for “Truth, Virtue, Faith”). Of the many areas where students are evaluated, one of 
the indicators they are graded on is their ability to “socialize with anyone” (bergaul 
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dengan siapa saja) and to “value difference of religion, tribe, ethnicity, opinion, 
behavior, and the actions of others who are different” (menghargai perbedaan agama, 
suku, etnis, pendapat, sikap dan tindakan orang lain yang berbeda). 
 
The Place of Pancasila in Civic Education  
 In addition to the strong position given to religious and moral values within the 
curriculum, there is also a renewed vigor for Pancasila as an integral component of 
democratic civic education. The support is based on two major discourses among 
educators regarding the negative effects of the de-emphasis of Pancasila during the early 
period of democratic transition. The first of these discourses posits that the lack of 
Pancasila education is directly related to the perceived moral degradation among youth, 
and argues that a renewed Pancasila civic education program will facilitate the teaching 
of uniquely Indonesian moral values. This particular perspective often assumes that 
teaching only democratic values in civic education courses has led to an excessively 
liberal and individualistic interpretation of democracy that is not compatible with 
Indonesian tradition. Therefore, some civic education researchers have encouraged a 
Pancasila foundation in order to give democratic civic education the moral basis needed 
for the success of democracy in Indonesia (Triyanto 2013).  
 Pancasila is intended to give a moral foundation and protect against liberal ideas 
deemed incompatible with indigenous values, as well as against political Islamism. In 
early 2016, when there was widespread panic about the spread of an LGBT “lifestyle” 
among Indonesian youth, Minister of Education and Culture Anies Baswedan announced 
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that the educational system would counter the trend through increased focus on religious 
values and Pancasila (Republika 2016c). Also in early 2016, as there was increased 
concern about the spread of Islamic radicalism (especially ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria) in the country, several government figures and educators spoke out against 
radicalism and the need to implement the Pancasila ideology to protect against radicalism 
on college campuses (Republika 2016a). 
 The second common discourse links the lack of Pancasila in civic education 
during the early reform era to the outbreak of ethnic and religious conflict across the 
archipelago. The two perspectives are certainly not mutually exclusive, but this particular 
one addresses the need for a framework to manage a diverse society and argues for a re-
implementation of Pancasila toward this end. One senior lecturer in civic education at a 
private Muhammadiyah university in Central Java who has seen several rounds of 
curriculum changes over the course of his career explained in an interview in July 2014:  
 “Upon entering the reform era, it was like people were allergic to Pancasila, and 
 so the name and the material related to Pancasila decreased...After the experience 
 of Reformasi, ten years in, the effects of that emerged. For example, the impacts 
 on tolerance, and then people did not understand the importance of diversity. 
 There were horizontal conflicts everywhere, and like now, when the 2013 
 Curriculum was developed, Pancasila material was included again with the name 
 Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan”  
 
A prominent civic education professor in North Sulawesi similarly connects the near 
disappearance of Pancasila in the early reform era curriculum to the serious communal 
conflicts that plagued Indonesia at the time. He argues that Pancasila is necessary to 
provide national unity, and this is why it has been reinstated as an important component 
in the most recent revision of the curriculum. 
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 At the conferences and meetings of civic education teachers I attended both in 
Java and North Sulawesi, several common themes from civic education teachers and 
professors emerged. There is tension between a desire for civic education to be able to 
respond to the new needs and opportunities in a burgeoning democracy, along with 
nostalgia for the subject’s higher relative status and the clear moral directives of the PMP 
and P4 programs produced by the New Order Regime.  
 A common complaint among teachers is the lack of respect and academic 
importance accorded to the subject of civic education today. At the regional Central Java 
meeting of the Indonesian Professional Association of Pancasila and Citizenship 
Education (AP3KnI) in October 2015, the attendees expressed dismay about the lack of 
prestige given to the subject of civic education, and they brainstormed together ways to 
increase the standing of the subject in universities. While there was agreement on the 
need for a more scientific and academic approach in order to be taken seriously by other 
disciplines, at the same time they waxed nostalgically about the greatness of PMP and P4 
during the New Order Era.  
 The main speaker at the meeting, a professor from the renowned Universitas 
Pendidikan Indonesia, agreed with the civic education teachers and lecturers, explaining 
that P4’s methodology of indoctrination was problematic, but that the program also had 
many positives, especially the moral foundation it provided students. One teacher at the 
meeting complained that PPKn has become a “leftover subject” (mata pelajaran titipan) 
expected to address all topics that do not fit in other academic subjects, ranging from 
anti-corruption education to the importance of obeying traffic laws. The professor 
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countered that this approach is not wrong, as these do all fall under the broad scope and 
purpose of civic education: “to form citizens who are good, smart, and able to live in 
together in society” (membentuk warga negara yang baik, cerdas, dan bisa hidup 
bersama masyarakat).  
 
Religion, State, and Difference in the 2013 Curriculum 
 While the discussion above focuses on various debates about what education 
should accomplish and how it should do so, this section focuses on the discourses present 
within the government-produced and distributed high school textbooks. In line with the 
view of education as an arena of debate about religion and difference, the textbooks 
reflect the influence of varying interest groups and their particular visions of Indonesian 
nationhood, negotiated and packaged within textbook format.  
 
Civic Education 
 The PPKn textbooks produced for the 2013 Curriculum focus significantly on the 
place of religion within the Indonesian nation, looking at both the importance for the 
nation as a whole and for individual belief and character. The textbooks position 
religiosity as a necessary component of enacting Indonesian citizenship, in line with the 
government’s educational program to promote character education and moral 
development. At the same time, the textbooks also implicitly demonstrate the strong role 
that the state plays in religious life, particularly through their role in defining and legally 
enforcing what counts as religious orthodoxy, as well as blasphemy.  
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 In most of the PPKn content, the topic of religion is relatively prominent, and is 
most often discussed from the perspective of citizen rights and obligations. The cover of 
the tenth grade PPKn textbooks visually demonstrates the centrality of religion within the 
national context by featuring important national symbols, including the red and white 
Indonesian flag, the national logo Garuda Pancasila (national bird holding the Pancasila 
seal), the outline of the Indonesian archipelago, and a superimposed photograph of 
diverse religious leaders standing side by side. The eleventh grade PPKn textbook 
includes a section about freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia, a topic discussed 
both in the context of the Indonesian Constitution and Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The textbook affirms that Indonesia is a religious 
country, and though religion cannot be coerced or forced onto others, everyone is 
required to profess a religion. Furthermore, the book states that individuals must worship 
in a way that is consistent with religious teachings, and that blasphemy and defamation of 
religion are not allowed. Religious conversion is legal, mentioned in the textbook along 
with the reminder that religious freedom is guaranteed because no religion condones the 
imposition of one’s religion on others.  
 In addition to considering the role of religion in the national context, the 
importance of individual religiosity also emerges within the text. Emphasis on individual 
religious practice is evident mostly through discussion of implementing Pancasila values 
in daily life. For example, in the eleventh grade PPKn textbook, students are asked to 
complete a self-evaluation on actions clearly intended to index morality (ranging from 
showing up to school on time to helping victims of natural disaster) by checking one of 
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the boxes to indicate how often (always, often, sometimes, or never) they engage in such 
behaviors. Within the instructions for the evaluation, students are advised to change their 
behavior regarding any of the items for which they checked “sometimes” or “never.” The 
statements related to individual religiosity are as follows: 1) I don’t bother others who are 
worshipping 2) I join religious activities 3) I don’t choose friends on the basis of religious 
difference (Kemendikbud 2014:56–57).24 The main body of the textbook deals with a 
discussion of citizen rights, obligations, and principles, and discussion of their practice 
comes mainly through the assignments or activities students are asked to complete to 
check understanding at the end of each chapter.   
  
Figure 7: Student Drawing about Pancasila Values Guiding Development 
 
                                               
24 1) “Tidak mengganggu orang lain yang sedah [sic] beribadah,” 2) “mengikuti kegiatan-
kegiatan keagamaan,” 3) “tidak memilih teman berdasarkan perbedaan agama” 
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 Because of the ideological nature of citizenship education programs, it is not 
surprising that the textbooks do not take a more critical approach or address the topics in 
terms of pressing political issues. Liberal human rights advocates have long criticized 
Indonesian policy requiring citizens to profess a religion, arguing that it is not in line with 
the perspective of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on freedom of 
religion. However, in the textbook, Pancasila is assumed to be in line with the UDHR’s 
perspective on rights of freedom of religious belief and worship.  
 Respect for diversity (religious, ethnic, cultural etc.) is framed in terms of a need 
for national integration in the face of both internal and external threats. In the tenth grade 
PPKn textbook, this topic is addressed in the chapter titled “Knitting Togetherness in 
Diversity” (Merajut Kebersamaan Dalam Kebhinekaan) (Kemendikbud 2014a). In many 
respects, the general presentation of diversity does not differ significantly from those in 
the PMP textbooks produced by the New Order regime. The extensive diversity of the 
country is recognized and presented as both a potential challenge (by increasing the 
nation’s vulnerability to conflict) and a potential opportunity to enhance development 
prospects. A list of unifying factors, composed mainly of national symbols (the flag, the 
national anthem, Pancasila), is provided to indicate factors that contribute to national 
unity. In one of the textbook exercises, students are asked to fill in a table with the name 
of a province, the regional language used there, the model for traditional houses, and a 
famous dance from that particular region, categorizing diversity in a strikingly similar 
and compartmentalized way as the TMII (Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park) theme 
park created during the Suharto era.  
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 While intercultural tolerance does figure in the discussion, the only concrete 
example provided to students on how to accomplish it is to perform various regional 
ethnic dances, which will “give rise to inter-ethnic sympathy” (Kemendikbud 
2014d:64).25 The framing of respect for diversity in terms of rights is what distinguishes 
the discourse most from the coercive and integralist application present in the New Order 
textbooks. In addition, in the exercise portion, students are asked to reflect on a conflict 
in Indonesia that they have heard about or find out about through the media and discuss 
the causes and consequences of the conflict. The effort to integrate information about 
previous conflicts into the curriculum is also beyond what was discussed in the New 
Order discourses about diversity, and an attempt to address the uptick in conflicts that 
occurred as Indonesia transitioned to democracy.  
 Religious harmony is also an important topic in the PPKn textbook, and is 
presented in three parts: internal harmony, inter-religious harmony, and harmony between 
religious groups and the government (Kemendikbud 2014e:48). Internal harmony is 
defined as respect and tolerance for those within one’s own broader religious community, 
with the qualification that it is required as long as their beliefs/practices do not deviate 
from religious teachings. The explanation of inter-religious harmony clarifies that it does 
not entail any kind of “mixing” of religious teachings, and gives an example of 
implementation through an inter-religious dialogue centered around peace and harmony 
rather than a discussion of difference. The last principle about the relationship between 
religious communities and the state gives a reminder that people should obey religious 
                                               
25 “Contoh nyata implementasi hal tersebut adalah dengan mempertunjukkan tarian suku-suku 
yang ada di Indonesia. Dengan demikian, setiap suku mempunyai rasa simpati satu sama lain.”  
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rules and obligations, but are also required to obey Indonesian national law. The principle 
specifically rejects Islamism by clarifying that religious law does not negate or disqualify 
national law, but that citizens have an obligation to both. 
 As with the topic of religion, diversity is discussed in the context of abstract 
principles, and in a more legalistic sense in the main body of the text, while individual 
behavior to support these principles are more prevalent in the textbook exercises and self-
evaluations. In addition to the exercise mentioned above in which students investigate a 
conflict that has taken place in Indonesia, there is also an exercise in which students are 
asked to list their individual behavior at home, at school, in society, and in the nation that 
could lead to national disintegration. 
 
Religious Education 
 The religious education textbooks also consider the position of religion within the 
Indonesian state, and about religious teachings that relate to tolerance. Students are 
separated by professed religion for religious education, and textbooks for each religion 
include material on both religious dogma and ethics, in line with the approach of pushing 
religious values as the foundation of students’ moral characters. In Indonesia, 
Protestantism (agama Kristen) and Catholicism (agama Katolik) are considered separate 
religions according to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Therefore, there are separate 
religious education courses and curricula for Protestant and Catholic students. 
 The report published by the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies on 
the politics of religious education in the 2013 Curriculum (Suhadi et al. 2014) provides 
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an in-depth analysis of the new curriculum and textbooks, particularly in relation to the 
teaching values related to multiculturalism. The authors argue that religious education is 
an extremely important forum for presenting the values of tolerance and multiculturalism 
to students, but that the curriculum ultimately prioritizes teaching religious dogma rather 
than ethics. In addition, the researchers determined that the Protestant and Catholic 
religious education include material about respecting religious diversity in the context of 
Indonesia as a plural society, but that the material for Islamic religious education was 
more limited in providing students with an orientation toward respecting religious 
diversity (Suhadi et al. 2014:39).  
 In the state-produced eleventh grade Islamic education textbook, there is one 
chapter devoted to the subject of “Tolerance as the Unifying Mechanism of the Nation,” 
including the importance of inter-religious harmony for national unity (Kemendikbud 
2014a). The three levels of religious harmony (internal, inter-religious, and religious 
groups and the state) mirror those presented in the PPKn textbooks. Furthermore, there is 
an admission that these principles have not always been upheld in Indonesia, and that it 
has led to conflicts that endanger the unity of the nation, such as in Poso and Ambon 
during the early reform era. The text provides Qur’anic verses and hadiths to showcase 
religious teachings related to enacting tolerance and avoiding violence. However, within 
the same context, it also positions Islam as a missionizing or proselytizing religion, a 
characteristic that has been noted in regards to the revised Islamic education curriculum 
in general (Suhadi et al. 2014:35). One section that presents the “tolerant behavior that 
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must be fostered in accordance with Islamic teachings” explains the importance of 
enacting mutual respect between people of different religions: 
 “We cannot force our will on others so they join our faith. People of other faiths 
 also cannot force their will on us. Upon seeing noble behavior, God willing, 
 others will be interested. The Messenger of God [Muhammad] always 
 demonstrated noble character to all, including his enemies, and many unbelievers 
 were drawn to the character of the Messenger of God and converted to Islam 
 because of its glory” (Kemendikbud 2014a:196).26 
 Up until this point in the textbook, living with mutual respect for other religions is 
presented as a necessary part of living in a plural nation and upholding this unity, one 
which is supported by Islamic teachings. The connection to proselytizing occurs late in 
the chapter and certainly presents the possibility that the reader will re-orient his/her 
understanding of tolerance as required insofar as it serves the purpose of missionizing. 
 In the Protestant religious education textbooks, values related to living in a plural 
society are discussed in relation to several different topics, such as: maturity and honesty, 
becoming a responsible person in society, resisting exclusivism within the Christian 
community, and loving one’s enemies. The focus on broad Christian ethics as opposed to 
dogma is somewhat due to the existence of many Protestant Christian denominations in 
Indonesia, which might have slightly different dogmatic interpretations. As a result, the 
textbooks focus more on Christian values with the assumption that the students will learn 
dogma from their respective churches (Suhadi et al. 2014:33-34).  
                                               
26 “Kita tidak boleh memaksakan kehendak kepada orang lain agar mereka mengikuti keyakinan 
kita. Orang yang berkeyakinan lain pun tidak boleh memaksakan keyakinan kepada kita. Dengan 
memperlihatkan perilaku berakhlak mulia, insyaAllah orang lain akan tertarik. Rasulullah saw. 
selalu memperlihatkan akhlak mulia kepada siapa pun termasuk musuh-musuhnya, banyak orang 
kafir yang tertarik kepada akhlak Rasulullah saw. lalu masuk Islam karena kemuliaannya.” 
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 In the state-produced tenth grade textbook, the chapter titled “God’s Work 
through Diversity” (Karya Allah dalam Kepelbagaian) introduces diversity as a blessing 
from God that must be respected and requires each person to work for the unity of the 
Indonesian nation through the frame of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika that requires individual 
action and mutual cooperation to be realized (Kemendikbud 2014c). The chapter also 
includes Bible verses related to the respect of diversity and calls students to follow the 
example of Jesus Christ in interacting with those who are different. At the same time, the 
requirement to maintain a strong Christian identity is mentioned through the Bible verse 
1 Peter 3:15, as students are told to that in interaction with others, they are still required 
to take responsibility for and demonstrate their faith and Christian identity so that “people 
can witness a full Christian life” (orang-orang menyaksikan kehidupan kristiani yang 
sesungguhnya) (Kemendikbud 2014c:83). A more in-depth or concrete explanation for 
how students should do this while enacting the values of respect and tolerance in 
interactions with others is not provided. 
 The Catholic religious education curriculum addresses the importance of respect 
for religious difference through the frames of both the Second Vatican Council (Vatican 
II) and human rights. The eleventh grade textbook has a chapter on the subject of human 
rights that includes articles from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a 
consideration of human rights in accordance with Jesus’s teaching. The role of the 
Church in the broader society is asserted:  
 “The Church must try to build cohesion among citizens in the spirit of love and 
 peace. Upholding cohesion in a society is a unique contribution of religious 
 groups. Together with those of another religion, and those who are good-willed, 
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 Christians must fight for justice in brotherhood with all people” (Kemendikbud 
 2014b:130–31, emphasis in original).27 
 
The chapter also discusses building up a culture of non-violence and love. One notable 
difference between the Catholic religious education textbook compared to the Islamic and 
Protestant textbooks is the extensive use of current events and news articles within the 
lessons, and exercises about these events that require critical analysis. Within the 
textbook, several sensitive issues are addressed, including: protests against building 
churches in Java, the increasing gap between rich and poor, the conflict in Syria, and 
abortion. The CRCS report also captured this in its recognition that the Catholic religious 
education material left more room for students to consider religious teachings in light of 
personal experience, opinions, and reflection (Suhadi et al. 2014:36). 
  
Summarizing Textbook Approaches 
 The civic education textbooks produced by the state for the 2013 Curriculum and 
in the PMP textbooks of the New Order era both assert a relatively strong role for the 
state in regulating religious affairs. However, major differences between the textbooks 
representing the curricula include an increased emphasis on individual religiosity and 
religious practice as an enactment of citizenship. Furthermore, there is a stronger 
emphasis on the rights and obligation of citizens, and human rights, in relation to 
religious freedom. The treatment of the topic of diversity remains similar to that under 
                                               
27 “Gereja masih harus berusaha membangun keterpaduan antar-warga masyarakat dalam 
semangat cinta kasih dan perdamaian. Menegakkan keterpaduan dalam masyarakat merupakan 
sumbangan khas kelompok-kelompok agama. Bersama dengan orang beragama lain, dan orang-
orang yang berkehendak baik, umat Kristen harus memperjuangkan keadilan dalam 
persaudaraan dengan semua orang.” 
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the New Order in its formalistic discussion of difference, although there is a recognition 
of the conflicts that have plagued Indonesia in recent times and the need to address it 
through education. Pancasila has been awarded renewed importance in the civic 
education curriculum, and its previous use under the New Order has been openly 
acknowledged as a perversion of the ideology by a corrupt regime only concerned with 
power. As we move to the following chapters and focus on its presentation and 
interpretation within the classroom, it is important to ask the question of whether or not 
the presentation of Pancasila alongside the student of democratic institutions and 
engagement can allow it to become a social precedent harnessed to the project of 
multiculturalism. 
 Overall, the religious education textbooks mentioned above reflect an increase 
focus on ethics and character building in line with the goals of the 2013 Curriculum. The 
textbooks project the assumption that in order to be good citizens, students need a better 
foundation in religiously-based morals. There are clearly attempts to address current 
social issues of intolerance and religious conflicts through the inclusion of material 
related to diversity and respect for difference for the sake of national unity. The material 
is supported by religious teachings and from a religious perspective that preaches 
tolerance and inter-religious tolerance. At the same time, tolerance is sometimes 
discussed as ultimately for the sake of proselytizing or for demonstrating one’s religious 
identity to others.  
 This analysis demonstrates how curricula can play a role in the process of 
deliberation taking place in educational settings. In discussing diversity from both a 
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national and religious perspective, textbooks can model the application of varied ethical 
perspectives to the same phenomena. In encouraging the use of multiple ethical frames, 
they can potentially influence how individuals view and discuss diversity, influencing 
modes of public reasoning. The directives against exclusivism, as demonstrated by the 
discussion of tolerance and proselytization above, must not challenge religious teachings 
and remain clearly within the limits of orthodox religious interpretation. 
 
Conclusion 
 At the beginning of the chapter, I established the importance of education as a site 
of debate regarding the relationship between religion and nation, and the potential 
consequences for the accommodation of religious diversity. A historical look at the 
treatment of diversity under the New Order regime and its control through the PMP 
educational program demonstrated how the national ideology of Pancasila, which 
establishes the multi-religious character of the state, became a major tool to delimit 
appropriate forms of difference. Following the democratic transition, new manifestations 
of identity and difference have become possible in the public sphere. Some groups, 
including civic educators, have called for a Pancasila revival to counteract the new forms 
of exclusion that have emerged alongside the new forms of identity politics. While 
Pancasila may be able to serve as a basis for coexistence in theory, in post-Suharto 
Indonesia it has also been used by the state to justify increased support and regulation of 
the religious domain, as other individuals and organizations vie to impart their own 
interpretation. Civic educators maintain that the ideology needs to be brought back to 
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impart values as an individual moral corrective, and also as a unifying framework for the 
country. 
 Finally, an examination of the current civic and religious education programs and 
textbooks aptly illustrates the negotiation occurring between religion and state, and the 
accordingly uncertain consequences for the future of religious pluralism. The curricula 
are clearly in line with a focus on character building, but at the same time give mixed 
messages about the relationship between religion and state, how religion plays a role in 
public life, and how to approach religious diversity in everyday situations. The next 
section of the dissertation, “Schools as Loci of Deliberation,” provides insight into how 
these often conflicting messages are presented in different institutional settings, and how 
teachers contextualize them in light of local and national realities. 
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SECTION II: SCHOOLS AS LOCI OF DELIBERATION 
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CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL:  
INFLUENCE OF THE PROTESTANT MAJORITY 
 
 In January 2018, my social media connections in Manado were abuzz regarding a 
current event involving a public school, a controversial ustad, and a Minahasan adat 
organization.28 The students’ Islamic organization Rohis at one public high school in 
Manado had organized an event and distributed fliers advertising a seminar led by Ustad 
Felix Siauw, an ethnic Chinese Indonesian who was raised Catholic but converted to 
Islam while at university. He also has links to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), an Islamist 
organization that was outlawed by the administration of President Joko Widodo in 2017 
because it conflicts with Pancasila principles and challenges the legitimacy of the 
Indonesian state through its aim to establish a transnational caliphate. The flier was 
circulated by the Minahasan adat organization Aliansi Makapetor on Facebook with a 
strongly worded statement rejecting the presence of any representatives of radical 
organizations in Minahasa:  
 “As Indigenous Minahasans who hold fast to the four foundational pillars of our 
 nation, we reject the presence of those who clearly bring a RADICAL 
 understanding under the auspices of HTI (Hizbur Tahrir Indonesia) as well as 
 other radical organizations which have been declared as forbidden organizations 
 according to the Indonesian government, in MINAHASA.” 
  
 The group added nationalist hashtags to the post, vowing support for Pancasila as 
the foundation of the Indonesian nation. As several adat organizations called for protests, 
                                               
28 Ustad refers to an Islamic religious education teacher or preacher. 
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information of the event also spread in Muslim circles and the local branch of NU’s 
youth organization Ansor began to call for protests as well, in attempt to distance 
themselves from groups like HTI. On a national level, NU had been the most vocal civil 
society group calling the administration to ban HTI. One North Sulawesi FKUB member 
saw calls for protest on social media and immediately called a meeting with religious 
leaders, actors from the provincial government, Muslim organizations, and the Islamic 
education teacher and representatives from the public high school who planned the event. 
In this sensitive situation, the groups ultimately came to the decision that the best course 
of action would be to revoke their invitation to the ustad and cancel the event.  
 This focal incident picks up many of the themes familiar from chapter two. It 
involves a Minahasan adat organization carving out its role as the protector of the 
Minahasan homeland and championing nationalist values as it protects the region from 
outside threats, namely radical Islamic organizations. It also triggered a consultation 
among FKUB members working with religious leaders and organizations to defuse the 
situation, being proactive in prevention of inter-religious conflict. In this case there is an 
obvious connection to a public high school, demonstrating in a very direct way that 
schools are not simply isolated microcosms of the public sphere but can become highly 
intertwined in debates about religion, nation, and difference.  
 In this chapter, I begin a foray into a public high school, the first of the three 
schools presented in the dissertation. Going beyond an examination of how schools 
become the objects of political debate, it investigates how they articulate (or not) with 
debates in the public sphere about religious belonging, national belonging, and the 
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accommodation of difference by channeling, boosting, and/or redirecting the kinds of 
ethical normativities and reasoning encountered there. As this chapter demonstrates, the 
major debates taking place in the public sphere with regard to coexistence in a plural 
society, and the contested ethical normativities that relate to these positionings, are highly 
relevant to what is taking place in educational institutions, such as the public school that 
is the main focus of the chapter.  
 This chapter, which takes the public school SMA in Manado as locus of 
deliberation about the role of religion within the nation and the management of diversity, 
describes existing practices and discourses regarding religion and religious difference. 
Far from simply transmitting the national curriculum, teachers in this case deliver the 
curriculum according to the local context, negotiating its meaning and offering their own 
interpretations which make sense in Manado. Similarly, students apply their own 
understandings and interpretations as they participate and deliberate. Drawing on the 
threads from chapter two, I demonstrate how broader discourses about the status of the 
province as both a majority-Christian region and a region known for its respect of 
religious difference are deployed within the specific context of the public school. I also 
engage with the arguments from chapter three, to illustrate how directives from religious 
and civic education programs are implemented in this particular context, and in many 
cases provide varying directives about the place of religion within the nation, and how to 
accommodate difference. 
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Public High School (SMA)  
 I arrived at the public high school SMA for my first day of observation, relieved 
to see that the entrance gate on a bustling street of Manado was still unlocked, even 
though it was several minutes past the 7 AM bell. Two school administrators were 
stationed at the entrance, smiling and shaking the hands of students and teachers one-by-
one as they continued to arrive. Students were easily recognizable in their brown scouting 
uniforms, some pouring out of the blue mikrolets that passed by while blaring American 
pop music, and others emerging from the sea of motorbikes parked on the sidewalk.29   
 The gate opens up to the large central court of the school, encompassed by the 
rectangular 3-story building that accommodates the more than 2,000 students at the 
school on a daily basis. The court is open-air, but sheltered from both the piercing 
sunlight and the heavy tropical rain by a sloped corrugated metal roof. The edges of the 
court are peppered with trees and greenery. I would soon learn that the court is multi-
functional, easily transformed to accommodate a range of activities: basketball games, 
worship sessions, student competitions, and meetings with parents. As I walked toward 
the teacher’s lounge, I couldn’t have missed the one-story high poster featuring a formal 
photo of all teachers and administrators at the school dressed up in bright-blue batik print 
uniforms with the name of the school, SMA, and a slogan printed below in English: “The 
Right Choice, The Bright Future.” 
                                               
29 Mikrolets are light blue vans used for public transportation in Manado, known for their 
forward-facing seats (distinguishing them from angkut in Java), and their propensity for playing 
loud music. The drivers often use both music and decorations (lights, television screens, etc.) to 
attract potential riders. 
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 SMA has a notable academic reputation in North Sulawesi, and is often referred 
to as a “favorite school” (sekolah favorit) among Manadonese because of its prestige and 
record of high academic achievement. However, those familiar with the educational 
landscape in the region suggested that the quality is on the decline because it has begun to 
accept more students than it can logistically accommodate. The student body is ethnically 
and religiously diverse, loosely approximating the social diversity present in the broader 
population of the city of Manado. The majority of students are Protestant, with a sizeable 
minority of Muslim students, a smaller group of Catholic students, and a several Hindu 
students. Most Protestant students are affiliated with GMIM, but several other 
denominations are represented as well, including Seventh Day Adventists and 
Pentecostals, among others. Ethnically, the majority of students are Minahasan, but there 
is significant diversity on this front as well. In particular, Muslim students are mostly 
from the Sangir-Talaud, Bolaang-Mongondow, or Gorontalo ethnic groups. 
 
Figure 8: Principal Vidy Addresses Parents at SMA 
 
  
145 
 Principal Vidy always shows up to school events polished and well-coiffed. Her 
face is often visible throughout the school on printed posters and banners wishing 
students well on their national exams or for the holidays. Though she speaks in formal 
Indonesian when dictated by protocol, she prefers to talk to students and teachers in 
Bahasa Manado, in a lively and familiar manner. The first time I came to the school to 
ask for permission to do research there, I waited outside her office while she gave 
students a heartfelt pep talk before they set off to represent the school in a national 
academic competition. Principal Vidy is a devout Protestant, and is personally close to 
several of the Protestant religious education teachers at the school. It is not uncommon 
for her to shorten or cancel classes to make time for a religious worship session. She also 
hosted the twelfth grade Protestant student retreat at a villa she owns in Manado, helping 
to coordinate logistics and delivering a sermon during one of the worship sessions. 
 Since her appointment as principal, Ibu Vidy has made several important changes 
on the academic front, the most consequential being the decision to switch back to the 
2006 KTSP curriculum instead of moving forward with the 2013 Curriculum that her 
predecessor had already started implementing at the school. While teachers admitted 
having mixed feelings about the effectiveness of this strategy, nobody complained that 
the schedule allowed for a Monday-Friday school week, as opposed to the typical 
Monday-Saturday school week implemented at almost all other high schools in the area.  
 As an observer at SMA, I most often joined the Protestant and Islamic religious 
education classes. There are several Protestant religious education teachers, all affiliated 
with the GMIM Church, who teach the weekly religion courses, observe the small weekly 
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student worship sessions, and coordinate larger school-wide events for Protestant 
students. In addition, many of them also take on roles as counselors at the school. The 
Islamic religious education teacher is also a lecturer at the state-run Islamic university 
IAIN Manado, and had many other commitments that often led him to miss his scheduled 
classes. Muslim students had grown accustomed to his regular absence, and passed the 
time in the classroom chatting, eating, praying, taking selfies, or quietly reading. Due to 
the situation, I was able to more quickly get to know the Muslim students at the school, 
and spent a significant amount of time conversing with them during their scheduled class 
time. I also joined civic education classes, spent time in the counseling room, participated 
in extracurricular activities (especially religious clubs), accompanied students on field 
trips, and attended school-wide assemblies.   
  
A Public School with a Religious Focus 
 SMA’s administration is highly supportive of an increased focus on religion in 
order to provide all students with a strong moral foundation. As is required of public 
schools by law, SMA provides religious education for all students in their respective 
religions. Moving beyond these basic legal requirements, teachers and administrators 
work to weave religion and religious practice into the daily routine of the school, 
encouraging students to participate in a number of religious activities and to deepen their 
own religious practice.  
 As I arrived at the school one morning before the bell, I witnessed several 
students and teachers scattered around the sidewalk and school entrance stop mid-step to 
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bow their heads and fold their hands. The voice of Pak Daniel came crackling over the 
loudspeaker. Pak Daniel is a Protestant religious education teacher who has been teaching 
at the school for nearly 30 years. He has the tendency to grab students’ attention with his 
booming voice and fire-and-brimstone style of preaching. On this day, he began to pray 
for the school, the students, and the teachers and administration, in a formal and rhythmic 
Indonesian, audible not only within the school, but on the surrounding street, competing 
with the concert of honking horns and loud pop music from morning commuters. Pak 
Daniel asked for God’s wisdom and guidance as they carried out their daily activities. 
After several minutes of solemn prayer with teachers and students frozen in place, the 
final phrase “in Jesus’ name we pray,” cued the recommencement of the hustle and bustle 
as students and teachers arrived and prepared for the school day. Typically, one of the 
Protestant religious education teachers leads the morning prayer, although on one 
occasion another teacher joked that Pak Daniel shouldn’t be given the microphone, lest 
he be tempted to perform an entire sermon. 
 Prayer is not only used to ritualize the opening of the school day, but all major 
school activities and events as well. For example, before the principal inducted new 
members into the school’s Red Cross (Palang Merah) club after school, she asked the 
Protestant religious education teacher Ibu Sonia to be present, and to open the event with 
a prayer. When parents of seniors at SMA were called to the school for an information 
session about the national examinations, the principal again asked Ibu Sonia to lead a 
prayer in front of the parents before the meeting began. While most class subjects are 
opened with a collective greeting for the teacher, such as “Good Morning, Ma’am!” 
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(Selamat Pagi, Ibu!), the Protestant religious education classes begin with a prayer led by 
a different student each time 
 The school’s schedule is designed to accommodate one-hour worship sessions on 
Fridays, in addition to the mandated time spent on religious education each week. The 
Protestant students stay in their homeroom class to carry out a student-led worship 
session with prayers, hymns, and a short sermon, with each responsibility rotating among 
the students throughout the academic year. At the same time, Muslim students meet with 
the Islamic religious education teacher to walk to a nearby neighborhood mosque and 
pray there. Catholic and Hindu students also hold their own religious activities in 
different unoccupied classrooms at the same time.  
 The principal often decides to shorten academic classes on particular days to 
accommodate a worship session. These worship sessions are often in celebration of 
particular holidays, such as Easter or Valentine’s Day, or to prepare students for 
academic competitions or events, such as the national examinations.30 They are major 
productions which bring all of the Protestant students and teachers together in the main 
central court of the school to worship as one congregation.    
 In addition, there are several religious clubs at SMA which allow students to 
spend additional time after school on religious activities to plan the execution of these 
worship sessions and to encourage student-led worship and peer learning. Although there 
were several religious extracurricular activities available at the school, I focused mostly 
                                               
30 In Manado, Valentine’s Day is celebrated as a Christian holiday that celebrates God’s love, and 
the reflection of that love among his followers, as well as having popular connotations about 
romantic love.   
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on the Islamic students’ club Rohis (Kerohanian Islam), which is found at schools across 
Indonesia but can vary enormously in programming, and a locally established province-
wide Protestant students’ club, Pelsis (Christian Student Service- Pelayanan Siswa 
Kristen). Previous studies have shown the importance that extracurricular religious clubs 
can have in Indonesian schools in terms of acting as a public sphere where students 
debate ideas about coexistence, and how they can also be used by various social actors to 
gain influence among youth and spread ideas that impact plural coexistence in the 
broader society (Salim, Kailani, and Azekiyah 2011).  
 The principal is an enthusiastic promoter of Pelsis and highly supportive religious 
activities put on by other Protestant clubs at the school, but also regularly attends events 
hosted by other religious clubs, such as a Rohis community service event held in a remote 
village, to signal the school’s support for their activities. These religious clubs are also 
involved in planning and executing a yearly religious retreat for 12th grade students 
before they face the national examinations that play a role in determining high school 
graduation and acceptance into university.  
 Pelsis is a province-wide organization active in identifying and recruiting 
Protestant students with leadership potential. The club is most active at public schools in 
North Sulawesi, and is founded on the principle that Christian students must be aware of 
their ministry to preach the gospel everywhere, including in their respective schools. The 
organization’s leader, Pastor Steven Liow, is in the process of expanding the organization 
to the national level. He appeals to both Pancasila and Christian teachings of love in order 
to affirm the dedication of Protestant Christians in North Sulawesi to nationalist 
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principles. The number of students actually participating in Pelsis from any one school 
may be small, because those participating are typically identified as leaders. Part of their 
training in Pelsis encourages them to take initiative within their schools to become 
leaders in other Christian activities in the school and their community. 
 In short, the administration has instituted several policies that promote a strong 
emphasis on religion, weaving religious practices into the daily and weekly rituals of the 
school. As a public school, the administration is required to accommodate students of all 
religions by providing them with religious education according to their professed 
religion, and does so readily. Principal Vidy also provides support for all of the 
extracurricular religious clubs and activities, promoting religious education and activities 
as a strong moral foundation that is intended to provide students with the skills they need 
to excel academically, spiritually, and socially.  
 
Neutral Public Sphere or Majoritarian Protestant Influence? 
 In chapter two, I argued that the public reasoning in the broader public sphere of 
Manado points to the tension between the desire to maintain Manado’s image as a place 
of religious harmony while continuing to secure the position of the Protestant majority 
through general influence in the public sphere. In positing schools as arenas for debate 
about the position of religion within the national framework and as mechanisms for 
scaling different streams of ethical normativities relevant to orientation toward religious 
difference, the situation at SMA demonstrates how these tensions are channeled into the 
school environment. The school is strongly supportive of all religious activities and 
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projects pride in its image as a school that welcomes all religions and supports the 
integration of religious activities within the educational curriculum. At the same time, the 
way in which the religious activities are carried out often demonstrates de facto 
Protestant majoritarian influence within the school.  
 The religious makeup of Manado’s SMA students is broadly reflective of that of 
the population of Manado, and the school prides itself on being a diverse public 
institution dedicated to religious education and worship. The overall dynamic of the 
school also reflects the tensions present in the broader public sphere: an ideal of religious 
diversity and coexistence that is important and even a source of pride, but also a feeling 
among Christians that the public sphere should remain visibly and audibly Christian. The 
way in which the majority of teachers and administrators take steps to accommodate 
other religions while effectively maintaining a Christian atmosphere at the school is itself 
an example of a certain kind of normative work also visible from groups and actors in the 
focal incidents described in chapter two. In the classroom, some teachers preach the 
importance of religious harmony and tolerance in the abstract, but when faced with 
concrete questions, propagate ideas and opinions that go against or have a different 
interpretation of these ostensibly public ethical norms.  
 The situation of increasing majoritarian religious influence in public schools is 
not isolated to this particular case, but has been noted in majority-Muslim Java, and has 
been located within the larger trend of the foregrounding religious identity in the post-
Suharto era. Many public schools in Java have instituted Qur’anic recitation to open the 
school day, and require all Muslim students to wear the Muslim version of the school 
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uniform (which includes a veil for female students) (Kwok 2014). Furthermore, religious 
associations outside schools have proved influential in promoting, through extracurricular 
religious activities, an effective Islamisation of the public sphere within some public 
schools. For example, some schools have instituted policies about the separation of boys 
and girls in school activities, and rules requiring or pressuring female Muslim students to 
wear the jilbab (veil), and in particular, styles that are considered more modest (Salim et 
al. 2011).  
 At SMA, the integration of religiosity and religious activities into the school 
inscribes the public sphere of the school as Protestant, despite the official appeal to and 
concern about accommodating other religions. This majoritarian influence can be seen in 
the allocation of worship space, food policies in the cafeteria, greetings and prayer in 
various contexts, and through school uniforms. The de facto majoritarian influence arises 
in the school as a coherent scheme, not explicitly planned, but emergent from policies 
and practices. As teachers and the administration channel ethical normativities about 
plurality and coexistence encountered in the public sphere that impact the functioning of 
the school, they deploy particular understandings of what it means to coexist and to 
accommodate other religions. 
 
Spatial Organization: SMA as an Effectively Protestant Public Space 
 One of the ways in which SMA effectively imposes a majoritarian influence is 
through the allocation of worship space within the school. First, the particular holidays 
selected for all-school worship events are invariably Christian celebrations, such as 
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Easter or Valentine’s Day. During these events, the central court of the school is 
transformed into a Protestant worship space large enough to accommodate all Protestant 
students and teachers at the school. A makeshift stage is built, and a printed poster 
announcing the occasion is hung in the court. Students designated as worship leaders play 
instruments, say prayers, and perform dance routines to worship songs, transforming the 
court into a religious space.  
 
Figure 9: Pak Ustad and Students in the Islamic Education Classroom 
 
 At the designated worship times, Muslim students are supposed to meet with their 
religious education teacher and carry out their own religious activities. However, there is 
no place within the school that is large enough to accommodate the hundreds of Muslim 
students at the same time. The school has designated one classroom for Islamic 
education, where students go for their religious education course and meet for Rohis. 
This particular room, its green-carpeted floor and walls visually marking it as a Muslim 
space, is actually smaller than most regular classrooms. Students can use it to carry out 
their prayers during the school day if they want, and there is a stack of prayer rugs on top 
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of the bookshelves for their convenience. The classroom has no desks, which allows it to 
double as a prayer space and as a classroom where students sit on the floor in a circle 
around their teacher Pak Ustad, in a nod to traditional Islamic education.  
 During both the weekly all-school worship sessions (in which Protestants stay in 
their homeroom classes and Muslim students leave), and the special event worship 
sessions (where Protestants use the central court), there is no place large enough for all 
Muslim students to congregate and carry out their own religious activities. Instead, Pak 
Ustad typically takes students to a nearby mosque to perform sholat (prayer) together and 
deliver a short sermon. 
 One morning during the scheduled religious education class, I asked eleventh 
grade Muslim students about religious activities and celebrations at the school. 
Charismatic Pak Ustad was absent that day, and the students decided to take turns reading 
aloud from a section in the textbook on “Islam in the Modern Era.” The lesson devolved 
into a group conversation after approximately fifteen minutes as attention spans faded. 
The students, seated in a circle on the floor, decided to have a group discussion instead. I 
chimed in to ask what they do for worship sessions at the school. It didn’t take long to 
elicit concerns among the Muslim students about the treatment of religious difference at 
SMA.  
 One of the boys explained that logistically, they are separate from the Protestant 
students for any kind of religious celebration at the school, but that these celebrations 
usually involved the Muslim students accommodating “the others” (menyesuaikan 
dengan yang lain), implicitly referring to the Protestant majority. The student leader of 
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Rohis jumped in the conversation to explain to me that in Islam, there is a teaching that I 
have my own religion, and you have yours. He was referring to Surah Al-Kafirun 109:6 
(Untukmu agamamu, dan untukkulah, agamaku), which is a commonly cited verse in the 
Muslim community of Manado, serving as a guiding ethical principal toward acceptance 
of religious difference, although its practical consequences are not always interpreted in 
the same way. He used it to argue that in principle, there was no issue with the school’s 
method of organizing worship sessions. His fellow students, however, pushed back 
slightly on his claim, several voicing concerns about always needing to coordinate with 
and adapt according to “them” (the Protestant majority). Before moving on to another 
topic, another boy piped up, asserting that although it is not always easy, they have to 
continue to “struggle for the sake of dakwah” (berjuang untuk dakwah).31 This is one of 
many instances in which students were openly deliberating about the significance of 
school policies and how to interpret them in light of their own experience and 
understanding of religious coexistence.  
 Just as houses of worship often become major topics of debate and potential flash 
points for conflict in the public sphere, schools can and do become the objects of debate 
about accommodation of religious difference in public space. In Manado, this often 
relates to campaigns to maintain a public religiosity that is visibly Christian. When 
discussing his calling to contribute to the founding of Pelsis in the 1990s, Pastor Liow 
recounted to me that was living in Jakarta and heard about a plan to build prayer rooms 
for Muslim students in public schools in Manado. This convinced him to come back to 
                                               
31 Dakwah can be interpreted as referring to either a deepening of piety among Muslims, or to 
Islamic proselytization.  
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Manado and petition that if prayer rooms for Muslim students were to be built in public 
schools, they would also need to build Christian churches or chapels. He claims that his 
strategy effectively put a halt to the construction of most of the prayer rooms. This 
incident speaks to the prevalence of the fear of Islamization among Manado Christians, 
and the ways in which an effectively Protestant environment has been maintained in 
public schools. 
 
Syalom: Protestant Greetings and Prayers 
 The way in which Protestant-style greetings and prayers are often exclusively 
deployed at the school contributes to marking it as a Christian space. For many formal 
events at SMA—particularly those involving parents, other schools, or the broader 
community—a range of greetings are used to signify attention to religious plurality and 
offer a measure of inclusiveness. However, in the less formal everyday announcements 
and events at the school, these greetings were often shortened, and consisted exclusively 
of recognizably Protestant forms.  
 Before describing the everyday deployment of prayer and greetings at SMA, it is 
important to provide some background on greeting conventions. At many formal public 
events in the region, I was used to hearing both the Muslim greeting assalamu’alaikum 
waramatullahi wabarakatuh and the general Christian greeting salam sejahtera 
(considered appropriate for both Protestants and Catholics) in tandem. On occasion, the 
Hindu greeting om swastyastu was added. In Indonesia, using a range of greetings is 
considered an important gesture of accommodation toward different religious groups. At 
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an inter-religious roundtable discussion among youth in the region, a young woman who 
is Confucian complained that these greetings, though often plural, never include a 
Confucian greeting. However, her attempt to teach her peers a phrase in Mandarin was 
met with confusion, even among a well-intentioned audience. At the same inter-religious 
dialogue event, a Protestant pastor explained her use of the Minahasan greeting “Tabea” 
as an inclusive greeting, welcoming everyone, without needing to give different greetings 
based on the religious groups present. In short, greetings are often considered a measure 
of inclusiveness in religiously mixed settings. 
 In Manado, a more specific call-and-response Protestant greeting based on GMIM 
Church practices is commonly added at local events. In this greeting, the speaker begins 
with “syalom” (after the Hebrew “shalom”), to which the audience responds “damai di 
hati” (peace in my heart). The speaker comes back with “damai di hati,” and the greeting 
closes with the audience’s response, “syalom.” According to one of my informants, a 
lecturer at the Protestant university in Tomohon, this call and response format was a 
relatively recent convention (within the past decade or so), and that the Protestant 
greeting of choice in the area had previously been simply a mutual syalom.  
 At any formal event that takes place at the school, the principal and other 
administrators hew to the typical formula, giving multiple religious greetings to those 
present. When parents came to pick up their children’s report cards and attended an 
informational session first, they were greeted with syalom and assalamu’alaikum from 
Principal Vidy. After Principal Vidy invited a Protestant religious education teacher to 
open the meeting with a prayer, Ibu Sonia informed the parents that she would pray 
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according to her own religion, Protestantism, inviting the parents to join her in prayer 
according to their own religion.   
 When Principal Vidy came to a remote village to show her support for Rohis’s 
community service efforts and was asked to speak at the village mosque, I was surprised 
when she did not open with a greeting, but jumped right into her speech, thanking the 
village for hosting SMA students. Exhausted and having arrived several hours late after 
her driver got lost on the way, she later confided how embarrassed she was to have 
mistakenly omitted an opening greeting from her talk. By the end of it, she had realized 
her error, and added the general Christian greeting “salam sejahtera,” and the Muslim 
greeting “assalamu’alaikum” before handing over the microphone. 
 As classes (other than religion classes) begin at SMA, teachers greet students with 
the standard “good morning” (selamat pagi) or “good afternoon” (selamat siang), and 
students stand up to return the greeting in unison. For religion classes, which are 
separated by religion, students and teachers use the appropriate religious greeting. 
However, for other everyday school events at SMA, teachers do not typically make an 
effort to use multiple greetings as they would for more formal events. For example, when 
the extracurricular Red Cross (Palang Merah) club held an event to induct new members, 
Principal Vidy began the event with a simple “Syalom!” and then proceeded to call Ibu 
Sonia to lead them in prayer. Although teachers at SMA are religiously diverse, 
Protestant teachers are by far the majority.  
  On the morning announcements said over the intercom, different teachers take 
turns saying a morning prayer, but it is always a Protestant teacher who takes on the task. 
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When Ibu Sonia does it, she makes reference to “the Lord Jesus” (Tuhan Yesus), and 
when Pak Daniel prays, he ends by saying, “In Jesus’ name we pray, Amen” (Dalam 
nama Yesus kami berdoa, Amin). Although the morning prayer is not always said by a 
religion teacher, according to my observations, it is always said by a Protestant teacher.  
 Overall, greetings are an additional way in which teachers and administrators 
adhere to the principle of inclusivity. At the same time, the daily use of prayer and 
greeting tend to contribute to the Protestant environment of the school. For formal events, 
teachers and administrators at SMA use multiple religious greetings and take care to 
invite others to pray according to their respective religions when addressing their diverse 
student body at the same time as parents and/or the community. However, on a daily 
basis at the school, whether for extracurricular events or the morning announcements, 
these formalities are often skipped, and the greetings and prayers are exclusively 
Protestant.  
 
SMA: Halal Food Desert 
 Policies about food in schools emerge from a broader socialization agenda related 
to cultural beliefs, tradition, and morality, and orientations toward difference (Karrebæk 
2012). At SMA, the administration’s policy on halal food is related to particular visions 
of multiculturalism in Manado that openly welcome the idea of religious and ethnic 
diversity while simultaneously imposing a strong framework for how “others” are 
accommodated. Although SMA’s student body includes several hundred Muslim 
students, the school does not have any food vendors that cook halal food. Instead, the 
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administration instituted a policy that none of the food vendors at the school are allowed 
to cook or serve pork products. The measure, though intended to accommodate Muslim 
students, adheres to the common assumption among Christians in Manado that Muslims 
who follow dietary restrictions too closely are fanatic or radical. Furthermore, the public 
school’s policy is an example of one of the ways in which it is assumed that Christians 
are securing the religious harmony of the region through the voluntary accommodation of 
a Muslim minority.  
 Before examining the reality of food at SMA for Muslim students, it is important 
to point out that among youth in Manado, food is an extremely salient marker of religious 
difference. When both Muslim and Christian students are asked about their experience 
with friends of another religion, food is often mentioned both as a potential source of 
tension and as an opportunity to demonstrate tolerance. Several Muslim students from the 
madrasah and from SMA said that they were aware of the need to “be careful” (berhati-
hati) about the source of their food, especially when among non-Muslims. They also gave 
instances when they were touched by their non-Muslim friends going out of their way to 
provide halal food for them, or avoiding to eat in front of them during Ramadan, the 
fasting month. These concerns about halal food may be a relatively recent issue, as 
several Christian informants claimed that it had not been a concern among their Muslim 
peers when they were younger. However, this claim was often also used to imply that 
contemporary Muslims concerned with eating halal are unnecessarily fanatic, projecting 
them as responsible for drawing stronger social boundaries between religious groups.   
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 At SMA, one can follow the smell of fried food to get to the kantin, or cafeteria, 
by ducking under a stairwell to get to a room with a cement floor, where a handful of 
local food vendors come daily to cook rice, the local specialty tinutuan (a vegetable 
porridge typically eaten for breakfast), noodles, fried fish and chicken, sweets, and to sell 
pre-packaged snacks and drinks. In other words, there is not one official food provider for 
the school, but each has to gain approval from the administration in order to become a 
vendor at the school. Like at most Indonesian public schools, there is no official 
lunchtime, and the small room is only able to accommodate about 50 people at a time 
sitting at the wooden tables and benches. The school day at SMA runs from 7 AM to 1:30 
PM, and students may choose to stop by to eat a meal or buy snacks in between classes or 
after school. Parents often give their children a small daily or weekly allowance to cover 
the food expenses. Among the several food vendors at SMA, none is allowed to serve 
pork in the school cafeteria as per the policy of the administration. 
 I learned about the school’s cafeteria policy during a casual conversation one 
afternoon with Muslim students when I asked them which vendors serve halal food. 
Iqbal, a popular boy active in the Muslim student’s club, hesitated before responding. He 
explained that although no pork is cooked or served in the cafeteria, none of the vendors 
sell freshly cooked halal food. Surprised, I asked how the students navigate the daily 
reality of buying and eating food at the school. He said that some students who are 
concerned bring their own food from home to avoid the cafeteria altogether, while others 
opt to buy exclusively processed and pre-packaged snacks that bear the seal of halal food 
certified by the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI). Iqbal shrugged, finally admitting 
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that for the most part, Muslim students still tend to buy food from the school’s vendors. 
In other words, the school’s policy regarding food requires Muslims students (and their 
parents) to make daily decisions about how best to follow religious requirements in such 
an environment where fresh certified halal food is not readily available. 
 SMA’s ban on pork products is one strategy for accommodating a Muslim 
minority, but other public schools in Manado have taken different approaches. However, 
there is no consensus about the best way to accommodate the dietary restrictions of 
Muslim students, including among Muslim students and educators. One morning, I sat in 
a green plastic chair at the exclusively halal cafeteria of the state-run Islamic institute of 
higher education (IAIN) in Manado to speak with a group of male lecturers about the 
history of Islamic education in North Sulawesi. As I explained briefly my broader 
research question about education and tolerance, one of the lecturers immediately offered 
up a culinary example of what he referred to as an effort to “create an atmosphere of 
tolerance” (menciptakan suasana toleransi). At one of the local public middle schools, 
the administration recently decided to designate a specific area as the Muslim cafeteria 
(kantin Islam), with a vendor serving only halal food. Farizky, a younger lecturer active 
in a sub-organization of NU on Islamic Arts and Culture (Lesbumi), confided later that he 
disagreed with the professor’s statement about the cafeteria, although he did not dare to 
offer his contradictory opinion in front of his senior. Farizky worried that the act of 
creating a separate cafeteria, regardless of the intention behind it, could potentially 
harden the divisions among students based on religious identity due to the physical 
separation of students it would induce. 
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 SMA’s policy about food in the cafeteria can also be tied to common assumptions 
in Manado about the centrality of Christians in securing a working arrangement of 
religious coexistence through their tolerance on a number of different fronts. Just as the 
prohibition of pork is meant as an accommodating gesture toward Muslim students, so is 
the provision of food for Muslim guests at Minahasan events and celebrations (birthday 
parties, weddings, funerals, etc.). Although a roast pig (babi putar) is central in these 
celebrations, in my experience, there was often a separate table featuring dishes made 
without pork, dog, bat, or any of the other typical meats used for festive Minahasan 
dishes. This table was consistently referred to as the table with “national food” (makanan 
nasional) rather than explicitly referred to as halal food, but always understood to be for 
Muslim guests. The provisioning of food for Muslims is framed as an enactment of 
Christian and Minahasan hospitality toward guests and neighbors. 
 
Figure 10: A Separate Buffet Table for “National/Muslim Food” at a Minahasan Protestant Wedding  
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 Some Christians project such gestures of hospitality as the foundation of religious 
tolerance in Manado, with the assumption that it is Christian gestures of accommodation 
that secure the basis of coexistence. During the question/answer session at a teachers’ 
Christian leadership seminar run by Haggai Institute and held at a private Catholic 
school, teachers were asking the trainer questions about Islam and interacting with 
Muslims after he gave a presentation about Jesus from the perspective of the Qur’an. One 
of the young Protestant teachers at the school, clearly distressed, confessed that her 
Muslim neighbor attended a celebration at her house and inadvertently ate a dish with 
pork in it. The teacher admitted feeling deeply ashamed about what happened and was 
seeking advice about whether or not she should broach the subject with her neighbor and 
apologize. The other teachers sitting around her consulted with one another, 
sympathizing with the gravity of her dilemma, and came to the agreement that she should 
just leave the situation alone. Based on their understanding of Islam, one teacher offered, 
it is not wrong for Muslims to eat pork if they are unaware it is in their food. The pastor 
jumped into the conversation, asking why the young teacher felt so ashamed, 
provocatively adding the suggestion that perhaps her neighbor even enjoyed eating the 
dish. The pastor then upheld the teacher’s concern as a self-congratulatory example, 
exclaiming, “Look how tolerant Christians are!” He contrasted her behavior in interacting 
with her Muslim neighbors to how he has been treated by Muslims in Manado who 
aggressively questioned him about the authenticity of the Bible.  
 In chapter two, limits of tolerance in the public sphere clearly manifested when 
the future of Manado as a majority Christian city appeared to be threatened through 
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religious worship and expression in the public sphere. For many Christians in Manado, 
the presence of halal foods is indicative of a Muslim encroachment into the public sphere. 
At a few local restaurants and food stalls (warung), I noticed the designation “100% 
NON-HALAL” (100% TIDAK HALAL) on restaurant signage and menus. At one such 
restaurant, the fact that the house specialty was pork noodles rendered it immediately 
obvious that the food was not halal. Rather than being simply informative, these symbols 
work to mark and reinforce the public space as Christian. 
 
Figure 11: A Restaurant Advertises Food that is “1000% NOT HALAL” 
  
 In an interview I conducted with a GMIM pastor involved in inter-religious 
dialogues and a well-known adat organization, he argued that inter-religious tolerance in 
Manado is decreasing, citing changing food practices as one piece of evidence for his 
case. His observations also projected assumptions about Muslim encroachment on 
Minahasan cultural practices, weaving together a narrative that linked increasing 
intolerance toward Muslims as a response Muslim disregard for Minahasan cultural 
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practices. He recounted that at Minahasan parties in the past, the roast pig (babi putar) 
was prominently displayed, but that Muslim neighbors had no qualms about attending the 
parties and eating other dishes. Now, he claimed, it is considered polite to keep the roast 
pig inside the house so that it is not as visible and more clearly separate from the other 
food. The numerous Minahasan celebrations that I attended did not follow this directive, 
and indeed the prominent display of the roast pig was still considered important as a 
centerpiece of the celebration. However, as mentioned above, many hosts provided a 
table of what they refer to as “national food,” for Muslim guests, featuring dishes made 
with chicken and beef that are more generically Indonesian (such as fried rice and 
noodles) than particularly Minahasan. 
 The public school’s policy banning pork in the cafeteria, though enacted to be 
accommodating toward Muslim students, is based on common misconception among 
Christians in Manado that halal food is equivalent to food without pork. Muslim 
university students who participated in a week-long religious “exchange” program cited 
food as a major concern prior to and during their participation in the program, which 
required them to stay for a week at either the Catholic seminary or the Protestant 
university and live among Christian students there. The Muslim alumni of the program 
admitted to me that they had to adopt an attitude toward food that was more “open” 
(terbuka) during their time in the program. One of the former participants told me that the 
first day of the program, she did not feel hungry, and would put bites of rice in her mouth 
but could not shake the feeling that something was preventing her from swallowing. By 
the next day, she explained, she was hungry but still concerned about the source of the 
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food, and decided to pray to Allah to “make everything halal” (halalkan semua), which 
made her feel more comfortable as she continued to eat there throughout the week. 
Rhena, who had spent a week at the Catholic seminary, was moved by the concern of the 
seminarians, and their constant effort to keep food containing pork separate from hers, 
telling her which dishes were okay for her to eat. For Suleiman, who stayed at the 
Protestant university for one week, the program provided opportunities to teach the 
Christian students about the requirements for halal food. One evening, his hosts proudly 
declared that they slaughtered the chicken served for dinner that evening, and were 
therefore certain it was halal. Suleiman followed with an explanation about the 
requirements for halal food, which are not just about contamination with pork, but also 
govern the method of slaughtering and required accompanying prayer and ritual. 
 Christian religious education teachers at both the public school and private 
Catholic school on various occasions offered perceptions of Islam and halal food to their 
students. In one religious education class for eleventh graders at the private Catholic 
school, the teacher Pak George brought up attitudes toward Muslim eating practices as an 
example of thinking of others and avoiding discrimination, encouraging students to be 
relativist. Pak George contrasted the Christian wedding where one can find dishes with 
snake and dog to Muslim events where there might just be chicken, beef and vegetables, 
instructing students that they should not ask people, “Why are you eating like this? It’s 
not as delicious as my food.” He shared an anecdote about Christian friends who asked 
Muslims to cook for their weddings so that all the food would be entirely halal and could 
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be eaten by everyone, ending by making the moral of the story explicit: you should not to 
be too arrogant in your own religion.  
 However, at the same time, teachers’ explanations fed into popular perceptions of 
Muslims in Manado as more moderate because they are supposedly more lax about eating 
pork, as well as equating halal food with not eating pork. Again in the Catholic religious 
education class, Pak George discussed Muslim eating practices after a student group 
presented about Islam for a lesson about inter-religious dialogue. A girl in the class asked 
the presenting group, “Why do Muslims have to eat halal food?” Because the classroom 
was loud, Pak George demanded the students’ attention, shouting, “Listen!” Upon 
repeating the question, he rephrased it, asking, “Why can’t Muslims eat pork?” When the 
presenting group of students looked at each other in confusion and had difficulty in 
answering the question in front of their peers, the teacher offered a personal anecdote 
related to the topic. He once invited a friend out to eat, without realizing that the friend 
was Muslim. At the restaurant, Pak George ordered brenebon (pork and kidney bean 
soup) and pork satay, forgetting to ask his friend whether or not he could eat them. 
However, his Muslim friend ate the dishes anyway and explained to Pak George that 
some Muslims eat pork, and others don’t. Ending his story, Pak George asserted, “Some 
moderate Muslims do eat pork.”  
 Anecdotes like the one the Catholic religious education teacher supplied about his 
Muslim friend who was willing to eat pork are meant to emphasize the tolerant nature of 
Muslims in Manado, as opposed to a conceptualization of tolerance as uniquely 
guaranteed by the Christian majority. However, at the same time, it paints a picture of 
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Muslims as tolerant when they accept the conditions of the implicitly Christian public 
sphere. Another example of this outlook was often repeated by Christians in Manado 
during the fasting month of Ramadan. In some areas of Indonesia, including Java, 
restaurants often remain open during the fasting hours, but install curtains to shield the 
food and dining customers from the sight of those passing by. Minahasan Christians often 
remarked upon the tolerance of Muslims in Manado for not requesting that restaurants 
cover themselves during the fasting month. Consequently, Muslims who do not eat pork 
or who advocate for restaurants to be covered during Ramadan are projected as radical. In 
addition, when there are groups of Muslims following strict dietary restrictions in 
Manado, it plays into existing fears of a Muslim encroachment, or the idea that there has 
been an influx of Muslim “outsiders” in the region, and that it endangers the existing 
implicitly Christian public sphere.  
 
Jilbabs in a Christian Space 
 Parallel to statements about Manadonese Muslims and their relationship to halal 
food, Minahasan Christians often claim that Muslims in Manado do not wear the jilbab 
(veil) because they are moderate, as opposed to being radical or fanatic (radikal, fanatik). 
Though there is not sufficient space here to fully delve into the history of veiling and its 
myriad meanings across Indonesia, the practice of veiling in places like Java has 
increased in tandem with a general Islamic resurgence. Smith-Hefner (2007) analyzes the 
donning of the veil by young middle-class women in Java who want to signal their pious 
commitment while simultaneously taking advantage of new opportunities of education 
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and employment in a rapidly changing society. A relative increase in the number of 
veiling women is also evident in Manado, but is perceived in different ways among the 
Protestant majority. For those advocating for a strong Christian atmosphere and who 
view the expansion of Islam in the region as a threat, an increase in veiling offers proof of 
the growth of the Muslim community and/or of the spread of less moderate forms of 
Islam. 
 
Figure 12: Muslim Students at SMA with the Author 
 
 At SMA, the administration does not have a specific policy about veiling. There 
are, however, guidelines about wearing the school uniform, for which there was an 
Islamic option for girls with long sleeves, a full-length skirt, and the addition of a 
headscarf. The majority of Muslim girls at the school did not actually wear the Islamic 
version of the uniform, but stuck to the generic girls uniform worn by other female 
students. At another public high school in Manado, the principal was rumored to have 
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told the admissions committee of the school not to accept too many Muslims at the 
school, especially girls who wear a jilbab. In chapter seven, I discuss in more detail the 
issue of the school uniform both in terms of the conception of moral personhood it 
entails, and as a marker of religious difference. Here, the main point is that in public 
religiously mixed schools in Manado, veiling students were often perceived as evidence 
of the expansion of Islam (or a more “radical” form of Islam) in a Christian space. 
 
Protestants: Learning to Shift Majority/Minority Positioning  
 In chapter two, I discussed the importance of the majority and minority 
positioning taken up by Minahasan Christians in the public sphere. Protestants in Manado 
use their status as a local majority to advocate for Christians and publicize their plight as 
a national minority in response to several focal incidents, ranging from the destruction of 
churches in other provinces to the blasphemy trial of Ahok. In this section, I discuss the 
ways in which this shift in positionality takes place in classes and clubs at SMA, also 
linking it to the same practice by organizations and groups in Manado. In Protestant 
religious education classes at SMA, as well as Christian extracurricular clubs, the 
minority status of Christians in the national context is often stressed in discussions of 
inter-religious relations. The status of Protestants as a local majority is often brought up 
to encourage students to deepen their own faith and not become complacent. 
 In the classroom setting at SMA, Protestants are often referred to as a minority in 
discussions of inter-religious relations, taking the nation as the frame of reference. In a 
Protestant religious education class one afternoon, a student raised a question about the 
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destruction of churches and groups who oppose the construction of churches. As Ibu 
Sonia addressed the question, she started in by saying, “We are a minority,” sticking to 
the national context the student was addressing, but also occupying the particular subject 
position through use of “we” (kita / Manado: torang). In addition, throughout her answer, 
she used “they” (mereka) to implicitly refer to Muslims, the majority. 
 In the tenth grade civic education course, students learn about respecting and 
others as citizens and valuing difference rather than discriminating based on SARA and 
gender. On the day when this lesson was addressed at SMA, the teacher Ibu Pricilia gave 
students time in groups to brainstorm ways to enact national unity and avoid 
differentiating based on each of the categories. When she asked groups to respond and 
give examples of behavior that does not discriminate based on religion, they all came up 
with answers. From the first group, one boy stated that it’s important not to denigrate 
other religions (jangan menjelekkan agama lain). One student, Evan, shouted out without 
being called on, “Don’t compare religious teachings!” (jangan membandingkan ajaran). 
Grace spoke up for her group, “We have to maintain harmonious inter-religious 
relations” (harus menjaga kerukunan antar umat beragama).  
 Considering the responses from the students, Ibu Pricilia summarized that 
“religion is sensitive,” qualifying that this is especially so when we talk about majority 
versus minority. She went on to say that she is Protestant because she considers it the best 
religion for her, but if someone is Muslim it is because s/he considers it the best religion 
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for her/him. Bringing up the question of how to value religious difference, she offered her 
own response with a concrete example of the Protestant governor of Jakarta:32 
 “One example is Ahok, Governor of DKI [Jakarta], who is always attacked 
 because of his religion, said to be unfit to be governor because he is Christian. But 
 for a governor, there is no relationship between the formal position and his 
 religion!”  
 
 She then moved on without further discussion, asking students to give examples 
of behavior that doesn’t discriminate based on race. The teacher’s choice of concrete 
example is significant in its focus on the national context, where Christians are a 
minority, and there is resistance against the prospect of a Christian governor in a Muslim-
majority region. Months earlier, during the regional election for Governor of North 
Sulawesi, one of the three candidates (Benny Mamoto) had chosen a Muslim running 
mate and promoted the slogan “United in Difference” (Bersatu dalam Perbedaan) on his 
campaign fliers. Though the duo was popular in some circles, they did not win the 
election. The same concern was inevitably raised among Christians: what if something 
happened to Benny, and then a Muslim would be governing the majority-Protestant 
province? 
 The leader of the province-wide Christian extracurricular club Pelsis active at 
SMA spoke often about the situation of Christians as a minority in the national context, 
and the need for strong Christian leaders from North Sulawesi to have a national impact. 
Pastor Liow, when talking to me about the mission of the organization, explained that as 
Christians, they live in a country where they are considered a minority, and not just a 
                                               
32 The timing of the lesson was during the Gubernatorial race in Jakarta, when Ahok was running 
for reelection, but before he became embroiled in accusations of blasphemy against Islam. 
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minority, but as “kafir” (unbelievers). Despite being scorned, he claims, Christians 
continue to work for the unity of the nation. 
 
 
Figure 13: Worship Session at a Province-wide Pelsis Meeting 
 
Figure 14: Students Sing during Worship at a Pelsis Meeting 
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 As he began a sermon for the province-wide meeting in a conference room at the 
Governor’s Office, addressing selected Protestant students from across the province, he 
first mentioned that there is a challenge for Pelsis students. Although Christians are a 
majority in North Sulawesi, he wanted them to know that maintaining a Christian identity 
is not easy, but they have a calling to be God’s blessing for the nation. Pastor. Liow also 
mentioned Ahok, using his position as an example of the progress Christians have made 
after Reformasi. He called for Christian youth to maintain their identity, love the nation, 
and promote peace without regard to race or religion.  
 The idea that Christian youth in North Sulawesi might think life is easy, whereas 
in the national context (as a minority) being a Christian is difficult, was not always 
presented in a negative light. For example, at the Haggai institute training held at a 
private Catholic school, one of the trainers, a Protestant pastor, noted that where 
Christians are the minority in Indonesia, they experience difficulties, but that trials will 
ultimately strengthen their faith. His point was that in areas where Christians are the 
majority, like North Sulawesi, they might feel too comfortable, and ultimately become 
lazy in practicing their faith.  
 This perspective regarding the negative aspects of being a local majority was also 
echoed at a SMA Protestant student retreat for students, held yearly for twelfth graders as 
spiritual preparation for the final exam. Pak Daniel was passionately revving up his 
sermon, preparing students to reflect on their sins to later write them down on a piece of 
paper and throw it into a bonfire. He relied on the popular topic of sexual deviancy and 
promiscuity as he encouraged youth to consider all of their wrongdoings. Using the 
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phrase “permissive society” in English, he remarked that “This is a Christian region, but 
the majority of people are acting against God!” He was drawing on the popular notion 
that because of living in a majority-Christian area, they have started to lead lackadaisical 
religious lives. 
 Through these instances, it is clear how Protestant teachers at SMA and leaders of 
extracurricular religious clubs shift between a focus on Christians as a majority and 
minority in different contexts and for different effect. An emphasis on Christians as a 
minority in the national context was often brought up to draw attention to the difficulties 
that Christians face, and often used as an example of religious discrimination. On the 
other hand, the situation of Christians as a regional majority was typically invoked to 
argue for increased religious commitment, based on the observation that Christians had 
become complacent. 
 
Discourses on Religion and Respect for Diversity 
 In addition to school policies regarding the allocation of space and the governing 
of the cafeteria, discourses in the Protestant religious education classroom also tend to 
support the principle of tolerance in the abstract, but concretely focused on the difficulty 
for Christians as a religious minority. To do so, teachers used a national frame to reflect 
on the situation of Indonesian Christians as a whole, rather than on their situation as a 
local majority. 
 In a Protestant religious education class I attended in April 2016 at the public high 
school SMA, a discussion about living in a religiously diverse society involved students 
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drawing on discourses about the importance of respecting and valuing difference. The 
Protestant religious education teacher, Ibu Sonia, launched into a lecture about both the 
good intentions of all religions and the importance of love in Christian teachings. When 
speaking in the abstract, she proclaimed the good nature of all religions: “If we were all 
able to follow our religion well—whether Muslim, Catholic, Hindu, or Confucian—if we 
were all able to follow our respective teachings, there would be no conflict on earth!”33 
 The topic of the lecture prompted a student in the front row to ask about a 
Facebook post she had recently seen about demonstrations in Java against the 
construction of a church. She wondered what had motivated the protesters, and how she 
could respond to them in a Christian way. In addressing this concrete example, the same 
teacher explained that Christians are continually taught about love, but “they” (Muslims) 
are taught that Christians are “kafir,” unbelievers. She lamented how difficult it is for 
Christians to worship in Indonesia where they are a minority and their neighbors might 
report them just for clapping their hands in worship, while Christians tolerate Muslims 
yelling “Allahu Akbar” early in the morning. As the teacher spreads the official discourse 
of religious harmony and respect for difference, she also expresses assumptions about 
Christian love and tolerance that attribute the religious harmony in Manado to its 
majority Christian population and see those defined as “outsiders” as potential threats. 
 At the end of her monologue. Ibu Sonia implied that none of this matters when 
they consider the bigger picture. “Everyone is searching for salvation,” she explained to 
                                               
33 “Kalau kita mampu melakukan agama dengan baik—mau Muslim, Katolik, Hindu, 
Konghucu—kalau kita mampu menjalaninya dengan aturan masing-masing, tidak ada kekacauan 
di bumi ini!” 
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the students, “but salvation is already in our hands, through the flesh and blood of 
Christ!” Through her statement, she moves away from her earlier positive 
characterization of all religions, fixating on the ultimate truth of Christianity.  
 Ibu Sonia’s assumption that Christians guarantee coexistence, based on the 
essentializing equation of Christianity as love, is quite common in Manado. It resonates 
with the broader discourse of Manado as an example of religious harmony, but attributes 
this achievement to the fact that the majority of people in Manado follow Christianity. 
For example, one Protestant pastor affiliated with the Manado FKUB claimed that 
religious harmony in the city is decreasing. He argued that increasing the level of 
tolerance would be difficult so long as Muslims remain opposed to building churches in 
other regions of Indonesia. Suspicion of Muslims is thus framed as a reasonable response 
and is justified using essentialized portraits of both religions.  
 However, this does not mean that students necessarily internalize such discourses 
or that they are unable to grasp the meaning of respect for diversity. Many students were 
aware of the broader social and religious situation of Manado and of Indonesia. When 
speaking casually with Muslim students at the public school, I asked if it affects them 
personally when there are church burnings like the one that happened in Aceh, wondering 
if they faced discrimination from their fellow Christian students. One of the students 
active in the Muslim students’ club quickly responded affirmatively, explaining that any 
such conflict is troubling for them because it is troubling for the unity of the nation as a 
whole. In other words, some students were well aware of the high stakes of these issues 
and their potential impact on the future of Indonesia. 
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Conclusion 
 The public high school SMA appeals to support for religious diversity, projecting 
religious values as an important moral foundation. In doing so, the administration is 
aligned with the national push for character education with a religious basis, discussed in 
chapter three.34 At the same time, the implementation of school policies regarding the use 
of Christian prayers and greetings, allocation of worship space, and policies about halal 
food promote a Christian hegemony in the public sphere of the school. Throughout the 
chapter, I have connected the assumptions behind these policies to reasoning taking place 
in the broader public sphere of North Sulawesi about religious diversity and belonging.  
 The situation of public schools like SMA in North Sulawesi, which promote a 
Christian environment, also needs to be considered in the national context. There are 
significant parallels in Muslim Java, and other majority-Muslim areas of Indonesia. 
Qur’anic readings have in some cases become part of the daily routine of students, 
veiling is a requirement for all Muslim girls, and Islamic organizations have a strong 
involvement in shaping normative understandings of Islamic teachings through influence 
on extracurricular activities (Salim et al. 2011). These examples demonstrate that the 
exercise of majoritarian influence has not only taken place in North Sulawesi, but is a 
widespread strategy about control of the public sphere. As such, these findings 
underscore the importance of examining schools as arenas of deliberation, not only in 
                                               
34 The school’s administration was heavily focused on promoting religious activities and 
religiosity more generally, in line with character education requirements of the 2013 Curriculum, 
even though at the time of research (2015-16), the school had reverted to the KTSP Curriculum 
(discussed in chapter three). However, by 2017 SMA started to implement the 2013 Curriculum 
once again. 
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how they are used by organizations to gain influence, but also in how perspectives from 
the public sphere get channeled through them to shape the life-worlds of Indonesian 
youth and their navigation of ethical frameworks regarding religiosity and respect for 
diversity.  
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CHAPTER 5: PRIVATE CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL:  
DEVELOPING FAITH AND CHARACTER TO DEVELOP THE NATION35 
 
 Among the three schools analyzed in-depth in this dissertation, the private 
Catholic Lokon St. Nikolaus High School (Lokon) is the only one which strongly 
vocalizes its project of multicultural education. Its highly prestigious boarding program is 
geared toward character education, and has been able to attract students from different 
provinces and from different ethnic and religious backgrounds to enroll. The 
multicultural project of the school is ultimately based on a Catholic perspective, which 
positions Catholic principles as universal and able to provide a foundation for inter-ethnic 
and inter-religious tolerance.  
 Although Christians as a national minority in Indonesia “have a precarious role in 
the struggle for shaping the nation” (Schröter 2010:9), this historically and 
ethnographically situated analysis focuses on one such attempt through Lokon School’s 
framing of the relationship between Christian piety, development, and national 
citizenship. Lokon’s project of missionizing for development of the nation approaches 
individual faith and character building as the first step toward producing Christian—not 
exclusively Catholic—elites from eastern Indonesia who can shape the future of the 
democratic, multi-confessional Indonesian nation. 
 
                                               
35 A previous version of this chapter (Larson 2018) has been published in an edited volume on 
Mission and Development: Religion and Techno-Politics in Asia (Scheer, Fountain, and Feener 
2018), based on a conference of the same name held at the Asia Research Institute, National 
University of Singapore in December 2015.   
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Praying for the Nation 
 During her high school’s morning assembly, tenth grader Alicia walked to the 
center of the field and took the microphone to practice for an upcoming speech 
competition among Catholic high school students from North and Central Sulawesi. 
Positioned under the red and white Indonesian flag flapping in the breeze, with 
picturesque Mt. Lokon visible in the background, she appealed to her fellow students 
gathered around her in almost-neat rows. “As the young generation,” she said, “it’s up to 
us to realize the dreams of the generations who have come before us.” She made 
reference to the young nationalists in the Dutch East Indies who took the Youth Pledge 
(Sumpah Pemuda) in 1928 and declared Indonesia as one homeland and one nation, with 
one language. To continue this mission, they will need to be faithful, knowledgeable, and 
take responsibility for their actions, she explained. “Exactly how can we do this?” Alicia 
asked her fellow students. She paused for effect, and then continued, providing them with 
the answer: “without giving up, we have to keep praying!”  
 Alicia is a student at Lokon, which boasts an expansive and well-groomed 
campus and a prestigious academic reputation. While it is not a formal Catholic 
institution, it enjoys many informal connections to the Catholic Church. The educational 
project, which looks to the high position of Minahasans in the colonial past, promotes a 
national frame that does not simply reproduce existing national ideologies about the 
incorporation of religious and ethnic difference, but rather negotiates them in imagining 
the possibility of a more central position for North Sulawesi in Indonesia’s future. 
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Figure 15: Lokon Students during the Flag Ceremony (Upacara Bendera) 
 
Religion, Development and Re-imagining the Nation  
 The anthropological literature has increasingly recognized the importance of 
religion in relation to modes of belonging in the nation, and in approaches toward 
national development . For example, Lila Abu-Lughod explains how Egyptians have over 
the past few decades increasingly seen Islamic values and morals as “leading to the 
reform and restoration of the good society and nation, not its downfall,” challenging 
previous local assumptions about the relationship between secularism and patriotic 
nationalism (2005:175). In a similar vein, Kevin O’Neill has noted how neo-Pentecostal 
groups in majority Catholic Guatemala seek to solve national economic problems and 
fight crime through organizing prayer networks (2009). The importance of such studies 
lies both in the continued emphasis on the religious individual as a site of transformation, 
and the examination of its consequences for the ways in which people re-imagine the 
boundaries and the contours of national communities. Lokon School was launched during 
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a historical moment of decentralization in Indonesia, with a changing conceptualization 
of national center and periphery, and of a renewed questioning (and eventual re-
affirmation) of the multi-confessional basis of the nation. These conditions shaped the 
goals of Lokon’s founders, including the attempt to redefine the position of the province 
of North Sulawesi, and to present Christianity and the national ideology as mutually 
reinforcing. 
 How, then, can we understand this relationship between religion and development 
within the national project? One major anthropological lens for the study of development 
projects is through the concept of techno-politics (Mitchell 2002), or the view of 
development projects as “anti-politics machines” (Ferguson 1990). These approaches 
characterize the way in which development projects de-politicize issues by a process of 
‘rendering technical,’ or transforming problems into technical issues to be solved through 
bureaucratic processes (Li 2007). Can Lokon School be understood as a project that 
‘renders ethical’ rather than technical, in the sense that it is converting serious political 
issues into matters of individual faith? Rudnyckyj (2010) makes a similar claim in his 
argument that neo-liberalization in the contexts of democratization and decentralization 
in Indonesia has resulted in the creation of a new spiritual economy. This new spiritual 
economy, he claims, turns previous development failures into individual moral problems 
to be addressed through careful self-cultivation. However, I argue that viewing the 
project of Lokon School through the theoretical frame of techno-politics obscures the 
important deliberation that is taking place at the school about what it means to be a good 
Christian and a good citizen. While the school certainly focuses on individual religious 
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transformation as an important step toward national development, the project is much 
more an attempt to link two ethical systems (civic and religious) rather than simply a case 
of couching political projects in religious and ethical terms.  
 It is important to take seriously the educational program of Lokon as multi-
dimensional in nature, instead of analyzing it as simply a push toward or pull against a 
national development scheme. Rather, it is a forum where deliberation about the 
relationship between Christian and Indonesian values is taking place. James Hoesterey 
has documented the ways in which Islamic seminars in Indonesia “have become religio-
civic forums through which issues of civic virtue and Muslim citizenship are constituted 
and contested” (2012:39). As the founders of Lokon school look to a colonial past shaped 
by conversion of Minahasans to Christianity and the institutionalization of formal 
education, they are trying to answer the question of what this might have to offer for the 
Indonesian national future, in part through the coupling of civic and religious values. As 
expected, there are points of tension that arise, particularly in the frameworks that it 
provides for understanding religious and ethnic difference. After presenting the vision of 
the school and putting it into historical perspective, I focus on the tensions that arise in 
this dynamic and meaningful debate that have consequences for how individuals 
understand the national framework and its integration of diversity. 
 As we consider the educational project of the school it is important to keep in 
mind the students at Lokon who weave multiple aspirations as they dream about their 
possible futures. Although Alicia’s speech clearly echoes the objectives of her school’s 
educational project, along with her own desire to be a faithful Christian who prays 
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regularly, her aspirations are plural. The mostly upper-middle class students at Lokon 
dream of becoming successful individuals, have a desire to practice their religion and 
express their religiosity, hope to find a boyfriend or girlfriend, and often also a desire to 
participate in and align themselves with a global pop culture through choice of music and 
brand-name accessories. Although Lokon students are not singularly focused on the 
school’s vision, their concerns and efforts at times do overlap with the approach of the 
school in making a difference in Indonesia and contributing to national development. In 
this mix of goals, which are also charged with moral connotations, there is a “coexistence 
of various motivations, aims, and identities that can and often do conflict but do not 
constitute exclusive opposites” (Schielke 2009:S29). In other words, some of the dreams 
and desires of the students, including those to be pious and successful individuals, can 
interact with and reinforce the broader vision of the school, but that these same students 
also have aspirations that may lack commonality with or even conflict with the kind of 
subjectivity that the school seeks to cultivate.   
 
Lokon School: A Vision and Mission to Revitalize North Sulawesi 
 Lokon St. Nikolaus High School is a coeducational boarding school with over 400 
students who stay in dormitories on the school’s expansive campus, set back from the 
main road in the lush, green, and mountainous city of Tomohon. A visit to the campus 
impresses with its distinctive style: the buildings are modern, functional, and well 
maintained, and the manicured landscape showcases stunning flowers and trees native to 
the region. On the campus, there are classrooms, separate male and female dormitories, a 
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library, dining hall, sport hall, laundry facilities, a swimming pool, and a fully equipped 
hostel for parents to stay when they visit. The school offers extracurricular activities such 
as basketball, marching band, dance team, choir, science and math olympiads, and a 
hiking club.  
 
Figure 16: Boys’ Dormitories at Lokon  
 
Figure 17: Sport Hall and Swimming Pool on Lokon’s Campus 
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 The administrators often mention the founder’s goal of educating students to be 
“successful in life,” rather than just successful at school and in academic achievements. 
The boarding aspect of the school is seen as essential to this end, and is portrayed as the 
way in which they build students’ character. The school has also proven its academic 
success—prominently on display in the large trophy cases in the school lobby—and 
earned a reputation of prestige in the surrounding community. The school has welcomed 
numerous guests of honor, including former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who 
came to the school for its official inauguration ceremony in 2006. The Minister of 
Education and Culture, Muhadjir Effendy, visited in 2016 for the inauguration of the 
middle school that shares a campus with the high school.  
 Ronald and Mary Korompis, the couple who founded the school, are Catholics of 
Chinese descent from North Sulawesi who have used some of their considerable private 
capital to implement a number of religious initiatives in the province. Another notable 
site funded by the Korompis family is the impressive Prayer Hill (Bukit Doa) with 
stations of the cross along a path which climbs up Mt. Mahawu. The stunning bronze 
statues of the Christ are set against a backdrop of lush greenery and jungle ferns, and are 
made even more impressive by the fog that often sets in as part of this tropical mountain 
landscape. At the top of the mountain, there is a spectacular view of the city of Tomohon 
with a chapel and amphitheatre. There is also a retreat center designed for groups of 
pilgrims, also made available for Lokon students during spiritual retreats. In addition, the 
Korompis family contributes to local parishes to build churches and fund local Catholic 
charities, one of which is an orphanage that cares for children with severe mental and 
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physical disabilities. These initiatives are part of a broader vision not only to revitalize 
Catholic presence in the area, but also to develop the region and raise its position on a 
national level. 
 
Figure 18: A Station of the Cross at the Prayer Hill (Bukit Doa) 
 
 The school is run by a private foundation that often works closely with the 
Catholic Church, but is not officially recognized as a Catholic institution. Many of the 
teachers are civil servants, and all are lay people of diverse Christian backgrounds 
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(including Catholic, Protestant, and Pentecostal).36 The foundation overseeing the school 
includes on its board an influential priest in the region, and another Carmelite priest acts 
as a spiritual advisor for students at the school and often preaches during morning 
announcements and celebrates mass with the students. There are also several religious 
brothers from a local order who work as dormitory staff. In other words, there is strong 
collaboration with local Catholic clergy and institutions, but the school is ultimately 
independent from them as a private foundation.  
 Lokon welcomes students of all official religions in Indonesia, and the majority of 
students who attend are in fact Protestant. However, all students who attend the school, 
regardless of their professed religion, are required to take Catholic religious education 
courses and attend daily prayers and weekly mass. This is a common requirement at 
private Catholic schools in Indonesia, though such requirements have generally been a 
source of controversy and debate for decades due to concerns about proselytization via 
religious education (Crouch 2014:20-21). The school positions itself as multicultural 
based on accepting students of all religions. At the same time, there is a homogenization 
of existing religious difference on a surface level through the requirement that everyone 
participate in the same Catholic religious education classes and attend the same worship 
sessions.  
 Most of the students at the school are from North Sulawesi, but many provinces 
across Indonesia are represented in the student body. A significant 30% of the student 
                                               
36 Even though the school is private, the employees who are civil servants receive their salary 
from the provincial government. The provincial budget for education is requested and allocated 
from the national government yearly.   
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population is Papuan because the school’s foundation has signed an MOU with the 
foundation of Freeport Indonesia, which provides students from Timika, Papua and the 
surrounding area with full scholarships to study at the school.37 Many other provinces are 
represented, but the remaining portion of the student body is heavily populated by the 
children of elite Minahasans and ethnic Chinese from North Sulawesi. As a result, the 
difference in socioeconomic status between locals and Papuans is often stark, a gap 
which is often recast as ethnic rather than socioeconomic difference.  
 The administration foregrounds the ethnic and religious diversity of the student 
body as a positive quality of the school that will serve to educate the future generations of 
Indonesia in the values of tolerance and respect for diversity. In addition, the 
administration also characterizes the Catholic basis of the school and the boarding 
program as a response to the national concerns about strong character education. 
 Lokon School started out with the aim of Ronald and Mary Korompis, who are 
now based in Jakarta, to use their position to revitalize education and contribute back to 
their local community in North Sulawesi. In a publication entitled Curriculum Based on 
life: Education According to Ronald Korompis, the school’s co-founder explains the 
vision that he hopes to achieve through the school: 
 “This is the concrete form of my intention to make the children of this nation, 
 especially the children of Minahasans and children from North Sulawesi, mighty 
 in the future and with sufficient capacity to make a positive contribution to our 
 nation and country Indonesia, and to humanity on a global scale” (Ratag and 
 Korompis 2009:43). 
 
                                               
37 Freeport Indonesia, an affiliate of Freeport-McMoRan, is a mining corporation which operates 
the largest copper and gold mine in the world, located in Papua, Indonesia 
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The language used to express his intention, he explains, is taken directly from the Bible: 
“Blessed are those who fear the Lord, who find great delight in his commands. Their 
children will be mighty in the land; the generation of the upright will be blessed” (Psalm 
112:1-2). Korompis continually stresses that the inspiration to found this school came 
from God, and also that the overall goal is to bring education back to true purpose, which 
he argues can only be done if we recognize that we are God’s creation, who are loved by 
God, and must in return offer love to and be fearful of God (Ratag and Korompis 2009:2–
3).  
 Ronald and Mary Korompis established the Lokon Educational Foundation in 
1997, and in the year 2002 Lokon St. Nikolaus High School began operation with its first 
cohort of students. In the short time span between the establishment of the foundation and 
the operation of the school, Indonesia experienced a historical transition of 
democratization and decentralization, during which the multi-confessional basis of the 
nation was thrown into question. Against this backdrop, they started the school with the 
aim to form young people who are religious, have strong character, and will therefore be 
prepared to shape the future of the country.  
 As the project continued and the foundation began to seek students beyond North 
Sulawesi (including in Papua and other provinces), the project expanded into a national 
and multicultural one. Now, rather than just providing education for local Minahasans, 
the goal is to provide educational opportunities to students in eastern Indonesia, where 
schools are generally less well equipped and where there are few prestigious educational 
institutions compared to Java. With this expansion, the project became focused on 
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restoring the educational prestige of Minahasa while simultaneously making a 
contribution on a national level. Johanis Ohoitimur MSC, a priest at Lokon’s educational 
foundation explained to me: 
 “Ronald Korompis was thinking about how to revive education in Tomohon run 
 by the Catholic Church in this framework of Reformasi, such that this is double-
 sided: on one hand, he wants to respond to the needs of Indonesians through 
 education. This is on a national level. On a local level, he wants to return to the 
 heyday of North Sulawesi, which was centered in Tomohon in terms of 
 education.” 
 
 From this Christian inspiration, the “curriculum based on life” (kurikulum 
berbasis kehidupan) is focused on helping students grow intellectually and spiritually by 
teaching them to fear God (Ratag and Korompis 2009:44). It can also be understood as a 
broadly Christian project rather than exclusively Catholic, although religious ceremonies 
and prayers at the school are according to Catholic tradition. As a result, Protestants and 
Catholics are often grouped together in discussions about Christian ethics and Christian 
contributions to the region and nation.38 In the foreword of Korompis’s book, the former 
Governor of North Sulawesi, S.H. Sarundajang, praises their progressive vision of quality 
education as well as its intended contribution to Indonesia: 
 “Quality education is not only characterized by the ability of its graduates in the 
 mastery of science and technology, but also in the understanding of religious 
 values and devotion, ethics, aesthetics, and personality, as well as improving 
 physical qualities that can deliver Indonesia towards a nation that is smart, 
 competitive, modern, cultured, and prosperous” (Ratag and Korompis 2009:vii, 
 emphasis in original). 
 
                                               
38 As mentioned in the introduction to the dissertation, the grouping of Protestants and Catholics 
as Christians often takes place when implicitly or explicitly in the presence of Islam. In this case, 
there is an implicit contrast with Islam in considering how Christianity can contribute to the 
nation.  
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 The “curriculum based on life” comes from an eclectic mix of educational 
theories, taking inspiration from a golden age of Catholic education in Europe while also 
drawing from John Dewey’s model of progressive education as an attempt to teach 
respect for diversity and foster critical thinking and democratic participation. However, 
Korompis rejects the secular humanist foundation of Dewey’s framework, arguing that no 
matter how good the model, it will be fragile without a basis in religious principles. 
While there is faith in the ability of a progressive educational model like Dewey’s to 
drive Indonesia toward progress, there is conviction that if it is done without building 
character and providing a religious education for students, it will not be effective.  
 In this section, I have introduced the vision and mission of the school and 
explained how the educational project began as one concerned with restoring Minahasa 
as an important center of education. The project evolved to become more national in 
scope as it sought to incorporate ethnically and religiously diverse students from across 
eastern Indonesia who could become influential in national politics. To give historical 
perspective to this account, I will first discuss the way in which geographical 
conceptualization of Minahasa has changed since colonial times. Then, I provide a brief 
historical account of missions in the region during the colonial period to stress the way in 
which education, missions, and development became strongly intertwined there. 
 
Missionization and the Establishment of Formal Education in Minahasa 
 The development of education in the Minahasan area of North Sulawesi during 
the Dutch colonial period took place through the establishment of both Protestant and 
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Catholic missions, as well as the expansion and establishment of the colonial government 
that created a need for educated natives to work as colonial officials. The establishment 
of mission schools put Minahasa on the path to becoming a majority Christian region, 
and by the late 19th century Minahasans had the highest levels of literacy and education 
among natives in the Dutch East Indies. During the colonial period, Minahasa came to be 
nicknamed the “twelfth province of the Netherlands” because its inhabitants were known 
for being educated Christians with a taste for European culture and styles of sociability 
(de Jonge et al. 2008:430). Today, the province of North Sulawesi is lumped in with 
geographical conceptions of the “outer islands,” referring to islands outside of Java, or as 
part of an underdeveloped “eastern Indonesia.” This contrast between the prominent 
position of Minahasa in colonial times and its relatively marginal position in post-
independence Indonesia provides a historical context for the contemporary discourses of 
development prominent in this elite Catholic boarding school. 
 In Minahasa, intensive efforts by the Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap 
(NZG) Dutch Protestant missionary society led to the establishment of formal education 
as well as widespread conversion to Protestant Christianity in the mid-19th century. 
Previous waves of missionaries, starting with Portuguese Jesuit missionaries in the mid-
17th century and continuing with Dutch Protestant missionaries after the Dutch East India 
Company established its presence, had been relatively unsuccessful and were mostly 
active in coastal areas rather than in the heart of the Minahasan highlands (de Jonge et al. 
2008:419). NZG missionary Joseph Kam, who played a central role in spreading 
Christianity to Maluku, began sending missionaries, including G.J. Hellendoorn, to North 
  
196 
Sulawesi in the 1820s. Before a large number of schools were built, missionaries 
evangelized by inviting children to come to their homes to learn about Christianity by 
witnessing the daily lives and activities of missionaries and their families. These children 
were then encouraged to enter schools as they began to be constructed and, later, to build 
schools themselves to spread the gospel. Hellendoorn played an important role in 
increasing the number of schools and students, but his missions were limited to Manado 
and coastal areas. Even at this early point, the importance of education in the success of 
the missions was already evident: “The success of the mission was counted in pupils 
rather than in baptisms” (de Jonge et al. 2008:421). 
 Widespread conversion did not occur until German NZG missionaries J.G. 
Schwarz and J.F. Riedel began their missionary activities in the Minahasan highlands in 
1831, in the first years of the Cultuurstelsel (compulsory cultivation system) as the Dutch 
were in the process of consolidating their control over the vast archipelago of the East 
Indies (de Jonge et al. 2008:419–22). These mission schools played an important role in 
helping to imagine a Minahasan identity as well as convincing locals that education was 
“an avenue to material gain and increased status in the realm of colonial power and 
indigenous social hierarchy alike” (Swazey 2013:77). The secondary level teacher-
training schools, some of which used Dutch as the language of instruction, offered a 
chance for Minahasans to increase their status. However, one of the most remarkable 
characteristics about the founding of these mission schools is that many elementary 
schools (sekolah rakyat) offered basic popular education for both boys and girls of 
villages in the highlands of Minahasa. Conversion efforts through education were highly 
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successful, and 80% of the population had converted to Protestant Christianity by the 
year 1880 (de Jonge et al. 2008:422). 
  Mission schools continued to grow even as the Dutch colonial government 
established schools in Minahasa to train natives as colonial personnel. Minahasans who 
passed through either of these two educational tracks were sent all over the East Indies, 
continuing their education, working for the colonial government, or assigned to mission 
posts, such as among the Karo Batak in Sumatra (Henley 1996:81). In 1930, the Manado 
residency recorded the highest rates of schooling anywhere in the East Indies (Henley 
1996:80n30). While there are no literacy statistics for Minahasa alone, the combined 
literacy rate for Minahasa and Bolaang-Mongondow (two regions which now partially 
comprise the province of North Sulawesi) in 1930 was the highest in the Netherlands 
Indies, at 38.97%, compared to a 5.48% literacy rate for Java and Madura (Henley 
1996:80). In 1934, when the schools that had been established by NZG and continued to 
expand while under the auspices of Indische Kerk were transferred to GMIM, the 
autonomous Minahasan Protestant denomination, there were 220 elementary schools, 20 
secondary schools with Malay as the language of instruction, and several elite Dutch 
language secondary school (Lintong 2015:6). Minahasans’ high level of education, linked 
to their embrace of Christianity and thirst to emulate European culture and speak Dutch, 
gave them a high status relative to other ethnic groups in the Netherlands East Indies 
(Steenbrink 2003:265).  
 Although Portuguese Catholics were the first European missionaries in North 
Sulawesi, by 1660 the Dutch presence there had forced them out, and Dutch Catholic 
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missionaries were politically banned from entering Minahasa again until the 1880s 
(Heuken 2008:63). Catholic missions were then allowed to enter despite an official ban 
on “double missions.” They then, however, faced a majority Protestant Minahasan 
population (van den End and Aritonang 2008:140). The establishment of Catholic 
missions in Minahasa in the late 19th century was the start a long period of competition 
and mutual suspicion between Protestants and Catholics, despite the fact that Protestants 
have remained a majority and the Catholic population in Minahasa has never been above 
5% (Steenbrink 2003:262). Although their numbers have remained small, Catholics have 
made an impact on Minahasan society, particularly through their educational and health 
care institutions. As was the case for Protestants in Minahasa, schools became a key site 
for conversion, and for setting in motion the significant social and cultural change that 
accompanied it. Teachers played important roles in communities, and schools also 
functioned as chapels in different mission areas (Steenbrink 2003:263). One strategy for 
extending the influence of the church was by catering to elite families in founding 
schools with Dutch as the language of instruction. This strategy was effective in 
attracting students from elite Protestant families, and until the 1930s more than half of the 
children in the prestigious Dutch language Catholic schools were Protestant (Steenbrink 
2003:273). Lokon St. Nikolaus High School is drawing on this Catholic legacy in North 
Sulawesi and adapting it to contemporary political circumstances aiming to form a young 
Christian elite that will have an influence in national politics. 
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Religion and National Development through Education 
 Lokon’s educational program is part of a broader public discourse that portrays 
deepening one’s own religious commitment (as a member of one of the now six 
recognized national religions) as an essential step toward national progress. Daromir 
Rudnyckyj argues that discourses such as these signal a shift in Indonesia from a previous 
“faith in development” during the thirty-two years of the authoritarian New Order era in 
Indonesia to a new focus on “developing faith” following the 1998-1999 transition to 
democracy (2010:3–4). Drawing on his research in a privatizing steel company that 
began implementing a spiritual training program based on Islamic principles, he claims 
that this transition entails a growing disillusionment with the nation-state as the principal 
agent of modernization and development. Furthermore, he argues that the program 
integrates citizens into a spiritual economy that is founded on mutually reinforcing 
neoliberal and Islamic principles in interaction to produce self-governing subjects. In 
Lokon’s educational project there is recognition of the importance of individual faith in 
pushing Indonesia toward progress, but not due to a perceived failure of the nation and its 
role. Rather, it is an attempt to take action toward shaping the nation as a moral 
community, bound not only as Indonesian citizens, but also because of their commitment 
to a religiously founded morality. 
 An overly technical characterization of New Order development projects in 
Indonesia ignores their significant moral component and strong functionalization of 
religious and moral principles toward the goal of national development. During the New 
Order period, missionaries and religiously based organizations often acted as adjuncts of 
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the state in modernization and development programs. Lorraine Aragon describes the 
way in which the Salvation Army missionaries in Central Sulawesi during this period are 
one example of a relationship between religious institutions and the government 
demonstrating how “religious devotion and economic development have become quietly 
indexed to one another” (2000:305). In addition, Robert Hefner has indicated that 
Rudnyckyj’s particular characterization of “faith in development” as relying simply on 
the state and technical expertise overlooks the New Order’s strong emphasis on religious 
education and the launching of nationalist ethical and moral training programs mentioned 
above (2012:105). These analyses indicate that a harnessing of religion and ethics to 
national development projects is not new, but that changes in the political and religious 
atmosphere have allowed it to evolve in different ways. Democratization, 
decentralization, and a broad religious resurgence that has made public reflection about 
the relationship between religion and development more politically possible, and perhaps 
even necessary as questions about national unity and religious difference have surged to 
the fore of public debate. 
 Another important shift that has occurred during and after the transition to 
democracy and relates very strongly to the relationship between religion and 
development in a national framework is the emergence of “majoritarian intolerance in 
post-authoritarian Indonesia” (Hefner 2012:105–6). Performance of nationalism through 
religious piety takes on particular significance in the current political context of Indonesia 
where there is increasing polarization across religious lines. At Lokon, the proposed 
vision of citizenship is based on Catholic and more broadly Christian principles that are 
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cast as universal principles of all religious believers, consistent with national values and 
understood as holding the key to progress and development for the region and nation. The 
way in which this relationship is constructed, far from settled even in the day-to-day 
activities of Lokon School, has serious consequences for the future of a multi-
confessional and multi-ethnic Indonesia. 
 In contemporary democratic, post-Reformasi Indonesia, with the trends of re-
emergence of local identities and increased decentralization following the authoritarian 
New Order era, the terms of the nation itself and the basis of national cohesion are under 
negotiation. Efforts of institutions like Lokon are part of a broader movement by some 
educational institutions across Indonesia to respond to threats to the multi-confessional 
basis of the nation, made painfully clear through the reassertion of ethnic identity, 
foregrounding of religious identity, exclusivism, and in some cases outbreaks of mass 
violence as a result.  
 North Sulawesi has been praised for its ability to resist being pulled into the kinds 
of conflicts occurring in so many surrounding regions. A discourse of religious harmony 
(kerukunan beragama) has been a major strategy within North Sulawesi to promote “an 
inclusive cultural identity while re-invoking religious difference through a non-
threatening nationalist idiom” (Swazey 2013:98). In Lokon’s educational project, the 
history of education and Christian missions in North Sulawesi becomes harnessed by the 
founders of Lokon to present the unique position of Christians in North Sulawesi as 
evidence that they are poised to become exemplars of this multi-confessional religious 
citizenship. The school’s goal to revive education in the region conjures up the historical 
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prominence of Minahasans during colonial times, and the school’s intent to contribute to 
development pledges its commitment to national values.  
 
Avoiding Corruption, Building Integrity  
 One of the ways in which Lokon School acts as a forum for deliberating about 
religious and civic values is through discussions about corruption, an action seen as 
marking personal failure both as a Christian and as an Indonesian citizen. Corruption is a 
national issue, and is considered a major obstacle to national development. For many 
Indonesians, it is shameful that their country, known for its strong religiosity, should also 
become infamous for its rampant corruption.  
 The national effort to educate youth against corruption is based on an expectation 
that focusing on religious education and instilling a good religious character will guide 
students to reject corruption. In a national news report on March 1, 2016, the vice chair of 
the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK- Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi) proclaimed the basis for integrity and anti-corrupt behavior is through religious 
education in any of the official religions, as “no religion has ever justified corrupt 
behavior” (Republika 2016b). Efforts to develop faith in this case also focus on the moral 
crisis that Indonesians presume has caused the failure of earlier development projects.  
 In a regional newspaper report in February 2016 regarding the publication of his 
new book Educating with the Heart, Ronald Korompis, Lokon’s co-founder observed, 
“Indonesia does not lack smart people, but smart people with good character” (Tribun 
Manado 2016). Thus, according to this reasoning, individuals must be educated in 
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religious values and effort must be taken to cultivate their character so that they can be a 
part of a broader moral community who will positively influence the future direction of 
the Indonesian nation instead of being concerned only with personal gain. 
 Responding to what has been cast as a national crisis of morality and the rampant 
problem of corruption, character building is a major theme at Lokon St. Nikolaus High 
School. Religious values are projected as universal, therefore suitable to serve as the 
foundation for civic ones. In practice, corruption is discussed in both civic and religious 
education classes, and is often mentioned by administrators and in teacher training 
sessions. The typical message from these lessons is that living one’s life according to 
Christian values and principles will automatically make one a good citizen, because 
Christian ethics are universal and in line with the nationalist ideology. Just as the Prophet 
Muhammad is portrayed by Muslim trainers and self-help gurus in Indonesia as “the 
ultimate exemplar of civic virtue” (Hoesterey 2012:40), in Minahasa, Jesus Christ takes 
on the role. In other words, following the example of Jesus is presented as preparation for 
becoming a good Indonesian citizen.  
 In the school’s Catholic religious education course, one teacher explained the 
importance of living based on Christ’s example. He asked students to open their Bibles 
and read aloud: “If we claim to have fellowship with him and yet walk in the darkness, 
we lie and do not live out the truth” (1 John 1:6). He proceeded to connect this to the 
moral failings of the nation. He explained to the students that while many claim to be 
morally upright, they are still falling into “KKN” (corruption, collusion, nepotism).39 In 
                                               
39 KKN is an acronym typically associated with the corrupt practices of the New Order regime. 
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the classroom, students tend to echo the dominant national discourse that blames 
corruption for the lack of development in Indonesia. When students presented short 
orations on “how to develop Indonesia” as an assignment in their religion class, 
eradicating corruption emerged as a major theme. One boy offered his opinion that while 
Indonesia is extremely rich in natural resources, it still suffers from poverty, which he 
viewed as a symptom and consequence of corruption. Another boy gave a short speech to 
his peers that offered a summary of his connection of religious and civic values and 
invoked Pancasila, the five principles that form the basis of the Indonesian nation: “We 
need Pancasila as the foundation of this country, and we need Jesus Christ!” 
 While the school’s broad version of multiculturalism is not entirely consistent 
with national discourses that emphasize the separation of different religious groups, their 
approach to using Christian values to fight against corruption also diverges from those 
presented at a Christian leadership training seminar run by the Haggai Institute for 
administrators, teachers, and dormitory staff at Lokon School. The Haggai Institute is an 
international mission organization that offers an alternative to a foreign missionary model 
and runs workshops held by local missionaries who train and encourage other locals to 
spread the gospel. Haggai’s international website discusses problems of societies 
suffering from corruption, caused by “the stark reality of separation from God” (Haggai 
Institute n.d.). The Indonesian trainers who ran the session at Lokon (mostly ethnic 
Chinese preachers from Jakarta who are associated with various Protestant 
denominations) offered a four-segment session on building integrity, approaching the 
topic of corruption from a Christian perspective. Individual integrity was a key part of the 
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training because, when enacted in tandem with the methods taught for evangelizing, it 
was said to determine one’s effectiveness as an ambassador for Christ.  
 The Protestant pastor who led the Haggai session on integrity stressed that moral 
corruption always starts with small actions, but very quickly snowballs out of control. He 
pointed to some actions that for him represented a slippery slope toward corruption: 
running traffic lights, carrying around knockoff designer bags, and breaking international 
copyright laws by downloading pirated media. He informed the teachers of their 
important position as ambassadors for Christ, asking them, “How are people going to 
know God if Christians themselves don’t have integrity?” The pastor is a convert to 
Christianity, and he cited his own mother’s hesitancy toward Christians because in her 
experience as a neighborhood tailor, the Christians often went back on their word after 
negotiating a price. The message was clear: if you are corrupt, you might prevent others 
from coming to Christ. These sessions were juxtaposed with another class on the Biblical 
Mandate, the only session taught by a speaker who lives in North Sulawesi. He shared 
practical methods for how to approach Muslims and speak to them about Jesus, and 
explicitly played on fears of increasing Islamisation of the region. He suggested that 
participants might feel comfortable now because this region is majority Christian, but it 
might not be that way for their children and grandchildren if they do not take action.  
 An important distinction between the discourses about morality and anti-
corruption from the school administration and those from the Haggai Institute is the 
school’s tendency to connect these issues to the importance of building civic values and 
forming the future generation of Indonesia. For the Haggai Institute, the importance of 
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these values is clearly for becoming an ambassador of Christ, and implementing Christian 
values in one’s own life to increase the effectiveness of winning souls for Christ. When, 
during the Haggai Institute leadership training, one speaker notified the teachers of their 
luck in having a “captive market” to transform, some of the dormitory staff told me they 
felt this approach was too extreme. Lucas, a religious brother who is part of the dormitory 
staff at Lokon, explained to me that evangelization is not as narrow as sharing the 
Gospel, but most importantly it is about serving others and being a witness through one’s 
way of life. Whether they realized it or not, the staff’s interpretation of missionization 
aligns closely with the school’s project, also more readily reconcilable with multi-
confessional and multi-ethnic nationalist values. However, as described above, while 
missionization is framed as a project for development which transcends sectarian lines, it 
also violates national sensibilities about religious mixing and provision of religious 
education. 
 
Integrating Religious Diversity at Lokon School 
 What are the consequences of this linkage between religious and civic values for 
the school’s broader emphasis on a multi-confessional inclusive citizenship that is put 
forward as the key to developing the nation? Even if all religions are supposed to be 
interchangeable in their ability to fill this role of building character in its citizens, there is 
still no guarantee that such educational or training programs aspire to religious pluralism 
or that they will not ask participants to proclaim their religious belonging over and above 
national belonging (Hoesterey 2012:41; Rudnyckyj 2010:192). At Lokon School, there 
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are some tensions between different understandings of how to integrate and respect other 
religions, ranging from a position of extreme relativism to one espousing the universality 
of Catholicism and Catholic values.  
 From the perspective of the school’s founders, Lokon offers an education that is 
Catholic but appeals to universal values and teaches students about living with difference. 
Administrators are proud of the diverse student body they have been able to attract and 
see it as an important learning opportunity for students regarding religious tolerance. 
They also emphasize their accommodation of diversity in allowing students to leave the 
campus to celebrate other religious holidays or provide food on a different schedule for 
Muslim students who are fasting. At the same time, all students are required to take 
Catholic religious education courses and participate in Catholic prayers and rituals at the 
school regardless of religious backgrounds. There are debates at the national level 
regarding such policies and their status in relation to the 2003 Education Act, which 
requires public and private schools to provide students religious education in accordance 
with their professed religion. Many private Protestant and Catholic schools, including 
Lokon, request that parents sign a form agreeing that their child will join the Christian 
religious education classes and worship services at the school (Hoon 2014:512). Christian 
schools with a good academic reputation are typically able to attract students from other 
religious backgrounds, which is often framed by those who reject it in the national debate 
as proselytization and a violation of rights and respect for other religions. 
 These tensions and internal contradictions represent one way in which 
deliberation about the coupling of civic and religious values is ongoing at Lokon. The 
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Catholic education teachers recognize that they are teaching a religiously diverse group 
of students, and explain that they try to teach about Catholicism through universal values 
that are relevant to people of all different religions (such as love, peace, justice, etc.). In 
their delivery of the curriculum, they often touch on the importance of tolerance and 
respect for diversity. The Carmelite priest who acts as the spiritual director for students 
explained that Catholicism is a universal teaching, and also supported the school’s policy 
of being respectful toward other religions based on the recognition in the Second Vatican 
Council (Vatican II) that there are seeds of truth in other religions. 
 While religious difference is relatively homogenized on a surface level when all 
students participate in the same course, it still forms the basis of students’ public 
identities inside and outside the classroom. In religious education courses, religious 
tolerance is commonly stressed through the discourse that one should not differentiate or 
stereotype people based on religion. For example, in one classroom session, the teacher 
explained that the universal nature of Catholicism instructs not to differentiate or 
discriminate, and to respect differences in religion and culture. In the same class session, 
the teacher asked students who are Christian to identify themselves by raising their hands, 
asking them to publicly proclaim their religious identity. 
 Another religious education teacher, Ibu Maria, commonly spoke on the topic of 
tolerance, and earnestly tried to get students to enact it. When she was teaching students 
how to lead a worship session, she praised a Muslim student for enacting tolerance by 
learning about and participating in Catholic forms of worship. On another occasion, she 
also discussed the importance of respecting difference and the benefits of engaging in 
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dialogue with people of other religions. At the same time, she warned students not to go 
so far as to recite the creed of another religion. Ultimately, the discourse of respecting 
difference at the school is projected through the frame of brotherhood and sisterhood in 
Christ in a universal Catholic perspective. 
 A major part of the Catholic religious education curriculum, taken from materials 
from the KWI, focuses on the importance of inter-religious dialogue. The textbook’s 
approach features a theologically based dialogue, under the assumption that one must 
understand the basic teachings of a religion before entering into meaningful dialogue with 
its followers. In the classroom, teachers discuss the importance of inter-religious dialogue 
and respect for diversity in terms of religious, nationalist, and humanitarian rationales. In 
one class session on inter-religious dialogue, the Catholic religious education teacher 
supported such teachings through reference to specific Bible verses, teachings in Vatican 
II, diverse humanity as God’s creation, the national ideology of Pancasila, and the 
national motto, “Unity in Diversity.” In civic education class, the material and class 
activities were more formalistic, but also emphasize the importance of mutual respect on 
the grounds of Pancasila, national integration, and human rights. 
 Students at the Catholic school know that they are not supposed to differentiate or 
discriminate, and one phrase that students liked to use among each other was “Don’t be 
racist!” (Jangan rasis!) often as a joke, when someone made a remark that could be 
perceived as differentiating among students in any way. After a volunteer group at the 
school spent time raising funds for and volunteering at both a Catholic and a Muslim 
orphanage, I asked one of the student OSIS leaders any differences he noted between the 
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two experiences. The typically confident and articulate young man stumbled as he 
attempted to respond to my question, which had clearly violated the norm of non-
differentiation he had learned for respecting other religions. Flustered, he finally replied 
that at the two orphanages, everything was the same except the prayer. He then explained 
why they had gone to both orphanages by asserting that they must work to serve all 
people in need, not just people of one religious background. 
 Among students, although religious belonging is considered public knowledge, it 
typically does not figure prominently in concerns about who to eat with at the dining hall, 
or who they might be assigned to bunk with in the dormitory. On the other hand, ethnic 
divisions among the student body are prominent and do clearly impact the social 
environment of the school. 
 
Developing Papua in Minahasa: Bridging or Reinforcing Ethnic Difference? 
 Another initiative at Lokon that relates to views of development and inclusion of 
difference brings promising students from Papua to study at the school. Papua is a 
predominantly Protestant province of Indonesia with special autonomy as part of a 
settlement in which the majority of profits from natural resources are returned to the 
province rather than channeled to the national government. However, due to a number of 
factors (including corruption), this settlement has failed to improve access to education 
and healthcare, which remain at the lowest levels in Indonesia (Anderson 2013). Every 
year representatives from Lokon go to Timika, Papua and surrounding areas to give a 
selection test and look for promising new students to bring to North Sulawesi to continue 
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their education, funded by the Freeport Foundation. Some of the Papuan students have 
parents who are employees at Freeport and whose status and income has helped their 
children to get an education that qualifies them for admission to Lokon. 
 Ethnicity, like religion, is a form of difference that is explicitly addressed in 
discourses about the Indonesian nation. It is also one form of difference that the school 
explicitly tries to teach students about through the experience of living and studying with 
students of various ethnic backgrounds. In this case, national discourses about the 
acceptance of ethnic difference dovetail with Christian notions of brotherhood to result in 
very little tension about the principle of accepting Papuan students. Instead, the tension is 
between the principle of ethnic inclusion, supported easily by both civic and religious 
values, and its actual practice, which is often challenged by the actions of both students 
and teachers. 
 
Figure 19: Papuan Students Lead Worship in Catholic Religious Education Class 
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 The founders of the school are ethnic Chinese who are able to flexibly identify as 
a family with local roots and identifiably Minahasan surnames. While Lokon has 
attracted mostly local students who are ethnic Minahasan and ethnic Chinese, there are 
students who come from many other regions and ethnic groups. For most of these 
students, ethnic difference is something that is clearly publicly recognized and discussed, 
but easily glossed over by the students’ similar upper middle class backgrounds that 
allow them to bond over their high-end smart phones and brand name accessories. All of 
the students, Papuans included, conform linguistically to the local Manado Malay 
language when speaking among peers. However, for Papuan students, ethnic difference 
maps on to class difference that reinforces distance with the other students.  
 All of the Papuan students at the school are Catholic or Protestant, and therefore 
share a similar religious profile to the other students. However, the visible ethnic 
difference between Papuan students and students from other ethnic groups in Indonesia 
contributes to their being grouped together and called “Papuan kids” (anak Papua). 
‘Papua’ is not actually an ethnic but a regional identifier, and many of the Papuan 
students actually come from different ethnic groups from within Papua. However, ethnic 
distinctions among Papuans are rarely recognized or talked about at the school, and their 
similarity as Papuans is reinforced. On a national level, Papuans are stereotyped as 
backward and uncivilized, and where they are migrants, are often blamed for 
drunkenness, violence, and criminal activities. The school counselor explained to me, 
disparagingly, that sometimes parents call to request that their child not be assigned to 
share a room with Papuan students. Although she never grants such a request, Papuan 
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students are often assigned to bunk together, typically choose to eat in the cafeteria 
together, and spend their free time together. In practice, ethnic differentiation is marked 
in social interactions throughout the school, despite the Catholic multicultural approach. 
 Although the original idea for the school was and still is that it should contribute 
first to Minahasa, it has expanded its scope in accepting students from Papua and from 
other regions. This shift was partially for economic reasons, but also in line with its 
expanded vision of providing quality education for eastern Indonesia. However, Papuan 
students are often assumed to be recipients of charity that might help to make a difference 
in their own region, but are not talked about as the “future of the nation” in the same way 
as other students are. For example, one of the school employees who works for the 
foundation cited the program for Papuan students as a real charitable gesture from the 
school’s founders. Lokon welcomes these students, he explained, despite the fact that 
their low academic performance drags down the school’s overall academic ranking in the 
region. In spite of this situation, the school has embraced this program as an important 
part of its mission to prepare students to go on to higher education or vocational training. 
 The school’s viewpoint is clearly a mainstream nationalist one that sees Papua as 
a province of Indonesia in dire need of development and educational opportunities. In 
Papua, however, separatist movements calling for independence from Indonesia are still 
active. While the Papuan students talk about their identity as Indonesian, they are also 
trying to negotiate their own identities and place in the Indonesian nation. Some are 
influenced by the separatist movements, whether they express it by putting symbols on 
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their personal Facebook pages, or by pulling a stunt as one group of students did by 
raising the Free Papua Movement’s flag on the school’s grounds.  
 While the students at Lokon are all influenced by a global pop culture, the Papuan 
students are most clearly influenced by an Afro-Caribbean culture rather than the 
mainstream American pop culture and K-pop style their peers favor. Wearing trucker hats 
and listening to Bob Marley and American rap music, the Papuan students at Lokon can 
often be seen sitting on the road running through the school’s campus instead of inside 
their dorm rooms with other students. Matt, a charismatic Papuan student who is highly 
skilled in English, has expressed his concern about the future of Papua, where he says 
corruption is high. His dream is to study politics and go back to be an upright leader 
there. Another Papuan student with a much weaker academic record who was later 
expelled on behavioral grounds, confided his wish to study in the USA, asking 
specifically about New Orleans, the former location of Freeport-McMoRan headquarters. 
Having been affected by the mine’s acquisition of land, he wanted to become successful 
and teach corporations that they cannot treat people unfairly. Papuan students, like all 
students at Lokon, have multiple aspirations at work as they are trying to imagine their 
future and also navigate the day-to-day life at boarding school.  
 During the Christian leadership training run by the Haggai Institute, one trainer 
who was familiar with the situation at the school sympathized with the teachers that it 
must be difficult to work with Papuan students and to always remind them to bathe, to 
wash their clothes, and to be disciplined. He then invited everyone to watch a video of a 
talk show interview with a Harvard Business School graduate who created her own 
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program to serve prisoners and help rehabilitate ex-convicts by teaching them 
entrepreneurship skills. In the video, the founder of the program explained her vision, and 
then the host interviewed ex-convicts who had benefitted from this program and 
recounted their success stories. After the trainer stopped the video, he looked at the 
teachers and dormitory staff and asked them, “If she can change these ex-convicts, can 
we change Papuan students?” Although he was clearly expecting an enthusiastic 
affirmative, after a moment of hesitation, the first teacher to speak up answered by 
qualifying that “it depends.” The trainer explained that perhaps Papuan students feel that 
they do not have a real future, and that it is an opportunity for the school to help change 
them, and by extension, change Papua.  
 Civic and religious principles called upon in the school mutually support a 
principle of ethnic inclusion in an abstract sense, but there is tension between the 
principle and practice. The implementation of the project seems to have more in common 
with the goal of reviving education in the region and looking to the historical position of 
Minahasa as a center of education for all of eastern Indonesia, than with a national project 
of inclusion and integration. Even so, the effort to educate Papuan students at Lokon does 
have political implications in its attempt, however tenuous, at incorporating ethnic 
difference and reinforcing a mainstream nationalist understanding of the Indonesian 
archipelago as naturally including Papua. At the same time, the Papuan students (just like 
all of the other students) are also participating in a global pop culture and trying to 
navigate what their ethnic identity might mean for them personally, and in a national 
context.  
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Spreading Christian Values as Civic values for Minahasa and the Nation 
 Born out of the era of decentralization and democratization in Indonesia, Lokon 
St. Nikolaus High School is promoting an educational program offering a foundation in 
Christian values and strong character, understood as a necessary prerequisite for 
becoming a future leader of the nation. While self-management and discipline are a 
crucial part of this process of self-transformation, the broader goal here is a national one, 
to establish a moral community that will have impact on the future of the nation. Put into 
historical perspective, it is one that looks back at the former importance and status of 
Minahasa and the history of education in the region. Accordingly, Lokon seeks to 
convince the rest of Indonesia that North Sulawesi has a role to play in Indonesia’s future 
and it is preparing the kind of leaders required toward this end. Missionization in this 
sense channels the development of faith through broader ideas about building character 
and civic values. Consequently, this particular understanding seeks to assert and shape 
national values and emphasize their overlap with Christian values. As I have shown 
through an analysis of the school’s attempt at religious and ethnic inclusion, there are 
tensions in how the relationship between religious and civic values is understood and 
practiced at the school, and the processes through which these are deliberated about and 
contested are important ones.  
 The strategy employed by this particular school is one which, in response, does 
not downplay but in many ways emphasizes its Catholic and more broadly Christian 
foundation and provides a space for deliberation about the mutual influence of religious 
and national values. This approach reflects another vision of the school that was born out 
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of the experience of the historical moment of Reformasi and transition to democracy. As 
ethnic and religious violence broke out in several regions across the Indonesian 
archipelago during this period, the school’s founders felt the urgency to educate a new 
generation so that such ethnic and religious conflicts would not be repeated again in 
Indonesian history. Although all of the religiously diverse students join Catholic mass 
and religious education, their experience at the school with others is designed as a lesson 
in multiculturalism and in ‘universal values’ that are taken from Christianity, but also 
considered important for character building and nation building. Therefore, the nature of 
relationship forged between religion and development also has important ramifications 
for imagining the contours of the nation and how religious and ethnic diversity are 
incorporated. As this example from Lokon shows, the question is far from settled, but 
everyday interactions at the school participate in attempts to answer it. 
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CHAPTER 6: PUBLIC MADRASAH:  
RELIGION AS THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL ACTION IN SOCIETY 
 
 In this section which analyzes schools as loci of deliberation, the third and final 
in-depth case study is a state madrasah, an all-Muslim high school in the majority-
Protestant city of Manado. In the first case study of the religiously mixed public high 
school (SMA), policies toward religion tend to effectively create a Protestant 
environment in the school by valuing religious diversity in the abstract while concretely 
implementing policies that establish a majoritarian influence. Students at the public 
school, in addition to understanding religious difference primarily through concrete 
practices (differences in dress, dietary restrictions) often shift their self-positioning as 
majority or minority groups. At Lokon private Catholic school, a self-consciously 
multicultural approach is projected through the universality of Catholic teachings by 
teachers and the administration. Students are wary of mentioning most forms of 
difference, often assuming that distinction is the same as discrimination. However, the 
visible ethnic, cultural, and class difference of Papuan students emerges as a challenge to 
this approach. In practice among both students and teachers, it is this particular form of 
ethnic difference that is often openly mentioned, discussed, and reinforced.  
 In continuing this investigation of deliberation about the challenges of living in 
difference, I selected the public madrasah in Manado, Madrasah Aliyah Negeri Model 1 
Manado (hereafter MAN) as a third case study. In September 2015, as I was just 
beginning to develop my relationships at the school, I sat in the school’s administrative 
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offices, studying the complicated course schedule to determine which classes would be 
most relevant for me to observe. Ibu Vita, a kind and soft-spoken religious education 
teacher, sat down next to me and offered to help me choose relevant courses. I explained 
that in my research, I am interested in how students learn to live in society and get along 
with others, particularly focusing on the topic of diversity or tolerance. Perplexed, Ibu 
Vita looked at me and stated, “But everyone is Muslim,” explaining that all students, 
teachers, and staff at MAN are Muslim. Her earnest confusion, though perhaps in part 
due to the unclear explanation of my research, also belies a major assumption among the 
teachers and administrators at the school. There is an implicit expectation that students 
will learn about coexistence through their daily experiences outside of the school in their 
diverse communities, and that the Islamic principles and foundation students receive at 
the school will drive them to respect diversity and practice tolerance. As a result, teachers 
do not feel that material about religious diversity and tolerance needs to be emphasized or 
addressed more than it is in the formal curriculum. 
 Throughout the chapter, I will address how the assumption that students will learn 
tolerance outside the school ends up dominating the school’s overall approach toward 
teaching religion and diversity, despite the pride and enthusiasm from the faculty about 
Manado’s perceived status as a religiously harmonious place. The goal of the teachers 
and administration is ultimately to build up students’ foundations as pious Muslims. In 
other words, while the madrasah teachers support the idea of teaching tolerance, the 
school is seen primarily as a place for teaching Islamic ethics that will lead students to act 
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in a tolerant way if they correctly apply religious principles in their daily life outside the 
school. 
 I first provide context regarding madrasah in the national schooling system and 
the situation of Islamic education in Manado. Then, I introduce the setting of MAN, 
particularly the makeup of students and teachers, the school grounds, activities, and the 
approach toward teaching religious values. Next, I discuss several situations in which 
students are openly deliberating about how Islamic principles and teachings apply in a 
plural society. In the remaining section of the chapter, I demonstrate the ambiguity in 
how the space outside the school is framed, in terms of being a potential place for 
students to learn to accept difference and enact Muslim values, but at the same time, a 
potential source of negative influence and temptation. 
 
Madrasahs in the National and Local Context 
 In Indonesia, madrasahs are modernist institutions of Islamic learning, in contrast 
with the traditionalist pesantren, and are distinguished by their offering a general 
curriculum in addition to the Islamic sciences (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007:176). A 
Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (MAN) is a state/public madrasah at the senior secondary level. 
MAN Manado was established as a state madrasah in 1992, though it had already 
previously functioned as a teacher training institute for Islamic education. In 1998, MAN 
Manado was chosen among a group of 35 madrasahs in Indonesia as a “model 
madrasah,” explaining the school’s current designation as MAN Model 1 Manado, 
referred to locally as MAN Model. It is located in a majority-Muslim district (kecamatan) 
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in the northern part of Manado. As one crosses the river toward the school from the city 
center, the increasing prevalence of mosques, halal restaurants, and Muslim clothing 
boutiques is apparent.  
 In North Sulawesi, there are four public madrasahs (Madrasah Aliyah Negeri), 
though there is only one in the city of Manado. A private madrasah in the city of Bitung 
(40 km east of Manado) changed status to become a state madrasah in 2015. The other 
state madrasahs are in the southern area of the province, in Dumoga and Bolaang-
Mongondow (150 km south of Manado), where there is currently a campaign underway 
for the creation of a new autonomous province, Bolaang Mongondow Raya, as a separate 
province from North Sulawesi. In Manado, there are a handful of private pesantrens and 
madrasahs, and several more across Minahasa and in the nearby city of Bitung. However, 
they are all relatively recent, with the earliest government-registered pesantren in Manado 
dating to 1978. The other schools were founded in the 1980s and 1990s, concurrent with 
a growing national interest in and demand for Islamic education (Hefner 2009:69). The 
pesantrens in Manado today have enrollments in the dozens, compared to MAN Manado, 
by far the largest Islamic school in Manado, with an enrollment of approximately 1,400 
students.  
 Following a 1975 national ministerial decree, madrasah graduates have the option 
to enroll in general institutions of higher learning or Islamic ones, rather than being 
restricted to religious institutions as was previously the case (Azra et al. 2007:186). 
Madrasahs, though under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, have since 
1989 been required to fulfill the general curriculum standards determined by the Ministry 
  
222 
of Education and Culture (Azra et al. 2007:177). In practice, this means that madrasahs—
like other public and private schools—are today in the process of implementing the most 
recent 2013 Curriculum.  
 MAN Manado has implemented the 2013 Curriculum, and as a madrasah, 
continues to require students to take additional courses in religious education. Students at 
MAN take up to ten hours of religious education per week, significantly more than the 
mandatory two hour minimum as implemented in public high schools. Instead of 
attending one course on general Islamic education (PAI- Pendidikan Agama Islam), 
students attend various courses on the Qur’an, Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic ethics, 
history of Islam, etc. Compared to students at the public high school, who take classes in 
approximately 13 subjects (depending upon their year and educational track), students at 
the madrasah may have classes in up to 17 subjects, taking into account the additional 
religious education courses. In order to accommodate the scheduling requirements of the 
additional course subjects, students attend school from 7 AM – 3 PM from Monday 
through Thursday and on Saturday. On Friday, students attend academic classes from 7 
AM – 12 PM, followed by Friday prayer. By way of comparison, this makes for 
approximately 45 hours at school per week at the madrasah, whereas at the public high 
school SMA, students only attend from 7 AM – 1:30 PM from Monday through Friday 
for a total of 32.5 hours of class time per week. On many days, students stay at the 
madrasah after school to participate in extracurricular activities or eat snacks and 
socialize with friends in the cafeteria.  
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Overview of MAN Manado   
 There are approximately 1,400 students enrolled at the madrasah, all of whom are 
Muslim. Parents typically decide to enroll their children at the madrasah specifically 
because it offers an Islamic-based education. MAN does have a good academic 
reputation, but there are many other general public schools that also offer a rigorous 
academic program. The students at MAN represent many ethnic groups from the region, 
including Sangir-Talaud, Bolaang-Mongondow, and Gorontalo ethnic groups. A 
significant population of students, many of whom are Javanese, have parents originating 
from outside the province who are civil servants and have been relocated to Manado for 
their positions. Around two hundred of the students stay in dormitories on school 
grounds, but the majority of students commute to the school daily. 
 Students at MAN Model, though all Muslim, come from a range of religious 
education backgrounds. Some have only attended Islamic schools, or have a strong 
foundation in religious education from their family or mosque community. Other students 
have attended public middle schools, or in some cases, Christian schools. Many religious 
education teachers viewed this range of backgrounds as a challenge, because some 
students come in with a strong grasp of Islamic teachings, while others have received 
minimal instruction and struggle to read the Qur’an.  
 The teachers are also ethnically diverse, from several different ethnic groups in 
the region, and some having roots in Manado’s Kampung Arab (Arab neighborhood) or 
Javanese roots by way of Kampung Jawa Tondano (a Javanese settlement in Minahasa 
dating from the 19th century). As a state madrasah, the school is not affiliated with any 
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particular religious organization. Teachers are involved in local branches of the national 
Islamic organizations Muhammadiyah and NU, among others. Many of the teachers are 
graduates from the State Islamic School for Higher Education (IAIN) in Manado.   
 
Figure 20: MAN Classroom 
 
 The school campus is organized as several different buildings (classrooms, 
library, cafeteria, school offices, and the school mosque) all around a central courtyard, 
similar to SMA, though larger and lacking a roof. Consequently, students typically avoid 
the central courtyard during the hottest hours of the day. The classrooms are in two-story 
buildings on the perimeter of the courtyard. Students have a homeroom class and teacher, 
and are responsible for decorating the classroom and keeping it clean on a daily basis. On 
some occasions, like for the commemoration of the Youth Pledge (Hari Sumpah 
Pemuda), the school organizes a competition to select the best classroom on the basis of 
both cleanliness and aesthetic value. There is a cafeteria with many vendors, all of whom 
sell exclusively halal food. There is also a library with government-provided course 
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textbooks. Student representatives can be seen running back and forth between the library 
and classroom at the start of the period to pick up textbooks for particular academic 
subjects to be used during the class.  
 
Figure 21: MAN Students Receive Awards in the Courtyard 
  
 The mosque on school grounds is newly rebuilt, and is now large enough to 
accommodate all the students at once, as it did for the prayers preceding the school’s Eid 
al-Adha celebration in 2015. The principal of the madrasah, Ibu Hesty, had started a 
program several years earlier to supplement government funds for the mosque 
renovations. The program (1000 Rupiah Per Day Infaq Movement; Gerakan Infak Rp 
1000 per hari) functioned by asking students to bring 1,000 rupiah ($0.07 USD) to the 
school every day as infaq, a particular kind of Islamic charity to donate toward the 
mosque. The money was collected each morning by the class leader and given to the 
school treasurer. In 2016, the mosque had already been rebuilt, but students continued to 
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bring money daily in order to contribute to the construction of a new area for performing 
ablutions (tempat wudhu) adjacent to the mosque. The religion teacher Ibu Rahma 
explained that the requirement to donate on a daily basis is part of the character education 
at the school. Students come to school with pocket money (uang jajan), usually to buy 
snacks, but go through the daily practice of setting aside a portion for the purpose of 
charity. 
 
Figure 22: MAN Campus Mosque, Masjid Darul Ulum 
 
 At MAN, students have the option of a variety of extracurricular activities. Some 
of the extracurricular activities are religious, described in more detail below. However, 
there are a number of general clubs and after-school activities. These offer concrete ways 
for MAN students to pursue sports or academic interests, and in doing so, meet students 
from other schools in Manado. Participating in activities like scouts, marching band, 
science/math Olympiads, and sports, gives students and teachers the opportunity to 
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engage with people of different religious backgrounds through school-sponsored 
activities. For example, to celebrate the anniversary of the school’s founding, MAN 
organized a volleyball competition for boys and girls. They invited a girls team from a 
nearby pesantren, boys and girls teams from SMA, and boys and girls teams from a 
nearby Christian high school. For the event, students and teachers gathered around the 
courtyard after school to watch the games, cheering on their teams before heading home 
for the day.  
 
School Policies Encouraging Religiosity 
 Teachers and administration at MAN take seriously their role of cultivating piety 
among students. Students are encouraged to go to the mosque to perform the daily 
prayers that fall during the school day. As a class session ends and the mid-day call to 
prayer sounds, teachers walk around their classroom and the school campus, corralling 
students to make sure they are headed toward the mosque to pray rather than to buy food 
at the cafeteria, for example. The daily prayers are seen as the first step in encouraging 
general religiosity. Ibu Vita, who teaches Islamic ethics, explains regularly to her 
students that daily prayers are the basis for maintaining good character and morals 
(menjaga akhlak yang baik). For many teachers, the behavioral grade (nilai sikap) they 
are required to factor into all academic subject grades amounts to whether or not students 
are diligent in their prayers. 
 Teachers sometimes admitted exasperation at the effort it takes to get students to 
perform this most basic religious requirement. Ibu Rahma, who teaches a religious 
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education course on the Qur’an, can often be seen walking around the campus, scolding 
students who do not go to perform their prayers. At the end of one class period, after the 
call to prayer, she instructed all boys and girls not menstruating to get ready to pray 
(sholat). One boy, who was clearly stalling, proclaimed to the class that he is on his 
period and thus cannot go pray, causing his male friends to erupt in laughter before Ibu 
Rahma shooed him out of the classroom in the direction of the mosque. 
 In addition to the generalized effort to get students to perform their daily prayers, 
there are specific religious activities incorporated into the school schedule. Every 
morning, students spend fifteen minutes for Tadarus Al Qur’an, group recitation of 
Qur’anic scripture with their homeroom teacher. With this daily reading schedule, by the 
time students are in twelfth grade, they have read through the entire Qur’an. Once the 
students reach this point, the school holds a special event, Khataman Al Qur’an, where 
students read the Qur’an and recite a prayer that they have learned together before eating 
a feast together at the school.  
 
Figure 23: Khataman Al Qur’an Event 
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 Pak Sudirman, who teaches the history of Islam, gave a speech at the Khataman 
Al Qur’an event in 2015, encouraging the twelfth graders to continue reading the Qur’an 
and teaching peers and children how to do so. Passionately, he said, “You can do it at 
your campus mosque! Oh, but if you go to UNSRAT (a public university in Manado) or 
mixed university, maybe you can do it at your village mosque. If you’re at IAIN, 
everyone is Muslim, so you can invite everyone to the mosque!”  
 On the whole, students are encouraged to partake in religious activities in hopes 
that they will integrate the importance of religious activities into their daily routines for 
the rest of their lives, and so that these youth gain understanding of Islamic values and 
enact them. Boys are required to attend Friday prayer at the school mosque while girls 
attend a religious sermon or participate in a religious activity in the multipurpose room. 
Throughout the school year, the school also organizes events for religious holidays. 
During the fasting month, the school opens its doors one evening to teachers, students, 
and their families, inviting them to break the fast together.  
 Some religious extracurricular activities are popular among students. Sanggar At-
Tanwir is an extracurricular club at MAN that involves Qur’anic recitation and dakwah 
activities. The group also choreographs Islamic-inspired dance routines to religious pop 
songs, such as Ustad Jefri Al Buchori’s “Subhanallah”. The club is active and draws 
interest from many different students. In December 2015, students ran a funding 
campaign to travel to the state madrasah in Kotamobagu (150 km south of Manado) to 
organize a session including Qur’anic recitation, dance performances, and religiously-
inspired speeches from students. The club also invited student groups from the local 
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madrasah to perform. One of the routines choreographed by MAN students, captured in 
the figure below, involved a group of boys playing drums to a popular Muslim song, and 
a group of girls lined up in front of them clapping and performing gestures to the beat of 
the music. While the administration is supportive of many kinds of extracurricular 
activities, they particularly admire students’ participation in religious extracurricular 
activities and the contribution of these students to the Islamic identity of the school. 
 
Figure 24: Sanggar At Tanwir Performance 
 
 Religious education teachers at MAN also seek to provide space for peer learning, 
as students can also guide one another to become deeper in their faith. Ibu Rahma feels 
strongly that the Islamic character of the school should encourage students to motivate 
one another to study through Qur’anic recitation. During one class session, she asked 
each student to speak in front of the class about how their habits of reading the Qur’an 
have changed since they began attending MAN. In their speeches, many students claimed 
to be inspired by their fellow classmate Nurhayati, gifted in Qur’anic recitation and 
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memorization. Her classmate Ayu said that Nurhayati was inspiring in the way that she 
uses her free time to memorize the Qur’an, and how she puts religious interests above her 
own. When Manado was experiencing a water crisis and there was no water at the school 
for wudhu (ablutions), most of the students stayed in their classrooms and played on their 
smartphones instead of praying. Ayu admired Nurhayati’s dedication, and had witnessed 
her leaving the school to find a nearby mosque where she could pray, even risking being 
late for her next class to do so. Even though Nurhayati was often mentioned as a role 
model, she also faced teasing from her fellow students, who saw he as something of a 
teacher’s pet, and made remarks that she only did her prayers for the sake of getting good 
grades.  
 
Religion as the Foundation of Morality 
 In line with both the focus of the 2013 Curriculum and the Islamic identity of the 
school, teachers at MAN claim character education as the central component of their 
approach. There is an emphasis among teachers and administrators on character building 
and instilling moral principles based in Islamic ethics. The general consensus is that in 
order to be effective, the character education must be based in Islamic principles. Overall, 
there is a positioning of religion as the foundation for morality that is similar to that of 
Lokon’s co-founder, who argues that Dewey’s progressive education model requires a 
religious foundation in order to be effective. The head of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs regional office, a former English teacher at MAN, agrees with such a perspective 
that religious education must be the foundation for character education. During the Eid 
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al-Adha celebration at MAN, he paid a visit to eat with the teachers. When I asked him 
what the biggest challenge is for education in Indonesia today, he responded that it is 
character education, and that it must be done through religious education as the basis. 
 Teachers at MAN often voice perspectives that align with the importance of 
Islamic values as the basis for character building. The Islamic jurisprudence (fiqih) 
teacher Ibu Fadila, who has taught at MAN for 10 years, described her goal in teaching as 
illuminating aspects of Islamic law in a holistic way such that it will have a moral impact 
on students and improve their character. As an example, she pointed to the involvement 
of students in ibadah qurban, or the distribution of meat following the sacrifice on Eid al-
Adha. That year, some students had raised enough money to purchase three of the seven 
cows that were sacrificed at the school’s celebration. After they were slaughtered, the 
meat was redistributed to economically disadvantaged neighborhoods in the school as 
well as the nearby police station. Through this experience and lesson in Islamic values, 
she explained, students can learn how to maintain a good relationship with God and with 
the broader society. 
 At an in-house training on implementing the 2013 Curriculum at the madrasah, 
one session was about employing the Islamic scientific approach in teaching. The 
speaker, from the regional Ministry of Religion, attempted to empower teachers to see the 
potential for integrating an Islamic perspective in all subjects. After leading the teachers 
in a mock classroom lesson, she spoke about the need to teach students to be scientific 
and critical, and also a need to realize the religious aspects of all subjects, particularly 
through the use of prayer to start lessons.  
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 According to these perspectives, it is development of spiritual competency that 
allows for students to enact social competencies, such as honesty, cooperation, and 
respect for others. The environment of the school is concerned with instilling religious 
values, particularly as a minority religion in the region, with the assumption that a strong 
religious grounding will provide students with the necessary ability to enact these social 
competencies inside and outside the school. 
 
Discussing Religious Difference 
 The additional time spent on religious education at the school does not necessarily 
translate into more curriculum or classroom time spent on the topics of religion and 
nation, diversity, or inter-religious relations. There are aspects of the curriculum in the 
tenth grade class on the Qur’an that address respect for all in a broad sense, and a lesson 
for twelfth graders specifically on the importance of respecting non-Muslims. Overall, 
the topic of diversity still emerges more often in the civic education classroom through 
the frames of Pancasila and human rights. Like the discussion quoted in the introduction 
of the dissertation, which came from a civic education class at MAN, discussions about 
diversity remained mostly abstract and focused on the issues of national stability as well 
as moving the country forward in the international arena. 
 Although the topics of diversity and coexistence rarely came up directly in the 
classroom, many of the teachers are proud of the region for its reputation as a place of 
inter-religious harmony. They are readily able to point to structural factors in society that 
contribute to the peaceful situation, as well as Islamic principles in support of coexistence 
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for a plural society. For example, several religious education teachers drew on Islamic 
teachings to explain that in addition to building a strong vertical relationship with God, it 
is also important to build a strong horizontal relationship with people in society, 
regardless of their religious and ethnic background. Not only religious and civic 
education teachers, but also several science and math teachers enjoyed discussing these 
topics with me, often seeking me out in the library, where I tended to spend time in 
between classes. They pointed to verses in the Qur’an that support tolerance and peace. 
However, these topics do not often make it explicitly into the classroom as part of the 
formal curriculum or informal class discussions.  
 Students in the school are clearly trying to navigate how to carry out their own 
religious requirements in a plural society, and on this front there were several instances of 
deliberation. I witnessed several classroom discussions in which students wrestled with 
the question of how certain Islamic principles and directives apply to non-Muslims. In 
these cases, the intent on providing a strong foundation in Islamic principles by the 
teachers, meant that students’ concerns and questions on the topic were rarely addressed 
and often brushed aside as peripheral. Later in the chapter, I will also discuss how 
assumptions about the space outside the school as a place for students to learn and 
practice tolerance, while the space inside the school should be about instilling a strong 
Islamic foundation. Students, as a result, often attempted to answer the questions among 
themselves, but struggled to understand how these Islamic principles might apply when 
living in a plural society, especially when they are a religious minority.  
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 For example, in Ibu Vita’s tenth grade class on Islamic ethics, a group of students 
gave a presentation on how to avoid various “spiritual illnesses” (penyakit iman), based 
on material from the textbook. The first question for the group, posed by a fellow student, 
was whether these potential spiritual illnesses must be avoided just by Muslims, or by 
everyone (oleh umat Muslim atau umat manusia). The students in the group, required to 
respond, discussed for a few moments, talking over one another in disagreement about 
whether or not non-Muslims should be responsible for avoiding spiritual illnesses like 
hedonism. Finally, one of the students exclaimed loudly, “Unbelievers’ hearts are already 
locked!” (orang kafir sudah dikunci hatinya), as if to say they are already beyond hope. 
Ibu Vita was supervising the discussion but did not weigh in on this particular question, 
as she did for the following question about whether it is acceptable to save money. 
Ultimately, this answer seemed to satisfy the questioner, and the group moved on to 
respond to the next question.   
 A similar situation arose in Ibu Fadila’s eleventh grade class on Islamic 
jurisprudence. She had also employed the student-led group learning and presentation 
method, like Ibu Vita, encouraged by the 2013 Curriculum. The topic of the day was 
zina, pre- or extra-marital sex, and the assigned groups were supposed to read a given 
current event about zina to understand why it is forbidden in Islam, identify the negative 
consequences, and give suggestions for how to avoid zina. Ibu Fadila stepped out of the 
classroom while the groups were given time to read and discuss their assignment. I joined 
a group of five girls as one appointed herself the recorder for the group and began writing 
down the group’s main points to cover in their presentation. One of the other group 
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members started by dictating that Allah dislikes and forbids “that act” (perbuatan itu) 
between men and women who aren’t married. After more than a half-hour, the teacher 
had still not returned, but the class leader (ketua kelas) announced that the groups would 
begin their presentations so that they could all present within the remaining class time. 
While each group stood at the front of the classroom and shared their findings, the 
remaining groups who had not yet presented mostly did not even pretend to pay attention. 
Instead, they continued to talk amongst themselves, preparing for their own turns.  
 In my group, the girls were working on a statement on what must be done to 
avoid zina as other groups presented. One of them began to read aloud her answer as she 
was writing it, “As Muslims, women must cover their aurat and stay away from 
forbidden things,” when another stopped her midsentence.40 Her peer brought up the 
question: is it just Muslims (umat Islam) that have to do this, or is it humans (manusia)? 
The girls looked at one another, unsure of which statement is correct. Another group 
member chimed in, suggesting that it is something required from all, not just Muslims, 
and so the other group members nodded in agreement. Ibu Fadila had returned by the 
time the group was asked to present, so the group stood in a line at the front of the 
classroom as their spokesperson read their conclusion that humans must take care to 
cover their aurat. Without further discussion, Ibu Fadila invited the class to applaud their 
group presentation, and moved on to have students read verses in the Qur’an that talk 
specifically about zina. 
                                               
40 Derived from Arabic, aurat is a term which refers to parts of the body that should remain 
covered according to Islamic teachings. 
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 These vignettes demonstrate instances of deliberation among students at the 
madrasah, seeking to understand what carrying out Islamic norms and directives means in 
a religiously plural society. Due to a number of factors, including a focus on the 
directives in the textbook, as well as the school’s general push to provide students with a 
strong foundation in Islamic principles, these issues were not addressed further in the 
classroom by the teachers, and students remained hesitant about their answers. 
Furthermore, I describe below how teachers end up making a strong distinction between 
the school, and the area outside the school, which also has an impact on which topics 
appear as central and peripheral in the classroom. 
 
The School vs. “The Outside” 
 Because of the religious identity of the school, as well as the minority position of 
Islam in the city and province, MAN takes on an important role toward character-
building of their Muslim students, offering a strong basis in Islamic values and teachings. 
There is an assumption that an Islamically-based education at MAN, in building up this 
foundation, will allow students to enact these values outside the school, and will learn 
about tolerance and living in a plural society first-hand from the diverse environment 
outside the school. When speaking with Ibu Fadila, who agrees that inter-religious 
tolerance is high in Manado, I asked her which kinds of teachings and policies from the 
school can continue to support this reality. In her opinion, activities like the daily 
Qur’anic recitation that encourage religious values, along with lessons that talk about 
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peace will give students the character they need to uphold inter-religious harmony in the 
region. 
 At the same time, teachers have varying attitudes regarding the degree of 
appropriate engagement with the environment outside the school. The outside 
environment is sometimes discussed as a place where students have the opportunity to 
enact what they learn and represent the community of the school proudly. On the other 
hand, it is also presented as a potential negative influence on students, as youth are 
assumed to be facing moral degradation in general. After a class session in Islamic ethics 
where students learned about the role of family, school, and society in religious 
education, Ibu Vita confided in me her concern that students misunderstood the lesson. 
Her students seemed to assume that society always brings good influences. She wanted 
students to understand that they need to protect themselves from negative environmental 
influences, which do not always support the goals of an Islamic education.  
 
Drugs & Alcohol 
 In Manado, alcohol is readily available, particularly compared to many Islamic-
majority regions of Indonesia. Locally produced palm wine (Manado: saguer) and 
moonshine (Manado: captikus), but also beer and imported hard liquor, are relatively 
easily procured. Alcoholism and public drunkenness had become increasingly prevalent 
in the region over the past few years, such that the North Sulawesi police started a public 
campaign to discourage drinking, called “Stop Drinking” (Manado: Brenti Jo Bagate).  
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 Among educators in the region, there is significant attention paid to the 
potentially negative societal influence regarding drinking alcohol and using drugs. At the 
popular museum of Minahasan Art and Culture, visited by students across the region, the 
newest exhibit is the “Wale Anti-Narkoba,” or the Anti-Drug House, which warns 
students about the impact of drugs. As students walk in, they are immediately greeted by 
a graveyard scene, with a plastic skeleton hanging from the ceiling and a coffin, with a 
dark poster featuring a quote from a United States Drug Enforcement Administration 
agent about how doing drugs ruins one’s life.  
 
Figure 25: Students Read About Religious Perspectives on Drugs 
 
 In addition to posters about the physical impact of doing drugs and lists of famous 
people who have died from drug overdose, the exhibit features several posters on 
religious teachings on drugs. One of the posters, “Drugs from a Religious Perspective,” 
demonstrates how religious teachings from the six official religions in Indonesia 
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universally condemn the use of drugs. There are also posters where one can read a fatwa 
(religious legal opinion) from the Indonesian Council of Ulama regarding drug use, and a 
letter from the Conference of Indonesian Bishops on the same topic. 
 The museum exhibit is mentioned to situate the approach of MAN teachers on 
anti-drug and alcohol education. Overall, the teachers tend to assume that teachings 
religious values generally, and the Islamic perspective on drugs in particular, is the best 
way to discourage drug and alcohol use. Ibu Rahma previously taught Islamic education 
at a public school in Manado, where she knew teenagers who were already experimenting 
with alcohol and drugs. She feels strongly that the environment of MAN, and the 
increased time for religious education contributes to the “togetherness” (kebersamaan) 
and the Islamic character there, such that they have not had issues with students using 
drugs or drinking alcohol. 
  In the course on Islamic ethics, there is material about alcohol (minuman keras) 
from a Muslim perspective, and Ibu Fadila mentioned it as an important part of character 
building in her course. When she brought up the topic, I remarked that students might 
wonder why alcohol is not explicitly forbidden in Christianity. In fact, a Muslim student 
from the public school had admitted her confusion (and disdain) to me after seeing some 
of her Christian neighbors drinking and having raucous gatherings for all of their events, 
including funerals. Ibu Fadila responded that in the course, they approach alcohol from a 
scientific perspective, showing the reasons why it is not allowed in Islam. For example, 
they look at the negative effects of alcohol on the body. In addition, she explained, they 
look at the consequences of alcohol in terms of the negative kinds of sociability that 
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drinking encourages, which is also contrary to Islamic teachings. Overall, the main 
concern is in making students aware of the particular Islamic teachings regarding drugs 
and alcohol, concentrating on why they are haram (forbidden according to Islamic 
teaching). 
 
Mobile Phones and Moral Uncertainty  
 Across many different schools in North Sulawesi, principals and teachers are 
consistently concerned about the impact of mobile phones (HP), especially because of the 
temptation to use the phones to view pornography. At the same time, in many of these 
schools, where textbook collections are incomplete and libraries do not always have 
necessary materials, smartphones become particularly useful for students to access 
information they need during class. Schools have reacted in a variety of ways to help to 
direct students with regard to the use of mobile phones. At MAN, there is not a unified 
policy regarding the use of cell phones on school grounds, and teachers have different 
guidelines regarding how to use them in the classroom. However, the general approach 
toward dealing with technology parallels the school’s push to educate students in Islamic 
values in hopes that students will be able to implement them in real-life situations. 
 At Lokon Catholic school, where concerns about mobile phones include 
pornography but center on bullying via social media and the potential for theft in the 
dormitories, cell phones were forbidden during the school day until 2014. The school has 
since changed its policy, and now strives to teach students to use smartphones and social 
media in a productive way. The religious education teacher has developed lessons about 
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being critical toward media in general, and about using social media to be positive and 
constructive. In this lesson, she gives the concrete example of posting Facebook statuses 
that praise God rather than engaging in destructive behavior like bullying or threatening 
others.  
 In contrast, the policies of a local all-boys pesantren (Islamic boarding school) are 
strict, requiring students to hand over their cell phones to the administration for the 
majority of the time. When they are allowed to use their phones, they can only do so in 
monitored settings. One of the religion teachers at the pesantren connected these policies 
to major character changes visible in his students. He explained that some students have 
arrived at the school with a habit of downloading pornographic pictures or videos, and 
parents turn to the pesantren for help. He claims that the pesantren’s policy of strong 
religious education alongside a strict policy regarding cell phones has enabled a major 
moral turnaround in students who had previously been tempted by pornographic images. 
Parents, he said, have come back to pick up their children at the end of the semester, 
overcome with joy at the positive changes they recognize in them. 
 At MAN, there is not a unified policy regarding the use of mobile phones. As 
mentioned above, they are often used in the classroom for learning purposes, and the 
school has a WiFi network installed in the school that students can pay a small daily fee 
to use. However, some teachers implement their own rules in the classroom, forbidding 
cell phone use. On the other hand, many allow cell phone use in the classroom, along 
with guidance tethered in general Islamic values intended to instruct students in the 
proper way to use mobile phones. 
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 During a religious education lesson about respecting one’s teachers and parents, 
Ibu Vita used the behavior of some youth with their cell phones as a negative example. It 
is disrespectful, she declared, to be look at your HP and play on it during class, not to 
mention that you will not learn anything from the lesson. She also scolded students who 
turn off their cell phones so that their parents cannot reach them and will not know where 
they are. As she mentioned mobile phones, she gave a short extemporaneous sermon on 
the dangers of having pornographic pictures on one’s cell phone:  
 “If you have pornographic pictures saved on your HP (mobile phone), you will 
 not receive your fortune, if you have strange pictures, pornographic pictures. If 
 you have them, please erase them, ok? Try some introspection. If you have 
 pictures like that, erase them, ok? HPs are not for that, what are they for? They’re 
 for sending messages, taking pictures, calling people.” 
 
Another teacher, Ibu Fadila has a conviction that teachers must anticipate the ways that 
students use cell phones, for good and bad, and guide them on the best way to do so. 
 Ibu Rahma creates a WhatsApp group for her homeroom class each year, so that 
she can easily communicate with her students and be available to answer their questions. 
It also allows her to stay in touch with students after they graduate. In Ibu Rahma’s class 
discussion about character (akhlak) according to Islamic teachings, she asked students for 
examples of good and bad akhlak. The class leader, a confident and articulate boy, 
suggested that if he gets a new HP and reacts by bragging and showing off to his friends, 
he is encouraging jealousy in his friends, an example of bad character. Ibu Rahma then 
directed students to look for verses about good and bad character so they can better 
understand the Qur’anic injunctions on the subject. 
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Birthday Parties 
 The last example regarding orientation toward the environment outside the school 
is about birthday parties, which are extremely popular among both Christians and 
Muslims, and are typically designed as religious celebrations. For example, it is common 
for Protestant youth to begin their birthday celebrations with a worship session, including 
readings from the Bible, prayers, and worship songs before offering a feast. In a similar 
vein, Muslim youth in Manado typically begin birthday celebrations with Qur’anic 
readings and prayers. While the mainstream opinion of birthday parties among teachers at 
MAN was that the celebrations are appropriate and fun, encouraging a kind of 
togetherness, this was not the case among all teachers. 
 Several teachers at MAN held birthday parties for their own children, and posted 
pictures of the big celebrations, including the copious amounts of food that are a staple 
for gatherings in Manado. Teachers also attended birthday parties of students in their 
homeroom class. For students, birthday parties were a fun way to spend time with friends 
and family, and were also a status symbol. While birthday parties for students at MAN 
were typically more modest in terms of gift-giving, it was not uncommon to hear about 
students from Lokon, or from a private Protestant high school, who received cars or 
motorbikes as gifts from their parents on their seventeenth birthdays.  
 The acceptance of birthday celebrations as appropriate Muslim rituals was not 
universal among MAN teachers. For some, the popularity of birthday parties represented 
an un-Islamic innovation. Pak Benny, one of the vice principals at the school, maintained 
that celebration of birthdays is not in line with Islamic culture, as it has no basis in the 
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Qur’an. This gives some sense of the variety of religious perspectives held among 
teachers about the appropriateness of birthday parties. 
 The topic of birthday parties also brings up the question of whether or not it is 
okay for Muslim students to attend the celebrations held by their Christian friends and 
neighbors. These parties often include Christian rituals and food which is considered 
haram according to Islamic teachings. However, if they have invited Muslim friends and 
neighbors, Christians will typically provide a table with separate food, referred to as 
“national food,” as described in detail in chapter four. Religious teacher Ibu Rahma said 
that she often attends events like birthday parties held by her Christian neighbors, and 
does not find it problematic to attend, as long as she remains quiet and does not 
participate in the worship songs and rituals. In her experience, her neighbors have not had 
any issue with attending Muslim events at her house that included Qur’anic recitation and 
Muslim prayers.  
 Muslim students from the public school, who may have more invitations to 
Christian birthday parties than MAN students because of their numerous Christian 
classmates, still have mixed feelings about attending them. One Muslim student from 
SMA used the provisioning of halal food at his friends’ birthday parties as an example of 
the enactment of tolerance, and also mentioned that he also shows tolerance through his 
respect of the worship session that takes place there. Another student, however, confessed 
to feeling uncomfortable attending birthday parties where there is haram food available, 
even though there may also be a separate table of halal food. 
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 In concluding the discussion of the school’s orientation to the “outside” 
environment of the school, I want to first contrast it to that of a nearby pesantren, which 
has focused much more on the negative aspects of the society. The head of the pesantren 
argued for the importance of keeping students inside the boarding school as much as 
possible, to protect them from all of the negative and un-Islamic influences in the 
surrounding environment. Although teachers at MAN have concern for immoral 
influences outside the school, they still feel strongly that giving them an education in 
Islamic values and principles will help them to thrive as they go out into the world. 
 
Conclusion 
 At MAN, the largest Muslim school and only public madrasah in Manado, the 
main approach is to provide students with a strong background in Islamic values and 
principles that will allow them to act moral and tolerant citizens. Most teachers agree that 
Manado does have high inter-religious tolerance and enjoy discussing both the various 
social factors and Islamic teachings that support it when prompted. On the other hand, in 
the classroom, the topic of living in a plural society is rarely discussed, and respect for 
diversity is typically addressed only when it appears in the curriculum. On several 
occasions, students wrestled with questions about how Islamic principles and teachings 
apply in a religiously plural society, and these questioned often became sidelined or 
ignored by the authorities in their strict focus on teaching dogma. While at times the 
outside environment of the school is perceived as the source of dangerous influences 
regarding alcohol and pornography, teachers hope to build up students’ characters with 
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Islamic values such that they will be able to reject these temptations and live a pious life 
in society. 
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SECTION III: YOUTH AND NEGOTIATION 
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CHAPTER 7: WEARING YOUR MORAL CHARACTER ON THE SLEEVE OF 
YOUR SCHOOL UNIFORM 
 
 On May 2nd, 2016, young students across Indonesia celebrated National Education 
Day by taking part in a patriotic flag ceremony and marching in parades on the street, 
dressed up to indicate their desired future professions. One day later, as other schools 
resumed their normal academic schedules, the vice principal of SMA public high school 
in Manado, came on the crackling intercom to announce that today they would continue 
their celebration of National Education Day by cancelling academic classes for the 
purpose of inter-class competitions, including a school uniform fashion show. 
 
Figure 26: SMA Student Poses in the School Uniform Fashion Show 
 
 For the fashion show, students began to enthusiastically congregate in the 
courtyard and on balconies of the upper levels of the school building as speakers blasted 
Western pop music in preparation for the show. A representative boy and girl from each 
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homeroom class took turns strutting on the makeshift red carpet catwalk set up in the 
school’s courtyard. Many of the girls imitated bodily comportment and gestures found 
among fashion models: swaying their hips as they walked, putting their hands on hips for 
a pose, tilting their heads, and smiles alternating with intense gazes into the distance. The 
boys tended to be more rigid as they walked and posed, some appearing more confident 
than others. Their peers cheered them on energetically as they worked the runway, 
especially screaming in excitement if the boy and girl representatives linked arms during 
the walk. Many teachers were present to root for students from their homeroom class, or 
because they had been appointed judges for the event. The judges evaluated the 
candidates on three categories: the quality of their walk, the quality of their poses, and 
how closely their uniforms follow the school’s approved code. 
 
Figure 27: Homeroom Class Representatives in the Fashion Show 
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 The uniforms matched the standard style for high school students seen across 
Indonesia: short-sleeved, collared white shirts with blue-gray slacks for boys and knee-
length skirts for girls, with black belts, white socks with the school’s official logo, and 
black shoes. But why were students being asked to participate in a so-called “fashion 
show” in which they were all wearing the same clothes? This was one of the questions 
that led me to further investigate the place of uniforms in the three Indonesian high 
schools where I conducted research. Extensive observation reveals that school uniforms 
are not only the object of attention during this fashion show, but are part of a daily ritual 
of discipline and moral evaluation in schools.  
 Based on ethnographic fieldwork data from three high schools in North Sulawesi 
(the three major case studies in the dissertation), I examine the specific ways in which 
uniforms are assumed to index students’ inner states and morally bind them to the 
community, understood as the school. In addition, I show how this morality is in some 
cases harnessed to expressions of religiosity, and often manifests in gendered ways. 
Despite the differences between the three schools where I conducted fieldwork in terms 
of their public/private status and religious affiliation, school uniforms in all three schools 
are objects of scrutiny in a broader discourse about behavior, discipline, and morality.  
 In wearing their polished uniforms and representing their classmates in the 
National Education Day fashion show, the students who walked on the runway were 
expected to embody and perform good moral character by virtue of wearing the school 
uniform proudly and in accordance with the school’s uniform code. In this event, teachers 
drew power and authority from their position either in coaching their homeroom students, 
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or as judges who threw each other glances and whispers when a boy’s pants were too 
tight or a girl’s skirt was too short, making sure these students received low marks from 
all judges and had no chance of winning.  
 It was not only Christian students who became class representatives, but some 
Muslim boys and Muslim girls wearing the standard school uniform were chosen to 
represent their homeroom class. One Muslim girl, Tania, who ended up placing in the 
event, had significant experience entering pageants and modeling competitions in North 
Sulawesi. As students participated in the event as either models or observers, they also 
subverted the morality and discipline that the uniform is intended to embody. Through 
the bodily gestures and movements of the models that were clearly inspired by various 
types of models and pop stars, and the encouragement for boy and girl representatives to 
link arms, students had their own interests and concerns in the event. While the 
ostentatious and overtly sexualized behavior was not necessarily rewarded in the scoring 
process, neither was it openly reprimanded during the fashion show.   
 I argue that teachers—and sometimes students—use an individual’s uniform 
presentation as an index of inner moral state. While the teachers at the fashion show 
focus on those who are being rewarded for wearing the uniform correctly through 
awarding them a high score, the following cases focus on the much more common 
reprimand and discipline involving students’ appearance and uniform. The reprimands 
can be understood in one sense as trying to reform students’ moral dispositions “from the 
outside in,” starting with their physical appearance as a first step toward inducing interior 
changes. This is part of the ideal in which the uniform code represents not only the 
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physical requirements of uniform size, length, color, etc., but also embodies the proper 
code of student behavior and character.  
 When teachers and administrators crack down on specific students for violating 
the uniform code, their actions are not only about punishing individuals and trying to 
reform their individual ethical dispositions. These disciplinary actions are often public 
acts and deliberately so, reminding the entire community of the school of the moral ideal 
to which they are all bound and measured against. In addition, from an institutional 
perspective, they are oriented toward preserving the moral reputation of the school in the 
eyes of parents and other educational stakeholders.  
 What this particular case brings to light, and the following cases help to elucidate 
various aspects of, is how school uniforms are involved in negotiating the moral tension 
between the ideal and practice of student behavior and character. In the fashion show, 
there is a clear ideal of the Indonesian student who wears the correct and proper uniform, 
and by extension, is someone whose behavior can serve as a model for others. The strong 
insistence on the uniform code is an appeal to and insistence upon the “ideal,” to the 
virtues and behaviors that one would find in an model student. The way that students 
actually wear their uniforms reflects the reality of practice, in which the ideal is never 
fully achieved. In this messy reality, if one looks hard enough, one can inevitably find 
pants too tight, skirts hiked up too high, shirts un-tucked, and socks pushed down.  
 As is clear in the opening vignette, youth often orient themselves toward various 
concerns and ideals through the ways that they wear the uniform. In practice, youth often 
bend the rules of the uniform codes by incorporating popular accessories, wearing tight 
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pants and having longer hair (for boys), and wearing short skirts (for girls). These 
deviations from the official code often pass under the radar and are not addressed by 
teachers or administrators, but merely fade into the messy reality of everyday life unless a 
student “misbehaves.” Student behavior understood as deviant (arriving late, not 
completing an assignment) is disciplined through correction of a student’s physical 
display (e.g. cutting boys’ hair, ripping boys’ pant legs), often in a public setting for the 
express purpose of cultivating shame. Students’ immorality as a result becomes 
physically embodied through their inadequate presentation of the school uniform. 
Teachers and administrators act to correct this failure not only as a tool to induce moral 
reform in individual students, but do so in a public display that reminds all students of the 
ideal of character and virtue to which they are bound as Indonesian students. 
 Using this approach to discipline in the school, teachers are making particular 
assumptions about character formation and morality through their attempt to transform 
students from the outside in. While there is a strong insistence on the ideal of students’ 
moral character when the uniform code is implemented, there is also recognition of the 
messy reality of practice when it is not. Attempts at correction can be understood as an 
attempt to re-orient students toward the ideal, embodied in the proper donning of the 
school uniform. 
 The literature on uniforms has focused on their use as mechanisms of social 
control that impose uniformity and a collective identity, minimalizing individuality and 
creating “docile bodies” (Foucault 1995). In her study of Indonesian schools under the 
authoritarian New Order regime, Saya Shiaraishi claimed that the ubiquitous school 
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uniforms were able to “visually efface diversity”(1997:127). According to this line of 
thinking, youth learn to enact the subject position of a student by learning the appropriate 
body techniques and disciplining oneself to make the wearing of the uniform and its 
accompanying behavior a matter of habit (Craik 2005). These particular arguments about 
uniforms and the intended effects on their wearers best represent the attempted projects 
of institutions, and studies of youth culture have demonstrated the creativity of youth in 
resisting and subverting their imposed meanings (Lomawaima 1993; McVeigh 2000). 
Whether about expressing liminality, resistance (Hall and Jefferson 2006), or an 
essentialized identity (Arkin 2009), styles of dress are one way in which youth exert 
agency and assert their positioned identities. I examine school uniforms as a site of moral 
negotiation for both teachers and students that mediate concerns about the moral states of 
individual, and the particular understanding of moral personhood that it entails. 
 
School Uniforms and Moral Personhood 
 At SMA, as the bell rang at 7 AM to signal the start of the school day, I left the 
crowded teacher’s room with Ibu Sonia, the Protestant religious education teacher, and 
crossed the school’s central court on the way to the classroom. Since it was a Tuesday, 
Ibu Sonia was wearing the required civil servant uniform, drab in comparison to the 
colorful batik prints that brightened up the school on Wednesdays, or the striped polo 
shirts that made an appearance on athletic Fridays. She dressed up her greenish-brown 
skirt and collared shirt with a pair of fashionable wedge sandals that she kept under her 
desk and strapped on each time she went to teach. Ibu Sonia combed her hair and 
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checked her makeup in the communal mirror in the back of the teacher’s lounge, as all 
teachers did before heading to their classrooms to ensure their appearance was always 
rapi (neat).  
 The day’s religious education course for the Protestant students began as usual, 
with the assigned students taking their place at the front of the classroom and leading 
their classmates in prayer and worship. Jonathan, one of the students in charge of this 
week’s worship, stood at the front and invited his classmates to find a Bible passage, and 
to stand up and shout “Hallelujah!” when they had located it and were ready to start the 
reading together. He nervously gave a short sermon about the sacrifices that are necessary 
to make if you truly love Jesus, until he was relieved of his duties by his classmate in 
charge of the closing song and prayer.  
 Ibu Sonia had wandered out of the classroom during the worship session, and the 
atmosphere quickly relaxed as students began chatting with their friends and sharing 
snacks. When she reappeared, the tone in her voice conveyed business. She reminded 
students they had been given group assignments last week to create skits about a 
Christian perspective on different topics: friendship, valuing others, and dating. The 
group performing a skit about friendship was ordered to go first, but they averted the 
teacher’s gaze and continued planning their skit together. Ibu Sonia gave them a bit of 
extra time as she took roll, but began to lose patience after calling them to the front 
several times as they looked down at the floor, mumbling to each other. She finally 
exclaimed, “If you’re not ready to perform your skit, then go to the sport hall now so you 
can take some responsibility!” With still no acknowledgement from the students in the 
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group, Ibu Sonia threatened action by counting backwards from five, which also failed to 
elicit any kind of response. Injecting her voice with even more authority, she called the 
group immediately up to the front to be disciplined, and the students grudgingly filed out 
to the central courtyard of the school (called the “sport hall”) to await their punishment. 
 The vice principal, security guard, and school counselor stood in the center of the 
court, casually chatting as they supervised several students jogging laps who were 
serving their punishment for arriving to school late. Ibu Sonia explained the nature of her 
students’ offense and let these men, standing proudly upright in their civil servant 
uniforms, determine the punishment. The vice principal, Pak Rudy, commanded the four 
girls and five boys in this group to line up in preparation for a thorough uniform 
inspection, as the remaining students in the classroom watched wide-eyed from the 
classroom windows. The girls, wearing their Tuesday uniform, a blue-gray skirt with a 
white collared shirt, black belt and black shoes, stood in line and awaited Pak Rudy’s 
decision. After examining the girls’ uniforms, he instructed them to pull up their socks to 
their required mid-calf position, surprisingly with no mention of the girl who was 
wearing plain white socks clearly lacking the required school logo. Their uniform check 
complete, the girls began to chatter among themselves as their male classmates 
underwent inspection. Two of the boys were given approval, but the other three were 
deemed in violation of the uniform code because they had fallen victim to the popular 
trend of skinny pants. Their pant legs tapered in to a diameter that fell short of the 20 
centimeters clearly spelled out in the school’s rulebook. The vice principal handed the 
boys scissors and instructed them to cut the seam of their pants from their ankles to their 
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knees. Getting impatient as the boys struggled to cut apart the seams without ruining the 
pants, Pak Rudy went over and pulled one girl’s ear, and then did the same to one of the 
boys. 
 The school counselor, a young man working on his Ph.D. in psychology, laughed 
sheepishly and reassured me that the students are used to this kind of punishment, 
although it might seem different to me. In fact, he explained, every day he is waiting at 
the school gates to dole out punishment to students who come late or are in violation of 
the uniform code. He paused our conversation as he eyed one student, Jimmy, and 
handed a pair of scissors to Pak Rudy, asserting that Jimmy needs a haircut. While the 
back of Jimmy’s hair was an acceptable length, he had let his bangs grow out, another 
trend among boys that the school administration was trying desperately to curb. I became 
aware of this one day after school when I saw the school principal cutting a boy’s hair 
while he was squirming with an expression of fear on his face. She had asked him, 
“What? Are you afraid I’m not good at cutting hair? Don’t worry, I’ll do a good job.” In 
this scenario, Pak Rudy gave the scissors to Jimmy and told him to cut his own bangs. 
Without any visible emotion or protest, Jimmy grabbed his bangs between his middle and 
index finger and put the scissors just above his hold, ready to cut. The other boys 
gathered around Jimmy, chuckling in amusement while guiding him in making the cut 
and helping to style his hair afterward to minimize the evidence. 
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Figure 28: Jimmy Cuts His Hair, Supervised by Administrators and Advised by Friends 
 
 After enduring their different punishments, the group was allowed to come back 
into the classroom, where Ibu Sonia had apparently been lecturing the rest of the class 
about the importance of responsibility. She pointed to one boy in the front row who had 
not been punished but was sporting skinny pants, and commented that he is lucky he was 
not in their group, or his pants would certainly be ripped now too. Ibu Sonia said she 
would request that the administration do more thorough uniform checks around the 
school. Just before the bell rang, she told all of the students that they should be careful, 
because if they aren’t able to pass religion class, people might judge them as religion-
less. In response, a few students gasped, while others jeered, “atheist!” When the bell 
signaled the end of class, students rose from their chairs to say “Thank you ma’am” in 
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unison to Ibu Sonia before she made her way out of the classroom and back to the 
teacher’s lounge. 
 This incident at SMA demonstrates how discipline for behaviors, such as not 
completing an assignment, is mediated through the school uniform. The students who are 
not prepared to present their skits are punished through a uniform check. There are many 
students in the classroom who are also in violation of the uniform code, which Ibu Sonia 
explicitly addresses when talking to the class, implying that it could have been him but 
was not, because he had prepared his assignment. The school counselor, who was clearly 
embarrassed that I witnessed the situation, asked how my high school would have dealt 
with the situation. When I answered that a teacher might give the students a failing grade 
for that assignment or sentence students to an after school detention, he shook his head. 
These approaches were not suitable for the Indonesian context, he assured me: these 
students needed physical punishment via uniform checks or running laps in order for their 
character to change. He is convinced that the effective way to shape students’ moral 
character is from the outside in.  
 Corporal punishment in the form of hitting, slapping, pinching, or similar forms is 
prohibited in Indonesian schools, and there are cases of teachers who have been 
prosecuted for such actions under child protection laws. Teachers are encouraged to bring 
in school counselors (and often the student’s parents) instead of handling disciplinary 
situations on their own. School counselors like the one at SMA, however, are clearly 
more convinced about the power of punishment through uniform checks, which 
sometimes involve cutting hair and destroying clothing.  
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 Parents, however, do not always agree with the disciplinary actions of the 
administration. Their objections are both due to concerns for the well-being of their child, 
as well as the financial burden of replacing expensive articles of clothing. One afternoon 
in 2016, a teacher’s mobile phone rang while I was having a discussion with her after 
school hours. She paused our conversation to take the call from a friend whose son 
attends the same high school where the teacher works. The mother was upset, her son 
having returned home from school with marks on his back from being hit repeatedly. Her 
son claimed that a teacher had beaten him as a punishment for wearing brown shoes, 
instead of the required black shoes outlined in the uniform code. The teacher gave her the 
contact information for a school administrator so that the mother would be able to share 
her concerns directly with the principal. The student’s situation raises questions about 
how teachers and counselors draw the line between (illegal) corporal punishment and the 
type of punishment doled out during the uniform checks. 
 Punishment mediated through the uniform is publicly visible to other students. 
Whether it was the students watching from the classroom windows or those who saw the 
boys’ torn pant legs during the rest of the school day, other students would know and 
understand what had happened. In Michael Lempert’s ethnography of a Tibetan Buddhist 
monastery, he found that the public reprimand of “the derelict monk” by disciplinarians 
employed rhetorical strategies to make each monk feel he is talking about them, making 
all of them uncomfortable by anonymously exposing them to public scrutiny (2012:110). 
Disciplining through school uniforms, though publicly punishing specific students who 
have acted out, creates a similar effect. Because all students wear the uniform and most 
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are not following the letter of the uniform code, each student is reminded that he/she 
could have been the one who was publicly shamed and disciplined. 
 Because school uniforms are seen as an index of students’ moral character, and a 
way to shape them from the outside in, some schools in Indonesia have even tried to use 
them to combat drug use and corruption, social ills that schools have been called upon to 
address in recent years. In Makassar, South Sulawesi, the mayor announced in 2015 that 
he would require all students to wear patches on their stating both “I hate drugs” (aku 
benci narkoba) and “I hate corruption” (aku benci korupsi). Standard uniforms already 
have a name patch, a red-and-white Indonesian flag patch, and the student council (OSIS) 
logo. When interviewed about the new policy, the South Sulawesi provincial head of the 
Department of Education said, “It will make an impression and build up a fortress of 
defense every day; it is a simple step but can positively impact students so they do not 
engage in those actions” (quoted in Antara News 2015).41 In other words, having students 
wear these statements on a daily basis is assumed to have an effect on students, 
impressing onto them the importance of rejecting drugs and corruption.   
 
School Uniforms and Public Image 
 In addition to being used as an index of individual moral character by teachers 
and students within the school, uniforms are also understood as an important part of 
maintaining a school’s image outside of the schools. Students are continually reminded 
that when they wear their school uniforms out in the street, their behavior reflects back on 
                                               
41 “Tentunya akan membekas serta benteng pertahanan setiap hari, langkah ini sederhana tapi 
bisa berdampak positif kepada siswa untuk tidak mencoba melakukan perbuatan itu.” 
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the entire community of the school. In other words, school uniforms are not just a moral 
index used by teachers and students, but society as a whole. On another occasion where 
students at SMA were asked to perform skits in their Protestant religious education class, 
they designated one of their characters as a bad student, though they clarified that it was 
his parents’ lack of care and attention had driven him to this point. Their plan was to 
establish his bad moral character in the drama by showing him doing “bad things,” like 
skipping school to smoke and drink alcohol, specifying that he engaged in these 
behaviors while wearing his school uniform. They were depicting this boy as bad not 
only through his actions, but by his wearing the school uniform while engaging in them, 
thereby reflecting badly on Indonesian students as a whole. 
 In Indonesia, it is now a common ritual for high school seniors to spray paint their 
uniforms after their last day of national exams in celebration of having completed the 
exams, marking that they are no longer high school students. The ritual takes place 
despite official school discourses, which universally disapprove of the defacement of 
school uniforms and highly discourage students from participating in an activity they see 
as inappropriate and disrespectful. Around the end of the school year, several teachers 
who had added me on Facebook were circulating a meme with a picture featuring a 
lineup of Alfamart (a popular convenience store) employees, ironically identifiable by 
their company uniform. The caption reads in all-caps conversational Indonesian: 
“Scribbled on [your uniform]? Happy to have graduated, huh. We await your application 
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at the store”.42 The meme implies that students who deface their uniforms will end up as 
nothing more than cashiers at a convenience store. 
 At Lokon Catholic boarding school, students disregarded the school 
administration’s pleas after the national exams. After signing and spray-painting each 
other’s school uniforms, they took group pictures, instantly uploaded them to social 
media, and then jumped into the school’s swimming pool. On that day, they were 
wearing the uniforms that were designated for Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays at 
Lokon, which includes neckties (for both boys and girls) and plaid skirts for the girls. 
Although defacement of uniforms has become more commonplace in Indonesia, the 
ability to destroy uniforms—instead of saving them for a younger sibling, for example—
still conveys the position of privilege of Lokon students. 
 At Lokon, scrutinizing uniforms was just as much a daily ritual as lining up 
around the flagpole and beginning the school day with a prayer on the neatly manicured 
lawn. It was a favorite topic of Pak Jefri, the vice principal who also acted as the athletics 
instructor and wore sweat suits to school with a thin gold chain necklace for added flair. 
On this particular day, the atmosphere was subdued, without the usual chatter, and the 
flag was flying at half-mast as students and teachers were grappling with the tragic death 
of a fellow student in a motorcycle accident. Although it was “English Day,” which in 
theory required students and teachers to operate by the policy of “no English, no service,” 
Pak Jefri addressed the students and teachers present in Indonesian, first saying a few 
words regarding how the school will move forward from the tragedy. He then quickly 
                                               
42 Udah coret coretnya? Seneng ya udah lulus. Kami tunggu lamaran di toko. 
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jumped to the topic of uniforms, as if to inject a bit of normality in the day’s assembly. 
He eyed the students in their Friday scouting uniforms—light brown collared shirts with 
dark brown pants/skirts—in disapproval, seeming to notice the numerous uniform 
violations even from his distant position behind the lectern.  
 The student body was smaller than usual since the seniors had finished their 
national examination a few days earlier, leaving them with nothing to do but await the 
results at home. Pak Jefri suggested that these soon-to-graduate students might be willing 
to donate their school uniforms to their juniors who, based on his judgment of their 
appearance, are certainly in need of proper uniforms. Letting out a sigh, he complained 
that despite his warning not to, the older students defaced their uniforms on their last day 
of national exams, before jumping into the swimming pool with their uniforms on. As a 
result, they might not be able to donate complete sets of uniforms to their juniors. “Ask 
for their uniforms as souvenirs,” he encouraged them anyway. Going on about the 
incident, Pak Jefri explained, “I told them not to do it, but what’s done is done. At least 
they did it on school grounds, because if they had done it outside, people would think, ‘so 
that’s what Lokon School is like!’”  
 Seeming to relativize what the senior students had done rather than emphasize the 
gravity, Pak Jefri then mentioned a recent national news scandal about a high school 
senior on the island of Sumatra who was stopped by the police while driving with her 
friends in their colorfully painted uniforms after the national exam. When accused of a 
traffic violation, she (apparently untruthfully) claimed to be the daughter of a police 
general in hopes that would provide her with immunity for her actions. Her verbal 
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confrontation with the police was filmed by bystanders and spread quickly in the national 
media, turning the girl into a national poster child for the morally decadent youth of 
Indonesia. Before handing off the microphone to another administrator who would 
continue with the morning announcements, Pak Jefri said with relief, “Luckily we are not 
like that.” 
 The administrator’s comparison of Lokon students’ actions with those of the girl 
who had been stopped by the police was based on the way it would reflect on the name 
and the prestige of the school. He did not approve of Lokon students’ painting of school 
uniforms, but he was still clearly relieved that the students remained on school grounds 
during their celebration. This comparison demonstrates how student uniforms act as a 
moral index not just for students and teachers about individual students, but also for the 
broader community as an index of the moral character of students at a particular school, 
and of Indonesian youth in general.  
 In an informational session for parents that took place at SMA public high school 
the week prior to national examinations, the principal Ibu Vidy stressed the necessity for 
students to show up to take the national examinations in their proper school uniforms. 
The importance of appearance and presentation was not lost on her, as she had clearly 
gone to a salon that morning to get her hair and makeup done before speaking at the 
meeting. The principal explained that the examination protocol requires having teachers 
from other schools to oversee the proctoring. The monitoring system became standard 
procedure in order to prevent rampant cheating, and in response to national cases of 
teachers providing answers to students during the exam to increase the school’s 
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graduation rate. However, for the principal, it also mattered because these outside 
teachers would certainly be making judgments about the school’s image and appearance. 
She explicitly instructed parents to make sure their children leave home with the correct 
uniform, because there will be teachers from other schools there. If SMA students are not 
wearing the correct or complete uniform, it will bring shame upon their school. She 
didn’t explicitly mention the trend of students painting and drawing on school uniforms 
after the exam, although she told parents to encourage their children to donate their 
uniforms to their younger classmates.  
 In these cases, the school uniform becomes significant in its potential to reflect an 
individual moral state back onto the image of the entire school. As a result, the individual 
who wears the uniform improperly, engages in questionable behavior while wearing the 
uniform, or defaces the uniform, risks being negatively projected as a representative of 
the school’s image.  
 
School Uniforms as an Indicator of Religiosity 
 At MAN madrasah, uniform checks are common occurrences organized and 
implemented through OSIS, the student council organization. The uniform checks are 
referred to as razia, literally, “raids.” A male and female representative of OSIS often 
interrupt class sessions to scrutinize the uniforms of their classmates of the same gender. 
The madrasah is the only school of the three that requires uniform checks to be done by 
students of the same gender. They order all of the students to stand up, and report those 
who are not in line with the uniform standards to the administration. As they stand up, the 
  
268 
boys, who often untuck their shirts as they sit down at their desks, typically rush to them 
back in as they stand so that they might have a chance of passing the inspection.  
 Uniform checks are an important ritual at the school, and the topic of the school 
uniform code emerged during the debates for student council president. The debate took 
place on a sheltered podium in the central court of the school, and each of the six 
candidates for class president stood behind old wooden desks that had been dressed up 
with batik tablecloths for the occasion. Behind them was a green banner announcing, 
“Student Council Election” which included the school’s seal. There were several teachers 
who had been chosen to act as moderators for the debate, and were seated on the sides of 
the stage. Because the debate took place during the sweltering mid-day heat, and the 
court facing the stage was in direct sunlight, the audience was small. The few students 
who came to the event sought shade behind the stage itself, or from the sparse trees on 
the school’s cramped campus. Other students used the time to buy fried chicken or 
noodles from the food vendors in the cafeteria. 
 By the second round of the debate, the teachers had already pre-selected the three 
most suitable candidates who were chosen to continue in the running for the student 
council president, one boy and two girls. Pak Heri, one of the teachers on the selection 
committee, sat on the stage looking serious in his official civil servant uniform. He posed 
the question in formal Indonesian, “In your opinion, is the school’s code of conduct as 
you know it still appropriate for the school? If not, which parts of it need to be changed?” 
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Figure 29: MAN Student Council Debate 
 
 As first in line to answer the question, Muhammad, a popular and handsome 
student, took the microphone. He suggested perhaps the code of conduct is not 
appropriate as it stands, citing the fact that many students are late and fail to follow the 
rules regarding the uniform. His suggestion brought some muffled cheers from the 
audience behind the stage and scowls from the selection committee. Muhammad 
continued, explaining his answer by critiquing the rule that boys must maintain short 
haircuts. “If we look at students at the madrasah now, we can see that many boys have 
hair that is a bit long, yet still neat,” he observed. He suggested that boys should indeed 
be allowed to have slightly longer hair as long as it does not appear messy. He added that 
these boys, “when they are outside of the school and wearing our school’s uniform, they 
must remain neat…and still must follow all religious rules and requirements.”  
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 Both of the girls who answered the question after Muhammad wore white veils 
with their long-sleeved white shirts and floor-length blue-gray skirts, the Muslim version 
of the school uniform for girls that was required in the public madrasah. Rhati, the first 
girl to respond, argued with conviction that in fact the code of conduct is appropriate, and 
the problem lies with the students who fail to follow it. The last candidate, Ani, argued 
along similar lines. She explained that following the rules is more important than just 
following trends. In their responses, Rhati and Ani applied an understanding of how one 
wears a school uniform as a measure of their moral character, with those failing to do so 
appropriately lacking in moral conviction and overly susceptible to negative peer 
pressure. Muhammad, on the other hand, tried to de-couple appearance and moral 
character (based in religiosity) by positing that boys could simultaneously have long hair 
and be good Muslims, still reflecting well on the moral community of the school by 
following religious rules and requirements. 
 Though Muhammad’s answer might have been popular with some of the students, 
it did not sit well with the teachers on the selection committee. After the three candidates 
had shared their opinions, Pak Heri requested additional clarification from Muhammad 
on how he would make sure that people follow the rules. As Muhammad started in, he 
seemed to uphold his original position, claiming that there are certain things, such as the 
rules about long hair for boys and that the school could afford to loosen up on. However, 
perhaps finally sensing that this was not the answer that the selection committee was 
looking for, he quickly added: “But actually, if students want to have long hair, maybe 
it’s better if they go to school somewhere else, because at our school, we represent 
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Muslims!” Cracking a smile, Pak Heri replied that the answer was enough, and handed 
over the microphone to the next teacher to continue on to the last round of questions in 
the debate.  
 The female candidates for student class president were not asked to clarify their 
position, presumably because they voiced the same assumption that the teachers held: 
failure to follow the school uniform code is a moral failure. Although Muhammad tried to 
add nuance to this assumption in his consideration that one could possibly be a good 
Muslim boy with long (but neat) hair, he quickly backed down after realizing that he had 
given the “wrong” answer and that the introduction of nuance into this matter would not 
be tolerated. As he backtracked, Muhammad spoke in the moral absolutes that the 
teachers were looking for, stating that this is a school where they must represent Islam 
and Muslim values, and that boys with long hair cannot do that. Once Muhammad 
realigned himself with this position, Pak Heri let him off the hook and continued with the 
debate. 
 
Gendered Concerns 
 The student council debate becomes interesting in its focus on male, rather than 
female, dress and behavior. At MAN there was not generally any more anxiety about the 
way in which girls conformed to the uniform standards compared with boys. At both the 
public school and the public madrasah, there was arguably more attention paid to boys—
particularly their hair and pants—and they were also more likely to be punished for their 
offenses. The example given earlier in the chapter of the Protestant students at SMA who 
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were punished with a uniform check for not completing their homework assignment 
demonstrates this gendered differential. The girls in the group were told to pull up their 
socks, with no mention of the girl who was not wearing socks with the proper school seal. 
The boys, on the other hand, were scrutinized much more heavily and forced to rip their 
pants, and Jimmy to cut his hair. 
 The private Catholic school Lokon was the most vocal compared with the two 
other schools in its concern about the way girls dressed. The female students were 
required to wear plaid skirts past the knee, but many of the girls roll up their skirts to 
make them land above their knees. The Catholic religious education teacher, Ibu Maria, 
explained to me that it is often the senior girls who do so, such that as students move up a 
grade each year, their skirts tend to get incrementally shorter. Although teachers 
sometimes mentioned the skirt length, in practice it was rarely punished as often as other 
uniform violations, such as not having the correct socks/shoes, or wearing flashy 
accessories.  
 After reports of numerous sexual assaults that had taken place across Indonesia 
and a brutal gang rape that occurred in Manado spread in the media, the topic of skirt 
length became a point of focus at the school. The extended morning announcements on 
that particular day included Pak Jefri’s reminder that skirts above the knee are not 
consistent with the uniform code and students wearing them need to be reprimanded. 
However, instead of the typical punishment of being called to stand in front of the 
flagpole and face their fellow students in shame, he asked teachers to talk to students who 
are in violation of the uniform code privately. He also made reference to girls’ immodest 
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behavior, wondering aloud what guests might think when they come into the school 
lobby and they see girls in short skirts sitting with their feet propped on a chair, or with 
their legs wide open. While short skirts were for the most part tolerated compared to 
other uniform violations, they were still connected to female modesty and morality as 
administrators implied that wearing short skirts is improper and sends a message that 
reflects badly on the name of the school and can turn one into a victim of sexual 
harassment. 
 
School Uniforms and Plurality 
 The examples throughout the chapter demonstrate the connection between school 
uniforms, individual morality and religiosity, and collective image and aspiration, and 
attempts to deliberate—or prevent deliberation—about their indexed meanings. Here, I 
turn to examine how debates about uniforms and dress in educational settings also 
capture concerns about coexistence, and ways to deal with difference. Conversations 
about the jilbab provide a lens for viewing such concerns and how they are addressed. At 
the same time, I take care to avoid reducing veiling to a mere political practice or symbol 
and look at the contextual and shifting practices of Muslim youth in Manado. The reasons 
for veiling (or not veiling) in Indonesia are complex, shaped by historical circumstances, 
local politics, and individual concerns about modesty and autonomy (Smith-Hefner 
2007). 
 Veiling figures in debates across Indonesia about accommodating diversity, 
including a major incident which took place in Yogyakarta, Central Java in December 
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2016. Two Catholic universities in the area had claimed they sought to express their 
acceptance of other religions by including a woman wearing a jilbab among a group of 
students on a billboard advertising university programs (Jakarta Post 2016). The hardline 
Muslim People’s Forum (FUI- Forum Umat Islam) responded forcefully, rejecting the 
appropriation of a symbol of Islam and accused the universities of covert 
Christianization. Concerns from conservative and hardline groups about religious mixing 
and proselytization motivated a campaign of intimidation to pressure the universities to 
take down their advertisements. The incident demonstrates how treatment of the jilbab 
can become contentious in the Indonesian context, triggering debates about acceptance of 
diversity and religious boundaries. 
 A study of public high schools in Yogyakarta, Central Java found that Islamic 
groups outside the school exercised their influence among students through involvement 
in Rohis activities. At many of the schools, the result was strong peer pressure for all 
girls, sometimes even non-Muslim girls at public schools, to wear a jilbab (Salim et al. 
2011). The researchers found that students distinguished between different veils and their 
according levels of modesty, often policing each other in their wearing of the veil. In 
addition, the New York Times published an article in 2014 about the increasing pressure 
for public schools from Islamic groups to make veiling mandatory for Muslim students 
(Kwok 2014).  
 In chapter four and the discussion of “Jilbabs in a Christian Space,” I argued that 
normative frames shaping veiling perceptions and practices in Manado project jilbab-clad 
Muslims as radical outsiders, as opposed to tolerant Manadonese Muslims. Christian 
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interlocutors often claimed that Manadonese Muslims do not wear the jilbab, even though 
this was clearly not objectively the case. Eka, an eleventh grader at the public high school 
who wears a long and modest jilbab, was well aware of how she was perceived. As we 
sat on the floor of the Islamic education classroom, students fanning themselves with 
paper in the mid-day heat, I had started an informal discussion with them about what it is 
like to live as Muslims in Manado. While her classmates started in by praising the city as 
harmonious (rukun) and peaceful (damai), Eka drew from her personal experience, 
stating bluntly that people in Manado often eye her suspiciously because of her choice to 
wear a long jilbab.  
 However, this was not the only normative frame shaping perceptions of Muslim 
women wearing the jilbab. Christians who witnessed Muslims wearing a jilbab at times 
expressed the expectation of heightened moral self-awareness in its wearer. On one 
occasion, when eating in a mall restaurant, the Protestant teacher who had accompanied 
me for dinner kept staring rather conspicuously in the direction of the outside seating 
area. I looked outside, confused and unsuccessfully searching for the object of her 
attention. She then explained what was so captivating: a woman who was wearing a 
jilbab and smoking at the same time. While rates of smoking in Indonesia are high, the 
practice is highly gendered, and it is typically considered morally unacceptable for 
women to smoke. The moral judgment she received from the teacher at a distance was 
clearly compounded by the fact that the woman was wearing a jilbab, read as a 
declaration of superior moral status and self-awareness. This was not the only instance 
when a Christian informant had pointed out what was for them moral inconsistency in 
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seeing a Muslim woman wearing the veil and engaging in a morally suspect behavior, 
such as smoking, at the same time.  
 
Jilbabs at School 
 Muslim students at a public school like SMA have the choice between the 
standard school uniform with short-sleeved shirts and knee-length skirts, or the Islamic 
version with long-sleeved shirts, floor-length skirts and the jilbab. The majority of 
Muslim girls at SMA choose to wear the standard uniform, forgoing the jilbab. At one 
religiously mixed public school in Manado, it was rumored that the principal had 
privately instructed the admissions committee at the school to not accept too many 
Muslim girls who wore the veil, for the image of the school. At SMA, wearing the veil is 
discussed in the religious education course as a requirement of Islam, but is not a major 
concern or topic of discussion among the girls in their daily lives at this public school. 
The choice not to veil has interesting practical implications for maintaining modesty in 
the classroom. In the Islamic education classroom at SMA, there are no desks or chair, 
and students sit on the carpeted floor in a circle for their weekly two-hour lesson. Girls 
who wear the knee-length skirt of the general school uniform deal with concerns about 
maintaining modesty while sitting on the floor by placing prayer mats over their laps. 
 Of the several Muslim girls at SMA who participate in the school’s dance team, 
none wear the veil. When the team competes in dance competitions or performs at 
basketball games, the Muslim students wear the same dance costumes as the other 
members of the dance team. In the video of their dance routine they proudly showed me, 
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they were wearing leggings with basketball shorts over them and jean jackets over loose 
t-shirts. My question about the kinds of costumes they wear on the dance team prompted 
a discussion among the students about the shockingly immodest costumes of other 
schools’ dance teams. Their stories of girls wearing crop tops or short cheerleading skirts 
caught the attention of a student wearing a jilbab who was quietly sitting next to us. She 
did not hesitate to share her opinion that is it not right for anyone, but particularly for 
students, to go around wearing such revealing and inappropriate clothes. The girls on the 
dance team nodded in agreement, affirming their participation in the dance team as 
appropriate and simultaneously distancing themselves from teams that wear immodest 
clothing. 
 
Figure 30: Muslim Students at SMA Cover up with Prayer Mats 
 
 In addition to participating on the school dance team, Tania also participated in 
local modeling competitions and had been selected by her homeroom class to represent 
them in the school uniform fashion show in celebration of National Education Day. She 
did not wear the jilbab; none of the contestants in the school uniform fashion show did. 
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This could have been because of their own objections to participating, or due to the 
selection process within the homeroom classes.  
 Many girls who wear the Islamic version of the school uniform on a daily basis 
have an overall shifting and contextual practice of veiling. Irma, who always wore the 
Islamic school uniform, showed me her pictures on Facebook one day while waiting for 
class to start. I noticed that in nearly all of her pictures, she was not wearing the veil. 
Before I could ask about it, she laughed and brought up the topic herself by saying, 
“There’s a lot of pictures of me without a jilbab.” I then asked about why she wears the 
veil to school, hinting that perhaps her parents had encouraged her to do so. Irma quickly 
shook her head and replied, “No, it’s my choice.” Students who veil on school grounds 
do not necessarily do so outside of the school. However, like Irma, many resisted 
narratives of parental pressure, instead asserting narratives of personal choice. 
 Two Muslim girls from Kotamobagu (150 km south of Manado, in the southern 
part North Sulawesi) attending SMA through a scholarship program veil on a regular 
basis, both at school and in their daily activities outside the school. Far away from their 
families, they both stay with Ibu Sonia, GMIM pastor and Protestant religious education 
teacher, who offered to house them. When there was a retreat for Protestant students that 
Ibu Sonia was coordinating, she brought the two Muslim students along with her. 
Students and teachers met at the school one Saturday morning before taking buses to the 
retreat location, a villa owned by the school principal on a hillside just outside of 
Manado. The girls showed up in jeans and t-shirts, and had chosen not to wear the jilbab. 
One of their friends saw them on the school campus that morning and was surprised, 
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commenting that they weren’t wearing the jilbab. One of the students shrugged off the 
question, and neither responded. 
 Even many of the female students involved in the Islamic students’ club Rohis 
typically wear the standard school uniform without the veil. On the other hand, when the 
Muslim students participate in Rohis events outside of the school, the girls wear matching 
uniforms: black long-sleeved collared shirts with a Rohis logo, Indonesian flag, and the 
student’s name embroidered on the fabric. They also wear the jilbab when representing 
the Islamic students’ club outside the school campus, signaling their membership and 
piety. 
 For female students at MAN, on the other hand, the jilbab is an accepted part of 
the school uniform at the madrasah. However, it is still rarely discussed outside of the 
formal religious education courses. Although the school is public, its status as a public 
madrasah and exclusive enrollment of Muslim students means that inclusion of the jilbab 
as part of the school uniform by the administration is required. Many of the girls wore it 
during the school day as part of their uniforms, but did not veil outside of the school’s 
campus or on their social media profiles, which students accessed on their smartphones 
throughout the school day. Some of the female teachers at the school pulled back their 
veils in between classes as a respite from the heat while sitting in the teacher’s lounge, 
often in mixed company, a practice which I noticed but was never commented upon or 
discussed. In addition, I never heard teachers or peers admonishing students for the lack 
of neatness in pinning the jilbab, or other critiques that are commonly given in order to 
help young women learn how to wear the jilbab properly.  
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 A student named Ririn, however, specifically chose to go to MAN because of her 
desire to wear the jilbab. Her parents are both teachers, one working at SMA and the 
other at MAN. Her older brother attends the public school SMA, but she explained to me 
that she preferred to attend MAN to be in an environment where she could learn how to 
wear the jilbab and feel more comfortable doing so. Despite the veil not being a major 
topic of discussion at MAN, it was accepted and required as a part of the school uniform, 
not a choice for Muslim students as it was at the general public school. For some 
students, like Ririn, and often their parents, this policy did play a major part when 
selecting a high school. 
 The situation regarding jilbabs at MAN is in contrast to that of an all-girls private 
pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Manado, where female students are required to 
wear the jilbab at all times. They must wear it even when in exclusively female company 
inside the dormitories, and are only allowed to take it off to shower. Discussions about 
the rules regarding the jilbab at the pesantren were much more explicitly linked to 
morality. In fact, while interviewing the head of the pesantren, I had asked how the 
pesantren approaches character building in students. The first example he gave was about 
the dress code: 
 “There are rules about clothing, naturally, and–excuse me–for example they are 
 not allowed to wear tight pants. They wear the jilbab and learn how to cover their 
 aurat when outside and inside [the dormitories] as well.”  
 
The head of the pesantren links the jilbab directly to character and morality, which is not 
surprising, especially considering the examples above of school uniforms and the attempt 
to shape students’ moral characters starting with their dress. What is more surprising is 
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that this connection does not come through strongly among at the public schools, and 
even at the public madrasah.    
 In majority-Protestant North Sulawesi, there appears to be little pressure from 
Muslim groups or school administrations for Muslim students to veil at public schools. In 
some cases, it may be actively discouraged by the Protestant environment of the school 
and even by direct policies from administrations that discourage accepting girls who wear 
the veil. This is in contrast to the increasing pressure to veil at public schools, and the 
strong peer monitoring that takes place among high school girls in majority-Muslim Java. 
In the schools, where uniforms are so explicitly used to mediate moral concerns on a 
daily basis, the jilbab was not a major topic of discussion for Muslim girls at the public 
high school or the madrasah. The particular situation of veiling in Manado is fraught, tied 
into questions about plurality and coexistence as well as individual piety and morality. 
 
Conclusion 
 The ethnographic vignettes from various schools in North Sulawesi demonstrate 
how school uniforms act as an index of moral character. Minor deviations in the uniform 
code are often ignored until students act out, in which case the deviations are re-
interpreted as moral transgressions. Based on this understanding of moral personhood, 
students are disciplined through correction of their uniforms, often in front of other 
students so as to induce embarrassment and shame, seen as the necessary basis for a 
character transformation. School uniforms represent a construction of the school as a 
moral community, and the way in which students wear the uniforms also reflects on the 
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moral character of the school as an institution and the students as Indonesian youth. 
Though there may be nuance in the way teachers choose to call out uniform violations or 
ignore them, the example from the public madrasah showed an unwillingness to 
accommodate the assertion that students’ adherence to the uniform code is not necessarily 
an indicator of one’s religiosity and by extension, moral character. 
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CHAPTER 8: CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONSHIPS:  
NAVIGATING THE ETHICS OF BOUNDARIES 
 
 As demonstrated in multiple ways throughout the dissertation, North Sulawesi is 
working to promote a regional identity as a model of coexistence for Indonesia. Locals 
are eager to point to many factors that support a framework of tolerance, including 
intermarriage between Muslims and Christians in the area, which adds a dimension of 
literal truth to the popular motto, “We are all brothers” (Manado: Torang Samua 
Basudara). A commonly cited historical example of intermarriage in the region took 
place in Kampung Jawa Tondano, where Muslim Javanese Kyai Modjo and 
approximately sixty of his followers were exiled by the Dutch colonial government. In 
the 1830s, they settled in the highlands of the region and married local Minahasan 
women (Babcock 1981).43  
 For many in North Sulawesi, intermarriage is not only a historical symbol of 
religious and ethnic coexistence, but also a contemporary social reality that requires a 
practical approach to managing relations across religious lines. One Muslim teenager at 
the public madrasah in Manado whose grandfather converted to Islam explained to me 
that his multi-religious family experience has taught him that: “religious difference is not 
                                               
43 However, according to Babcock, the Minahasan women who married the Muslim Javanese 
exiles were most likely not Christian, as the majority of Minahasans at that time remained 
adherents to the pre-Christian local religious tradition (1981:80). Although Protestant 
missionaries were already present in the area, mass conversion did not take place in the area until 
the 1880s (Heuken 2008:422). 
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an obstacle to brotherhood, because difference is not always bad. Difference often 
becomes a reason to fight, but can also be a reason for peace.” 
 The characterization of inter-religious marriage as potentially providing a 
practical or symbolic framework of tolerance is particularly striking when contextualized 
within the broader political and religious landscape of Indonesia, where inter-religious 
marriage is a highly contentious national issue because of its association with religious 
conversion. The 1974 National Marriage Law does not explicitly outlaw inter-religious 
marriage, but bureaucratic procedures have made registering such a marriage nearly 
impossible, effectively requiring the bride and groom to profess the same religion 
(Connolly 2009). Nevertheless, the MUI has also issued several fatwas (religious legal 
opinions) forbidding inter-religious marriage in any form, which are actually stricter than 
the guidelines of classical Islamic jurisprudence. At the same time, fears and rumors 
about mixed marriage as a plot of either Christianization or Islamization abound in public 
moral panics.  
 Furthermore, the reality of intermarriage and the potential for religious conversion 
often pose practical difficulties for family relationships. Discourses about the dangers of 
inter-religious socializing, dating, and marriage are also prevalent in North Sulawesi, 
audible from religious communities and in schools, and circulated among young 
Indonesian students. One Christian girl at the public high school SMA expressed her fear 
of socializing with youth of a different religious background, especially boys, because of 
the possibility of romance: “I don’t want to get too close. I’m afraid. Who knows? I could 
like them, because we’re still teenagers.”   
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 How can we understand these contradictory discourses prevalent in North 
Sulawesi, which position inter-religious marriage as either the very foundation of 
religious coexistence in the region, or as its most prominent threat? In this chapter, I seek 
to connect the broader political context and institutional structures that channel normative 
frames to the level of individual ethical position making in order to examine the multi-
leveled interactions taking place in how youth understand religious difference in 
socializing, dating, and consideration of marriage. 
  Widespread public concern about growing intolerance in Indonesia has led to 
changes in the national curriculum that incorporate imperatives for students to be friends 
with everyone, regardless of ethnicity, religion, social class, etc., and teachers are called 
on to evaluate students on how well they accomplish that task. At the same time, while 
religious education curricula include varied teachings about friendship and dating, they 
unequivocally stress the importance of marrying someone from the same religious 
background. In this chapter, I use the lens of ethics to better understand how these 
normativities regarding difference in personal relationships (friendships, dating, 
marriage) get channeled through schools via textbooks, educators, and administrative 
policies. I also describe the kinds of individual ethical position making Indonesian youth 
undertake as they make personal decisions about whom to be friends with, whom to date, 
and whom could be a potential spouse.  
 As youth approach the possibility of inter-religious interaction, their perceptions 
and actions are influenced by a complex conjunction of normative frames, shaped both by 
institutional policies on the management of religious difference as well as by everyday 
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experiences and interpersonal interactions. Their attitudes toward inter-religious 
socializing, dating, and marriage are related to the experiences of their families and 
friends, and the religious teachings about socializing and marriage they encounter 
through required religious education in school and their religious community. An 
evaluation of these attitudes and practices and their linkage to institutional structures and 
political context serves to demonstrate how individuals perceive and navigate religious 
boundaries in this religiously plural society, and the potential implications for possible 
frameworks of coexistence. 
 I argue that these seemingly contradictory discourses about inter-religious 
relationships which youth encounter and engage are based on different conceptions of 
subjectivity, with real consequences for religious coexistence. When individualized 
subjectivity is emphasized, tolerance is assumed to be an individual disposition enacted 
through crossing religious boundaries and encountering the “other.” However, when a 
community-oriented subjectivity is emphasized, tolerance is based on the respect of 
collective boundaries. Thus, the prospect of conversion remains a constant threat, and a 
reinforcement of religious boundaries and difference is perceived as necessary for an 
inter-religious encounter to occur. As youth seek to have a sense of self and belonging 
within their religious community, the way in which they think about religious difference 
and coexistence is inevitably shaped by both conceptions of subjectivity.  
 First, I discuss what the angle of ethics can bring to the analysis, and also what 
contributions this particular study can make to the emerging anthropology of ethics 
literature. I then shift back to the particular case study of Christian-Muslim intermarriage 
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in Indonesia to outline the institutional frames from the state and religious communities 
in dealing with this topic. Next, I bring in ethnographic examples of how the topic of 
inter-religious relationships is treated through state-mandated religious education at the 
high schools where I conducted fieldwork, and intertwine this with a discussion of the 
youth attitudes, practices, and concerns about the issue. Last, I open up to an analysis of 
the models of subjectivity present in these attitudes and their impact on how religious 
boundaries and belonging are conceived of and experienced, and the consequences for 
religious pluralism in North Sulawesi and beyond. 
 
Multi-Leveled Interactions Shaping Religious Boundaries 
 In this dissertation, the issue of scale figures prominently in searching for a way 
to understand how individual ethical positioning links with institutions, social structures, 
and political context. The chapter began by describing two opposing discourses about 
inter-religious marriage and its possible contribution to or threat toward societal 
coexistence. These discourses have not been taken from one individual, but exist on a 
broad societal level, though the same individual might call upon both discourses in 
different contexts. Take for example Pak Ustad, the Islamic education at the public high 
school SMA in Manado, who explained to the 10th grade students (and the foreign 
researcher) seated around him on the green-carpeted floor of the classroom that North 
Sulawesi is a symbol of harmony in Indonesia, and that a history of intermarriage 
supports this harmony. The same teacher follows the national religious education 
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curriculum, which expounds the importance of choosing a spouse who will bring one 
closer to Allah, and is therefore Muslim.  
 An overly narrow conception of ethical life-worlds precludes an understanding of 
how people in plural societies approach those with different, and inevitably varied ethical 
aspirations, some which may unite them together as neighbors or citizens, and others that 
divide or differentiate them. In response, Jonathan Mair and Nicholas H.A. Evans have 
called on a reflection of anthropology as a practice of ethics across borders to inform an 
investigation of how “others relate ethically across borders and respond ethically to 
borders” (2015:219). Such an analysis must be ethnographically informed, for example, 
avoiding the assumption that religious difference is always conceived of as a boundary to 
interaction. If, when, and how boundaries are perceived must be empirically determined 
and analyzed, and may be constantly shifting across social contexts and roles.  
 First, it is important to point out that practices of inclusion and exclusion as they 
relate to policies about marriage and sexual relations are intimately intertwined with the 
political order. Stoler (1989, 1992) has elucidated the policies of sexual control in the 
European colonial empires of the 20th century, linking the shifting construction of racial 
boundaries and their policing through sexual control and domestic arrangements to 
evolving political structures. Considering the role of family law in a modern Egypt, 
Mahmood ties the existence of communal religion-based family law and regulation of 
marriage and sexuality to the secular state’s enshrinement of religious difference 
(2016:115). In other words, far from being exclusively in “private” sphere and outside of 
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the state’s reach, family life and sexuality is regulated by the state and shapes 
boundaries—in this case, religious ones. 
 However, existing studies which have taken up cases of inter-religious marriage 
through the frame of ethics tend to assume that the state is imposing a top-down 
framework regarding religious difference. In Veena Das’s case study of a Hindu-Muslim 
intermarriage in Dehli (2010), she further develops her approach to ordinary ethics. Her 
account offers a nuanced look at how the couple and their relatives negotiated this 
relationship through different forms of re-orientation and a de-stabilization of identities. 
Although there is recognition that national and transnational ideas about belonging shape 
Hindu and Muslim identities, how these impact interpersonal relationships is assumed to 
be uniform across the population, rather than contextual. H. Keziah Conrad’s study of 
Bosnian mixed ethnicity families (2014) draws on theories of language socialization and 
Das’s approach of everyday ethics to look at how microprocesses open up the possibility 
of contestation of categories fixed by state ideology.  
 In these case studies, there is an implicit assumption that the top-down impacts on 
identity are self-evident, imposing a fixed social structure that categorizes and 
unequivocally produces opposition across clear borders that can only be altered through 
interpersonal interaction. In the conclusion, Das holds up this particular case of 
intermarriage and the ethical re-positioning that emerges out of it as one case where “a 
community of love can come about and, at least in some lives, break the solidity of 
oppositional identities” (2010:397). In addition, the studies assume that the state’s 
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imposition of religious (and ethnic) boundaries through marriage policies are inherently 
intolerant.  
 In North Sulawesi, the societal level discourses regarding inter-religious marriage 
appear contradictory and indeed produce identities that are much more ambiguous and 
flexible than they are solid. For this reason, it is important to understand how these 
discourses are filtered through and disseminated by institutions like schools, and how this 
impacts the way in which youth perceive religious difference and act in relation to others. 
In considering the role of the state, I keep in mind John Bowen’s question regarding its 
involvement in creating and policing religious boundaries: “Can it be viewed as a way of 
regulating difference, sustaining tolerance, or only as a manifestation of intolerance?” 
(2003:229). 
 In Jennifer Connolly’s research on Christian-Muslim intermarriage in East 
Kalimantan, Indonesia (2009), she gives insight into the contestations and compromises 
that have historically shaped the Indonesian state policies on marriage, rather than 
assuming that its policies singlehandedly produce solid and impervious religious 
boundaries. In addition, she discusses the median level of collective ethnic and religious 
identities and how they motivate dispositions toward inter-religious marriage. Ultimately, 
she concludes that the level of the family and individual are the most salient for Dayaks, 
as it they “anchor their concerns about intermarriage in religious and familial obligations, 
not in the maintenance of collective religious identities” (2009:492). Connolly’s position 
is a critique toward analyses that treat group-level differentiation and distinction as 
sufficient explanation for anxiety toward mixing and fail to consider individual and 
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familial concerns that also drive those dispositions. However, it needs to provide an 
account of how political, institutional, and collective levels connect to individual 
dispositions toward religious difference and perception of religious boundaries that 
emerge in the question of inter-religious socializing, dating, and marriage.  
 Through an analysis of the multi-leveled interactions that occur in shaping ethical 
dispositions, I examine how the political and institutional levels impact the ways in which 
religious difference is understood and enacted among Indonesian youth. A look at 
attitudes toward inter-religious friendship, dating, and marriage among Indonesian youth 
offers insight into the contextual nature of how religious difference is perceived and acted 
upon, and how it links to broader institutional and societal frames. I argue that the lens of 
ethics is useful here, as it can demonstrate how these levels become intertwined: 
institutionalized structures that shape ideas about religious categories, group-level 
concerns about belonging and differentiation, and individual aspirations for friendship, 
romance, and family support. All of these come together to shape when and how the 
religious boundaries are perceived, and how individual orientation and action toward 
them takes on ethical consequence. 
 
Ambiguous State Regulations on Inter-religious Marriage 
 Rather than portraying the state as a singular actor and strict enforcer of religious 
boundaries, I seek to demonstrate that existing social tensions have engendered the state’s 
rather ambiguous approach to regulating inter-religious marriage in both practical and 
legal terms. Later in the chapter, I focus on how different teachers approach the topic, and 
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how Indonesian youth experience and talk about religious boundaries in inter-religious 
friendship, dating, and marriage. To avoid unfounded assumptions about the state’s role 
in the imposition of religious boundaries, I examine the political and social circumstances 
that have informed the state’s strategy on inter-religious marriage and on regulating 
religious affairs more generally. While state policies on inter-religious marriage in 
Indonesia do in some ways reinforce social boundaries between religious groups, the 
policies themselves are controversial and have been at the center of bitter political 
debates since the time of national independence. 
 First, the issue of inter-religious marriage is part of a broader political question 
about the role of religion in the Indonesian nation itself. Controversy over proposed 
marriage bills has stemmed from the ambiguity, or “grey area,” that exists by virtue of 
the compromise between secular and Islamic nationalism as the basis of the Indonesian 
state (Mujiburrahman 2006:157). Indonesia gained independence in 1945, and in the 
years following, debates about the place of Islamic family law within the national legal 
system pitted the more conservative Muslim groups against Christians and secular 
nationalists, including a significant representation of pious Muslims like Vice President 
Mohammad Hatta. From the perspective of those supporting a stronger role for Islam in 
the governing of the nation, recognition of religiously based family law was deemed 
necessary in a state that is not strictly secular. Christians and secular nationalists, 
however, generally opposed state recognition of Islamic family law, arguing that it 
represented a slippery slope toward the implementation of an Islamic state 
(Mujiburrahman 2006:157).  
  
293 
 The 1974 Marriage Law resulted from the third attempt to draft a national law 
regulating the institution, the first two having failed in reaching a compromise between 
the two major ideological positions. The approved 1974 National Marriage Law, still in 
effect, followed a general trend in the New Order regime’s approach to compromise 
between the two visions of nation: to “accommodate the cultural demands of Islam while 
seeking to contain it politically” (Connolly 2009:495).  
 The initial draft of a marriage bill proposed in 1973 based the validity of marriage 
on civil registration, not religious law or requirements. The draft also included an article 
explicitly stating that religious difference is not an obstacle to marriage (Mujiburrahman 
2006:164,177). In parliamentary debates, the Muslim PPP party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan) objected to civil registration rather than religious law as the basis for 
marriage. They saw their party’s role as a crucial defense of Islamic religious authority 
and Muslim interests in an era of declining political influence (Connolly 2009:495; 
Mujiburrahman 2006:164).  
 Marriage reform became a highly politicized debate within the broader society. 
Several influential Muslim thinkers claimed that the bill’s allowance of inter-religious 
marriage was part of a Christianization plot, and Muslim students responded by 
demonstrating fervently against the proposed bill in Jakarta (Cammack 2009:110-1). In 
the resulting compromise that became the 1974 National Marriage Law which still 
governs the institution of marriage today, a marriage is considered valid if performed 
according to the religious law in accordance with the professed religion of the couple 
(Cammack 2009:113). In addition, the article allowing inter-religious marriage was 
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deleted, with the consequence that inter-religious marriage is not explicitly addressed in 
the national marriage law (Mujiburrahman 2006:179). 
 The lack of legislation addressing inter-religious marriage has left a situation of 
theoretical legal ambiguity, although in practical terms it is nearly impossible to register 
inter-religious marriage, especially between a Muslim and non-Muslim. Muslim 
marriages must be registered at the Office of Religious Affairs, while non-Muslim 
marriages are registered at the Civil Registry. Inter-religious couples sometimes seek out 
religious officials who do continue to perform inter-religious marriages. However, hese 
couples are not able to receive the state benefits of marriage that are dependent on 
registration if both parties maintain their religious status (Cammack 2009:124-5). 
Cammack has argued that the ambiguity and flexibility of the marriage law on questions 
of mixed marriage “opens avenues for mixed religion couples to marry while at the same 
time preserving the pretense that marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims is not 
allowed,” creating a legal loophole (2009:132). 
 Inter-religious marriage is a difficult phenomenon to capture statistically because 
of its legal murkiness and the fact that conversion often takes place prior to marriage. The 
national percentage of inter-religious marriages in Indonesia is estimated at less than 
0.5%, based on an analysis of 2010 census data (Aini, Utomo, and McDonald, 
forthcoming). According to this analysis, approximately 1.1% of marriages in North 
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Sulawesi are inter-religious, and the province is among those with the highest 
percentages (ranking sixth out of thirty-three total provinces).44   
 Significant legal challenges have been leveled at the 1974 Marriage law, 
including a 1986 Supreme Court case (Andi Vony v. State) involving a Muslim woman 
and a Protestant Minahasan man. While the resulting decision affirmed the existence of a 
legal vacuum, it failed to directly address the ambiguity arising from legal pluralism with 
regards to inter-religious marriage. In contemporary democratic Indonesia, the formation 
of a Constitutional Court provides a potential avenue for clarification on the marriage law 
in light of the democratic constitutional reform and the addition of several components 
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that could potentially be interpreted 
as invalidating an inter-religious marriage ban (Cammack 2009:128). However, in 2015, 
the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled against a petition to explicitly legalize inter-
religious marriages in 2015, a measure criticized by liberal human rights advocates 
(Human Rights Watch 2016; USCIRF 2016). The Indonesian Minister of Religion, 
Lukman Saifuddin, praised the decision for reflecting the strong religiosity of the nation, 
affirming marriage as an act of worship in and of itself that must be aligned with religious 
requirements (Kompas 2015). 
 Because historical contestations regarding marriage legislation also relate to the 
larger issue of the relationship between religion and the state, religious leaders and 
                                               
44 The researchers note that these numbers are likely underestimates. The census data is able to 
capture couples living under the same roof who officially claim different religious belongings. 
This would, therefore, include couples within which one partner converts for marriage but later 
officially converts back to his/her initial religion. The data does not include couples in which one 
individual converts prior to marriage and officially remains within the new faith tradition (Aini et 
al., forthcoming).  
  
296 
organizations have played a significant role in shaping the debate. In general, Islamic 
organizations have tended to reject inter-religious marriage both in support of a religious 
basis for the registration of marriage and out of concern for the possibility of increased 
conversion to Christianity if inter-religious marriage were legalized. One important point 
to note is that most major Islamic organizations have issued a fatwa prohibiting inter-
religious marriage. Islamic law is often interpreted as allowing a Muslim man to marry a 
Christian or Jewish woman, while prohibiting all other forms of inter-religious marriage 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. It is noteworthy that in the fatwa issued by the MUI 
(Indonesian Council of Ulama) and the one issued by Muhammadiyah, both argue that no 
form of inter-religious marriage is permitted in order to protect Muslim interests and 
avoid conversion (Cholil 2009). In other words, the religious decisions issued by Islamic 
organizations acknowledge the political situation and express the broader social concern 
about the prospect of increased apostasy if inter-religious marriage were permitted. 
 In this abbreviated analysis of the state’s approach, I have emphasized the ways in 
which the state has maintained a measure of legal and practical ambiguity in regulating 
inter-religious marriage, rather than either clear proscription or support. However, it is 
also important to note that most Indonesians today assume that inter-religious marriage is 
legally prohibited, and do not perceive state policy as ambiguous. Some inter-religious 
couples choose to get married abroad, in Singapore or Australia, where mixed marriages 
are recognized. For couples that cannot afford to get married abroad, conversion of either 
the bride or groom is often considered a necessary practical step in getting married. In 
this sense, inter-religious marriage is associated with a very specific and fraught kind of 
  
297 
boundary crossing: religious conversion. Although there are inter-religious couples that 
marry and maintain different religious belongings, inter-religious relationships that end in 
marriage typically involve the conversion of one partner. The prospect of conversion is 
highly sensitive in the religious and political context of Indonesia, as well in more 
localized familial and community contexts. 
 
Group-Level Boundaries and Inter-Religious Marriage 
  One of the major suspicions of inter-religious marriage stems from its association 
with the potential for religious conversion, and by consequence it is often framed as a 
conspiracy or plot toward mass Christianization or Islamization. Connolly, in her study of 
Christian-Muslim intermarriage in Kalimantan, has criticized the tendency to reduce 
Dayaks’ opposition to intermarriage to a concern for “their desire to guard their ethnic 
and religious boundaries,” arguing that fears are primarily about familial and 
interpersonal concerns that must be taken seriously (2009:494). In the following 
examples considered in this chapter, boundaries are not a mere sociological construct 
imposed by the researcher, but are examined based on the variety of ways they are 
experienced by individuals and interwoven with very emotional and personal concerns 
about how to navigate these boundaries.    
 As a majority-Protestant province in majority-Muslim Indonesia, Christians in 
North Sulawesi often do talk about the ways in which they feel Islam is infiltrating the 
region, with a strong conviction that they must maintain a strong Christian presence and 
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identity for the region. Inter-religious marriage often figures strongly in concerns about 
or evaluations of religious encroachment in the region.  
 These concerns came to the surface during a Christian leadership training at the 
private Catholic school Lokon. The training session was held at the school’s campus and 
run by Indonesian leaders in the Haggai Institute, an international Protestant mission 
organization. Pastor Raymond, a grey-haired Protestant pastor clad in suspenders, was in 
charge of one major session on “Leaders and Family.” He warned the teachers and 
administrators undergoing the training about the prevalence of free sex among youth 
nowadays. Of particular concern were the men whom Pastor Raymond referred to as 
from “Group A,” who allegedly tell young girls they are interested in Christianity to get 
close to them and have sex with them, but when the girl becomes pregnant, they will 
refuse to marry the girl unless she converts to Islam. Though he began by referring to 
them as from “Group A,” his story left little doubt as to the Muslim identity of these 
purportedly dangerous men. Earlier in the session, Pastor Raymond had shocked 
participants by revealing that his own daughter had become interested in a Muslim boy 
while she was at university. Children often make mistakes, he explained, and need a 
parent’s support and friendship to make the right decisions. For his daughter, he 
supported her as she came to the conclusion that she should break off her relationship 
with a Muslim boy. 
 Claims about plots of intermarriage as part of the expansionist agenda of religious 
groups are common across Indonesia, and the same rumors about intermarriage scams 
perpetrated by Muslim men are reported among Christian Dayaks in Kalimantan 
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(Connolly 2009:498). Connolly considers these claims based not on their verifiability, but 
on what they indicate with regards to Christian-Muslim relations, and “Christian Dayaks’ 
interest in guarding their community in the face of social and political stresses” 
(2009:499). Although religious harmony is an important part of North Sulawesi identity, 
some organizations and individuals who appeal to religious harmony often do so under 
the assumption that the province will remain majority Christian with broad Christian 
influence and visibility in the public sphere. From this perspective, Christians perceive 
the possibility of Christian-Muslim intermarriage as a direct threat to the Christian 
majority of the province.  
 Other sessions of the Christian leadership training at the Catholic high school 
expressed these communal fears with little ambiguity. In a session on the “Biblical 
Mandate,” one of the few local speakers at the training had been coaching participants to 
approach Muslims and teach them about Christ. One participant, a school employee, 
questioned the pointed focus of the seminar on talking to Muslims about Jesus. He 
reasoned that Muslims still learn about Jesus by reading about Prophet Isa from the 
Qur’an, but Hindus or Buddhists might not learn about Jesus at all. Seemingly offended, 
the speaker shot back:  
 “Maybe because we are in a majority Christian area, we feel calm…but one day 
 they can become a threat…they come and keep coming, and then build houses of 
 worship…When your grandchildren are adults, will Tomohon still be a majority 
 Christian place? Manado is already 50/5045! The slogan is ‘We are all brothers,’ 
 but in other regions it’s ‘Blood!’ But that’s because they are keeping a low 
                                               
45 By this, the speaker means that Manado is 50% Christian and 50% Muslim, which was a 
common claim, although according to the 2010 census the city is 62.6% Protestant and 31.5% 
Muslim (Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Manado 2014). 
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 profile. Once their numbers are large enough, they will start doing things 
 (Manado: beking-beking).” 
 
Although many of the teachers, especially the religious brothers who made up the 
dormitory staff at the school, found the Christian leadership program’s approach to 
witnessing and proselytizing extreme, the opinions about the dangers of inter-religious 
marriage proved much more mainstream, as discussed below.  
 
Indonesian Youth Attitudes Toward Inter-Religious Relationships 
 In one study of Indonesian students’ attitudes toward inter-religious socializing, 
dating, and marriage, Parker, Hoon, and Raihani (2014) analyzed surveys of more than 
3,000 Indonesian youth collected across five Indonesian provinces. The researchers 
conclude that the majority of Indonesian youth are generally open to inter-religious 
friendship, and even courtship; however, only 6.6% of youth reported that they “agree” 
with inter-religious marriage (Parker et al. 2014:482). These surveys draw attention to the 
reality that for inter-religious friendships and even dating, boundaries often remain 
permeable to some extent for youth, but considering prospects for marriage in the future 
often results in the perception of an impervious border between religious groups.  
 Similar findings about inter-religious marriage were reported in a survey 
conducted among Muslim youth in Indonesia, indicating that 14.7% of males and 4.0% of 
females would be willing to marry someone of a different religion (Suryana 2011:24). 
Among those Muslim youth who indicated they would be willing to marry someone of a 
different religion, the majority (71.7% of males and 62.7% of females) also said they 
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would ask their spouse to convert to their religion, while 25.2% of males and 33.5% of 
females indicated they would allow their spouse to keep his/her religion (Suryana 
2011:24). In other words, youth associate the inter-religious marriage with the prospect of 
conversion, which is viewed as acceptable if their partner is the one who will convert. 
According to the survey, only 2.1% of the males who would be willing to marry someone 
of another religion said they would convert to their spouse’s religion, while 0% of 
females said they would (Suryana 2011:24). Even in cases where youth say they are 
willing to marry someone of a different religious background, this often comes with the 
expectation that they would be able to maintain their religious belief, and that their 
spouse would be the one who converts.  
 The literature on Indonesian youth and dating has documented how youth often 
balance the need to maintain a sense of self and public image as upright and moral, while 
still entering into romantic relationships and looking for future marriage prospects. The 
moral panic about youth and concern about free sex in a country that prides itself on 
religious commitment and piety is not simply a discourse perpetuated by teachers and 
parents, but a perspective that youth often agree with (Parker and Nilan 2013:116). Many 
parents mandate that their children must finish school before dating and/or marriage, and 
youth are concerned about losing their parents’ support if they do not follow their 
directive while only being armed with minimal practical understanding of how to interact 
with the opposite sex (Smith-Hefner 2009).  
 While these concerns are highly gendered and often more fraught for girls than 
for boys, many girls still do want to date and are worried about their future possibilities 
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for marriage (Parker and Nilan 2013:119). For pious Muslim youth in Java, these 
multiple considerations often lead to the perception that “selfhood and sexuality should 
be not merely a matter of individual achievement and autonomy but part of a broader and 
notably less individualistic vision of religious piety and moral community” (Smith-
Hefner 2005:459). One result of the increased emphasis on enacting religious piety in 
selfhood and sexuality is the assumption that one should seek out a marriage partner who 
shares the same faith and can help one to work toward religious aspirations.  
 For contemporary youth in Manado, practical questions about inter-religious 
socializing, dating, and marriage take on particular importance because of their potential 
to lead to the blurring or crossing of boundaries between religious groups. Though youth 
are often encouraged to mix with students of other religious backgrounds, this is clearly 
also done with the assumption that they will eventually marry someone of the same 
religion. However, within the act of inter-religious mixing and dating, the possibility of 
inter-religious marriage looms, and the potential is sometimes perceived as dangerous, 
expressed in the teenage Christian girl’s fear about socializing with, or even talking about 
anything beyond homework, to the Muslim boys in her class at the public high school. 
 On the other hand, in this regional context, inter-religious marriage is also 
characterized as the foundation for tolerance within families and in the broader society. 
Inter-religious marriage is a particularly apt angle from which to approach the tension 
between various existing ethical frames in society about religious coexistence, and how 
they are navigated by youth embedded in their own particular social circumstance who 
encounter the realities of religious difference in their everyday lives. In addition, it raises 
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a question of scale in terms of how particular ethical frames are imposed, negotiated, and 
transformed on these different levels. 
 
Religious Boundaries and Inter-Religious Mixing in Schools 
 In this dissertation, I view civic and religious education in schools as arenas for 
debate about different visions of nationhood and possibilities for coexistence. Focusing 
on the issue of intermarriage from this perspective allows for elucidation of the tensions 
existing between varying institutional policies regarding intermarriage and religious 
boundaries that are brought to light within the educational setting. Furthermore, it draws 
a clearer picture of how youth deliberate about the importance of religious difference in 
their own social lives, and where they perceive religious boundaries to be salient.  
 Recent changes in the national curriculum explicitly encourage students to 
befriend others who are different in terms of ethnicity, religion, or cultural background in 
order to demonstrate their competency as tolerant individuals and good citizens. At the 
same time, religious education curricula for Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims discuss 
friendship, dating, and marriage from different perspectives, but ultimately encourage 
youth to surround themselves with others who will bring them closer to God and make 
them stronger in their own faith. Youth are encouraged to accept difference and become 
close to others as friends, but are also warned about individuals who might draw them 
away from God and jeopardize their own religiosity and even salvation.46 In this context, 
                                               
46 This category would include more than just individuals from a different religious background, 
as it could also be referring to individuals of the same religious background engaged in behavior 
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where the broader social discourses about inter-religious marriage and tolerance (and 
even its legal status) are ambiguous, and the curriculum does not always provide clear 
directives about navigating personal relationships, youth are left to navigate the realities 
of their interpersonal relationships and enact an approach toward religious difference.   
 A new national curriculum was released in 2013 with the intent to address the 
perceived moral failings of youth through character education (pendidikan karakter) 
integrated into all academic subjects. Within the new curriculum model, all teachers are 
asked to evaluate students on their spiritual and social competencies. A general attitude 
and behavior of “tolerance” is listed as one of the core competencies required from 
students at each grade level in senior high school. Within certain subjects, such as civic 
education, this requirement is elaborated to specifically address the expectation that 
students “value the equality of citizens without differentiating based on race, religion, 
belief, gender, class, culture, and ethnicity in the life of society, nation, and state” 
(Kemendikbud 2013:40).47 The textbooks produced for this new curriculum also ask 
students to evaluate themselves on how effectively they have reached the various goals. 
For example, in the 11th grade civic education textbook, a self-evaluation section asks 
students to answer a list of questions in order to observe whether or not their behavior 
reflects that of a good citizen. One of the questions asks students if they have decided not 
                                                                                                                                            
that is considered immoral. However, association with religious others is sometimes perceived as 
particularly dangerous to one’s religiosity because of the specter of religious conversion. 
47 “Menghargai persamaan kedudukan warga negara tanpa membedakan ras, agama dan 
kepercayaan, gender, golongan, budaya, dan suku dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa, 
dan bernegara.” 
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to be friends with others because of religious difference, with the clear implication that 
such behavior would not be reflective of a good citizen (Kemendikbud 2014:57).  
 When I asked students in a classroom setting about their experience interacting 
with someone of a different religion, the way in which both religious and civic education 
teachers responded often reflected an expectation that their students should have a 
religiously diverse group of friends as a manifestation of tolerant behavior. Importantly, 
this approach assumes that tolerance can be taught as an individual disposition, and that 
crossing religious boundaries indiscriminately through friendship is a manifestation of 
this behavior. However, teachings about marriage, typically encountered in religious 
education classes, employ a different understanding of subjectivity that is more explicitly 
community-oriented, with different consequences for enacting religious coexistence.  
 
“Mixed Marriages Cause Headaches”: Catholic Religious Education 
 Some religious education curricula explicitly address the prospect of inter-
religious marriage, and here I consider a case of classroom discussion on this particular 
lesson in a Catholic religious education class. The standard Catholic religious education 
curriculum includes a section on family life and marriage, and touches on the topic of 
“mixed marriage” (perkawinan campur), implicitly understood as referring specifically to 
inter-religious marriage, in a textbook produced in conjunction with the Indonesian 
Bishops’ Conference. At Lokon Catholic boarding school, this topic was covered as part 
  
306 
of the regular religious education curriculum.48 The particular class session recounted 
below is instructive, especially in the way that the teacher often struggles in conveying 
the complexity of the topic: the Catholic rules and requirements compared to the 
requirements of other religions and those for legal registration, and the real situation of a 
who is the child of an inter-religious (Muslim/Catholic) marriage. 
 During a morning class session, the Catholic religious education teacher Pak 
George, an energetic man in his thirties who had attended the nearby Catholic seminary 
but ultimately decided not to enter the priesthood, asked students to silently read a page 
out of their textbook. The text provided was a hypothetical letter written by Ibu Nelly, a 
Catholic woman, addressed to a priest with the intent of explaining her desperate 
situation and asking for advice. She had married a Muslim man who promised her that 
she could remain Catholic, and that their children could be brought up as Catholic. 
However, twelve years of marriage and three children later, her husband has given her an 
ultimatum to convert to Islam. If she refuses, he will ask for a divorce. In the letter, Ibu 
Nelly asks the priest whether she should remain Catholic with the risk of losing her 
children, or convert to Islam. Typically, the examples in the religious education textbook 
were black and white, with a clear “right” answer. This example, in contrast, was a 
dilemma that lacked clues as to the best course of morally upright action. But the 
intended message was still clear: in the words of Pak George, “mixed marriages cause 
headaches.”  
                                               
48 The student body is religiously mixed (majority Protestant and with a large minority of 
Catholics, but also with some Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Confucians), but all students 
enrolled at the school take Catholic religious education courses.  
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 While some students attempted to respond to Ibu Nelly’s situation, advising her to 
get a divorce rather than convert to Islam, Pak George moved forward with the lesson, 
asking students to think about why mixed marriages happen in Indonesia. He explained to 
them that Indonesia is multicultural, with many religions, skin colors, and languages, 
living within one country. He suggested that differences in race, ethnicity, or language 
could be easily overcome and did not pose any obstacle toward marriage, but affirmed 
that differences in religion are more problematic. George’s reasoning echoed common 
concerns about inter-religious marriage in terms of the difficulty it poses for families, 
particularly that most parents will not agree to such a marriage for their children, and the 
potential for religious conversion it encapsulates. Citing Ibu Nelly’s situation, the teacher 
also reminded students that over time, people can change and default on their promises. 
 Pak George also reviewed the guidelines on inter-religious marriage for Catholics 
given in the textbook. Although inter-religious marriage was presented as a possibility 
from a Catholic perspective, the strict guidelines governing its logistical execution were 
also emphasized. In addition to the requirement that the Catholic spouse remain Catholic, 
both parties must agree to baptize their children in the Catholic Church and raise them 
according to the Catholic faith. Pak George then stumbled over his words as he attempted 
to summarize the Church’s position on mixed marriage: “The Church forbids…. sorry, it 
doesn’t forbid it, but doesn’t advise it either. Mixed marriage is more difficult than it is 
nice, but if you can love and respect each other, so be it.” The teacher had shifted quickly 
between an emphasis on a community-oriented subjectivity (in which inter-religious 
marriage must be carefully managed to avoid conversion for the Catholic party), to a 
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more individualized version in which love between two individuals could overcome 
potential obstacles. 
 A few moments earlier, Pak George had used one example of an inter-religious 
celebrity couple as a harmonious mixed marriage as a counterpoint to Ibu Nelly’s story. 
There are several Indonesian celebrity couples in inter-religious marriages, and 
interestingly, the media alternately portrays these relationships either positively as a pure 
expression of romance—willing to do anything to be with one’s soulmate—and 
tolerance, or as a sign of hedonism and vanity in putting one’s own desires above 
religious belief and requirements. Pak George’s point was that it is possible, but more 
often than not it is difficult. He gave suggestions of the multitude of things that could go 
wrong: the wife or husband’s faith could be shaken, and their children’s religious 
education might suffer. These are common concerns, discussed in more detail below, that 
are raised by both Muslims and Christians about the possible dangers of inter-religious 
marriage.  
 In the class, Pak George also presented inter-religious marriage from a Muslim 
perspective. He explained that Muslim-non-Muslim marriage is nearly impossible 
because in the Muslim marriage ceremony, one would be expected to state the shahada, 
implying that the non-Muslim party would be required to convert to Islam in order to 
marry.49 He cited as an exception the common Islamic legal opinion that a Muslim 
woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man, but a Muslim man could marry a Christian 
                                               
49 The shahada (Ind: syahadat) is the Muslim profession of faith. 
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woman—though, as mentioned above, most Islamic organizations in Indonesia have 
actually issued a fatwa forbidding inter-religious marriage for Muslims in any form.  
 Jenny, one of the students in the class, is officially Muslim according to the 
school roster, though it was public knowledge that she was a child of a mixed marriage. 
Her tenuous relationship with Islam had become obvious earlier in the course when she 
was asked to lead a presentation about engaging in inter-religious dialogue with Muslims 
and publicly emphasized her lack of knowledge on the subject. During the lesson on 
inter-religious marriage, Pak George asked her about her family’s religious situation in 
front of the class, also inquiring which mosque she attends. Jenny asserted that she has 
never set foot in a mosque, and quietly responded that her mom is Muslim, and her dad is 
Catholic. Clearly divergent from the information given about mixed marriage from either 
a Catholic or Muslim perspective, the teacher brushed the real-life example away with the 
admission that it is complicated and difficult to explain.  
 Pak George ended the class, perhaps trying to lighten the mood, by going around 
the room and asking each student to state the religion of his/her boyfriend or girlfriend. 
Punctuated by awkward and uncomfortable laughter, students hesitated as they were put 
on the spot, most claiming not to have a boyfriend or girlfriend while their classmates 
shouted, “S/he does!” Pak George was suspicious of their negative responses, wondering 
aloud how it is possible that 90% of the students don’t have a boyfriend/girlfriend. One 
Papuan student made everyone laugh by claiming to have a Confucian girlfriend, which 
everyone knew was not the case. 
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 Although having a boyfriend or girlfriend is officially forbidden according to the 
rules of the private Catholic school, most of the teachers (including Pak George) and 
dormitory staff saw dating as an inevitable part of teenage life. Jenny, like many of the 
girls in her grade, had a boyfriend, despite claiming not to in the class session. The 
couple spent a significant amount of time together studying in the library, eating meals in 
the dining hall, and walking side-by-side around the campus of the co-ed boarding 
school. However, in Jenny’s case, her romantic relationship constitutes an inter-religious 
one, as she is officially Muslim, dating a Christian boy. The dormitory staff, who often 
saw Jenny with her boyfriend, did not express any concern about her long-term 
involvement with the boy. Perhaps they assumed that Jenny, as the child of a mixed 
marriage, is confused about her own religious belonging. Furthermore, because it was 
clear that Jenny was not a practicing Muslim, it may have been assumed that a Christian 
influence from the school and from her peers (including her friends and boyfriend) would 
have a positive impact. 
 Within this classroom lesson about inter-religious marriage, a complex weave of 
normativities regarding attitudes toward friendship, dating, and marriage among 
Indonesian youth emerges. The official textbook and curriculum presents inter-religious 
marriage as a possibility, though one that should be avoided if possible, due to the 
potential problems it could cause. The teacher often struggled to convey the official 
directives on the subject, trying to introduce nuance while still firmly discouraging 
students from pursuing inter-religious relationships. All of this took place in the context 
of a school that prides itself on promoting a Catholic multicultural vision, challenging 
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students to learn to live in a religiously and ethnically diverse community. Students were 
often reminded that they should never select friends based on religion, ethnicity, or social 
class, summarized and repeated by students through the popular catchphrase among 
students “Don’t be racist!” (Jangan rasis!). While dating was forbidden according to 
school rules, attitudes among the teachers and dormitory staff were typically lax. One 
staff member from the female dormitory justified this attitude through her explanation to 
me that “high school is the time to learn how to date.” Students at the school are left to 
navigate these various directives and come to their own understandings about the salience 
of religious difference in friendship, dating, and marriage.  
 
“Am I the one who has to be willing to give up my religion?” 
 At the public madrasah in Manado with an all-Muslim student body, I asked 10th 
grade students to write down their experience with someone of a different religion during 
their course on Islamic morality (Aqidah Akhlak). After the students took time to write 
their answers, the teacher Ibu Indah speculated in an accusatory tone, “Maybe some of 
you don’t have friends of a different religion?” One of the students in the front of the 
class reassured her, “Yes, everyone does! Of course they do!” When Ibu Indah asked if 
anyone had “told fairy tales” in their response (implying that they had made up stories), 
one student named Cita refuted the accusation in front of the class, telling everyone that 
in fact she had poured her heart out into her answer. Her classmates responded with 
snickering, but were cut off by Ibu Indah’s reminder of the popular regional motto: “We 
are all brothers” (Manado: Torang Samua Basudara).  
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 The papers were anonymous, but Cita came to talk to me after in an interaction 
that was closely monitored by her fellow classmates. As she started to explain her 
situation to me, one of her classmates came over and pointed at Cita as she loudly 
announced, “She has a Christian boyfriend!” (Manado: Depe cowok Kristen). For Ibu 
Indah, having friends of a different religion is something that is clearly expected of her 
students, but Cita’s case of dating a Christian boy was clearly perceived by her peers as 
inappropriate and sanctioned through teasing. 
 At the public madrasah, many teachers talked about dating in general as 
something that is not allowed in Islam because of the potential to lead to zina, pre- or 
extra-marital sex. In this context, it is important to note that “dating” (pacaran) often 
refers to a relationship carried out strictly on social media or through texting, or perhaps 
involving meeting in a group setting (Parker et al. 2014). Many students at the madrasah 
did have a boyfriend or girlfriend, despite the fact that it was highly discouraged. Some 
students did refuse dating and often made their position publicly known. At a school 
assembly filled with Qur’anic recitation and Islamically-themed performances, one girl 
gave a speech to remind her fellow students that social media can also lead to zina, 
ending her speech by telling her peers to “marry, don’t date!” The 10th grader, Cita, had 
chosen to date, but faced significant embarrassment and teasing within her homeroom 
class when her friends found out her boyfriend was Christian. Cita wrote the following to 
me about her situation: 
 “My experience with people of a different religion is that I have lots of friends of 
 a different religion and we are good friends, already like family. And, honestly, 
 now I am also in a relationship with a boy of a different religion. It’s true a lot of 
 friends often tease me because they know about my relationship. But I don’t care 
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 about them. I continue to follow my heart, because I really do love him. He is a 
 boy who makes my life happy every day. But I am surprised by my friends, why 
 do they often tease me like that- because in my opinion, as long as we have a 
 proper relationship, there’s nothing wrong with it. Truly, I love him. And I am not 
 going to pay attention to what my friends say. But now he is gone to follow his 
 dreams. Now he is in Makassar. He is going to a Christian school there…it’s been 
 torture these past two months and nobody cares. I am still willing to wait for him 
 to return so we can follow the dream that we have planned  together. But I am 
 confused- he and I have different religions. Am I the one who has to be willing to 
 give up my religion because up until now, he is not willing to follow my religion, 
 and I am still confused. But that is not a problem because we have not yet 
 planned marriage because I am still in school. I believe that if we are soul mates, 
 we will surely be united despite having different religions. I just hope there is a 
 way out. And it’s not possible for me to leave him because my heart is already 
 sealed to his. What I want now is for him to come back to be with me, because I 
 am sad when he is gone for too long. And hopefully he is fine there. I also hope 
 for the best. That is my experience but I am sorry, ma’am, because I’m pouring 
 my heart out hehehe but there’s nothing wrong if we share stories. That’s all, 
 thanks.”  
 
 Cita’s situation represents an attempt to navigate the ambiguities surrounding 
inter-religious relationships and friendship and dating in general. She knows that having 
friends of another religious is positively evaluated, and emphasizes that she has become 
close with them, like family. But she struggles to make sense of her relationship with her 
Christian boyfriend, feeling that they are soul mates, but worrying that there is no future 
for them and even wondering if she would have to leave her own religion for them to be 
together.   
 Despite the fact that many of the students at the madrasah viewed dating someone 
from another religion as inappropriate or transgressive, several students wrote about their 
upbringing as children in religiously mixed families as providing a positive experience 
and example of coexistence. One student wrote about her father who converted to Islam. 
She confessed that she has at times felt awkward around her Christian relatives. 
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However, remembering that her father has not always been Muslim has helped her to 
realize that “we are all the same even if we’re different religions, as Manadonese say ‘We 
are all brothers.’” A boy whose mother converted to Islam also felt that his experience 
with his Christian relatives has taught him tolerance, but expressed this tolerance in terms 
of respecting boundaries: “The lesson is that we must know the respective limits given by 
each religion, because if we know them, this will make us comfortable in interacting with 
people of another religion.” 
 
Religious Education and Religious Personhood 
 Religious education represents an important lens for studying the issue of 
Christian-Muslim relationships and intermarriage. As we have seen, it offers a forum for 
providing youth with religious teachings that discourage or forbid inter-religious 
marriage. In addition, it is expected to build a pious character in students that will 
inevitably lead them to seek out a spouse of their own faith. In the Protestant education 
courses at a public school in Manado, students were encouraged to have a diverse group 
of friends from different cultures, ethnic groups, religions, and nations as an enactment of 
Jesus’ boundless love. When it came to dating, however, inter-religious relationships 
were not addressed directly, but students were told clearly that they must date “in a 
Christian way” before getting married, and that a good boyfriend or girlfriend will make 
one’s faith stronger and bring one closer to God. Anything else, they were warned, is not 
in line with Christian values.  
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 Because religious belonging is typically assumed to be the result of upbringing, 
objection to inter-religious marriage is often raised on the grounds that children from 
these unions will suffer from confusion on religious matters. Parker, Hoon, and Raihani 
found that high school teachers often cited “clashes over religious authority” and 
religious education as a main objection to inter-religious marriage (2014:483). During a 
religious education class on the Qur’an and Hadith at the public madrasah, the teacher 
Ibu Rahma was passionately lecturing about the beauty and perfection of the Arabic 
language in the Qur’an. As she spoke, she spontaneously brought up an example of the 
confusion that inter-religious marriages can cause for the children of such a union. One of 
her former students had a Muslim mother and a father who followed another 
(unspecified) religion. This student had come to Ibu Rahma to ask for guidance about 
which religion to follow. She had counseled him, explaining that religion cannot be 
forced and he would need to decide for himself. In the end, the teacher explained, this 
student’s exposure to the beauty and perfection of the Qur’an through hearing his 
mother’s recitations moved him to embrace Islam. According to the teacher’s account, 
guidance through formal religious education and the moving experience of hearing 
Qur’anic recitations were ultimately what enabled this student to have a clear religious 
belonging. 
 When inter-religious marriages do take place in Indonesia, the spouse who 
converts is assumed to be less deeply committed to his/her religion. In this case, his/her 
parents are often blamed for failing to properly educate their children in their faith 
(Connolly 2009:389). The perceived lack of personal commitment that leads one spouse 
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to convert is not just a reflection on the family, but also on the broader failure of religious 
education. Speaking at an Islamic studies conference in Manado in 2015 on the theme of 
“Harmony in Diversity,” the Indonesian Minister of Religion made an important point 
that helps to express why. He affirmed the importance of education imbued with religion 
and religious values that will make religion an integral part of students characters, so 
much so that it cannot be separated from the individual. The Minister of Religion’s point 
elucidates one way in which religious education is intended to fundamentally shape 
students’ characters in a way that reinforces boundaries between religious communities 
as a consequence. However, some measure of boundary reinforcement is often perceived 
as a practical and necessary pre-requisite for religious mixing.  
 
Discourses about Diversity and Frameworks for Coexistence  
 In contemporary Indonesia, the educational system is increasingly emphasizing 
the need for curricular material about respecting diversity, a measure responding to the 
prevalence of violent religious and ethnic conflicts and general intolerance in society. 
These particular frameworks for coexistence, though vague in their exhortations to 
“respect and value difference,” clearly remain premised on an assumption that 
differences—especially religious differences—must be preserved. In the context of the 
classroom, calls for tolerance are often framed in terms of the importance of knowing 
about other religions or other ethnic groups so that one can respect the boundaries of the 
communities.  
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 Discourses about diversity circulating in Manado tend to emphasize the beauty of 
difference and the need to maintain it, supported by metaphors of gardens made more 
beautiful with a variety of colors (compared to boring monochromatic ones). Johan, a 
Protestant university student who participated in the religious exchange program (see 
chapter two) among university students from Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic 
universities in the Manado area, likened religions to puzzle pieces of different colors. 
“When the puzzle is put together,” he explained to me “we can see that the puzzle is 
beautiful; it gives a beautiful image.”50 Each puzzle piece has its own shape, color, and 
pattern, but together, all of the pieces produce a beautiful image that none can achieve 
individually. Johan, who aspires to become a Protestant pastor, chose to spend a week 
with Muslim students at the Islamic university IAIN because his entire extended family is 
Muslim and he wanted to know more about their religion. Although the integrity of 
religious boundaries is not explicitly challenged by Johan’s abstract understanding of 
difference, it also requires further examination for how boundaries may also become 
permeable to some extent as youth are encouraged to have friends with different religious 
backgrounds to put this respect for diversity into practice. 
 
Pluralism and Religious Boundaries 
 While discourses on diversity may imply the integrity of religious boundaries in 
the abstract, the topic of inter-religious relationships and practical approaches to 
socializing allows for an understanding of how individuals implement these ideas in their 
                                               
50 “Ketika puzzle itu disatukan, torang [kita] bisa lihat bahwa puzzle itu indah, memiliki gambar 
yang indah.” 
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daily lives. Because of the reality of inter-religious marriage and mixed families, they 
represent an apt case for understanding how boundaries are not always clearly delineated, 
and practical approaches toward interaction are necessarily complex. While Johan’s 
puzzle metaphor positions religions as distinct communities coming into contact with one 
another, his willingness to participate in a week-long religious exchange program among 
Muslims would certainly be criticized by some who may argue that it encourages too 
much mixing. For those who participated in the program, however, it was a first step 
toward building lasting inter-religious friendships and cooperation among future religious 
leaders of the region. 
 The head of an all-girls pesantren for high school students in Manado, Pak Umar, 
had difficulty reconciling his theoretical and practical understandings of religious 
coexistence. Many of his students—he estimated as many as 30%—come from 
religiously mixed families. While some of the students have one parent who is Christian, 
others have Christian extended family as a result of an inter-religious marriage that was 
also accompanied by conversion. He lamented that many of the students came in with 
only a superficial understanding of Islam, having received the majority of their education 
from public or Christian institutions. Pak Umar explained his conviction that educating 
students about tolerance happens through a strong grasp of religious values, and that the 
school was contributing through its strong focus on providing students with a strong 
religious formation they might not have previously received. In this way, he echoed many 
of the assumptions of teachers and administrators at the madrasah MAN, discussed in 
chapter six. 
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 At the same time, Pak Umar claimed that many students—like those coming from 
religiously mixed families—already have first-hand experience in learning tolerance. He 
drew on the practical importance of being exposed to religious others in order to learn 
about tolerance, while maintaining that religious values imparted through the school lay 
the foundation for their approach. While these understandings may appear contradictory, 
they work to balance the concerns of conversion by looking positively at inter-religious 
interactions while simultaneously maintaining the importance of a strong religious 
belonging that will not be shaken by such interactions. Overall, he clearly argued for the 
importance of school in teaching youth boundaries in navigating religious difference.  
 Pak Umar asserted that in learning about how to implement tolerance, youth 
should understand that religious mixing is okay for social events, but not for religious 
ones. In his statement, he made it clear that youth should respect other religions but 
understand the limits of religious boundaries. However, as he reflected on his own 
experiences in a religiously diverse neighborhood, he struggled to define the boundaries 
so clearly. When his Christian neighbors are preparing a funeral or ceremony, he said that 
he always donates money, qualifying his action by explaining that it is a social gesture of 
care, and not to support their religious activities. Of course, in practice, it does directly 
contribute to his neighbors’ ability to hold funerals or celebrations, which are religious 
activities.  
 At inter-religious events, such as the opening ceremony for the religious exchange 
program in which Johan participated, a reinforcement of boundaries was sometimes used 
to diffuse tension about the prospects of inter-religious mixing. Students knew that as a 
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part of the program they would be required to attend religious rituals outside of their own 
faith backgrounds, which is often discouraged or considered an inappropriate boundary 
crossing, and caused some anxiety among participants. One speaker at the opening 
ceremony, a professor from the state Islamic university IAIN Manado, shared his view of 
religious difference from what he described as a social science perspective. In his 
understanding, religious belonging is as simple as “environmental influence” from their 
family. He gave the example that when he was a young child, his parents always brought 
him to the mosque, and at five years of age, he would have been able to tell you that his 
God is Allah. Children have the same God as their parents, he clarified, so it doesn’t 
mean that what he learned at the mosque was wrong; it means that he had a different 
social environment from others. In this case, the speaker emphasized religious 
boundaries, though in doing so from his “social science” rather than theological 
perspective, it allowed for a particular kind of boundary emphasis. He described religious 
difference as a product of the social environment of one religious group. In the context of 
the religious exchange program, discussing religion as a product of one’s social 
environment had the potential to diffuse tension because it reinforced lines between 
specific religious communities without perceiving conflicting truth claims as problematic. 
Emphasizing the permanent nature of the borders allowed for a temporary crossing, and 
therefore anxiety about the possibility for religious conversion and change that often 
emerges in situations of religious mixing and socializing was minimized. 
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Conclusion  
 Considering the two seemingly opposing discourses presented at the beginning of 
the chapter, framing inter-religious marriage as a major foundation of coexistence in the 
region emphasizes the need for fluidity of boundaries in sustaining the social fabric. On 
the other hand, an understanding of inter-religious marriage as a major threat to 
coexistence in the region draws on the need to maintain boundaries. As these examples 
have demonstrated, a measure of ambiguity is perpetuated as individuals recognize both 
of these positions and draw on both assumptions in navigating the realities of living in a 
plural society. The consideration of multiple societal levels shows that this contradiction 
about religious boundaries visible through attitudes about intermarriage is not only 
present in individual deliberations about the subject. There are ambiguities and 
contradictions at nearly every level, such as in the state’s position of neither clearly 
prohibiting nor allowing inter-religious marriage. In addition, within the educational 
system, students are increasingly being encouraged to mix with religious “others,” as part 
of a multicultural project, allowing them to see religious boundaries as perhaps less solid. 
At the same time, youth are reminded (and remind themselves) about the dangers of 
inter-religious marriage, reinforcing religious boundaries. 
 Christian and Muslim youth in North Sulawesi are encouraged to find friends who 
follow a different religion in order to demonstrate their individual disposition of 
tolerance. At the same time, they may be exposed to different expectations about the 
specifics of dating, but are expected to marry someone of the same religion. To further 
complicate matters, in the religiously diverse province of North Sulawesi discourses 
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portray religious intermarriage alternately as the foundation of tolerance and as a serious 
threat to inter-religious relations because of the constant threat of conversion that it poses.  
 In navigating personal relationships, the salience of religious boundaries is 
constantly shifting based on the balancing act between modes of subjectivity as youth 
seek a sense of self and a sense of how they fit within their religious community. On the 
one hand, an individual-focused subjectivity presents tolerance as an individual 
characteristic, manifested by crossing (and potentially ignoring) religious boundaries and 
meeting religious “others.” Hence, the focus from the curriculum and the emphasis from 
teachers on demonstrating tolerance by showing the ability to be friends with those from 
a different religious background. On the other hand, from the perspective of a 
community-oriented subjectivity, one is always responsible to his/her faith community, 
and the threat of conversion positions inter-religious relationships as dangerous. Take, for 
example, the Christian girl at the public high quoted at the beginning of the chapter who 
preferred to avoid talking to the Muslim boys in her class for fear of becoming attracted 
to them. 
 Youth are constantly trying to find a balance between these two modes, just like 
the teenager Cita in her confusion over her romantic relationship with a Christian boy. 
Through the relationship she seeks personal fulfillment through a romantic relationship, 
sees it a demonstration of her personal tolerance, but also experiences as a source of 
tension among her peers, and when she considers her responsibility as a Muslim. The 
consequences of this balancing act are significant, because they project the manifestation 
of tolerance in significantly different ways. As youth balance these two modes of 
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subjectivity, they also navigate different possibilities for approaching inter-religious 
relationships, where religious “borders” are constantly shifting, and the way to approach 
them as a tolerant individual and the tolerant member of a faith community (through 
either ignoring them or reinforcing them) shifts as well.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Belonging in Manado and in Indonesia 
 In the introduction to the dissertation, I underscored the main tension in public 
deliberation about religious difference in Manado: pride in representing a diverse and 
peaceful region of Indonesia, with a desire to maintain a majority-Christian demographic 
and influence in the public sphere. Chapter two outlined the presence of different groups 
and organizations and their relative influence in scaling varying conceptions of 
coexistence. For many in Manado, Ahok was an important figure as the Christian 
governor of the nation’s capital, fulfilling the potential of Christians to contribute to the 
national project of Indonesia. As a result, the blasphemy trial and subsequent sentencing 
of Ahok, which made apparent the influence of a particularly conservative stream of 
Islam, led many Christians in Manado question their role and participation in the national 
project of Indonesia. During a return trip to the field in July 2018, the backlash following 
Ahok’s prison sentence had settled somewhat, but the vision for the future of the 
province of North Sulawesi as a model of respect for diversity and a Christian stronghold 
remains. Public debates continue to consider the question of how to maintain coexistence 
locally, and how the province can continue to be part of the national project of Indonesia. 
 Throughout the chapters, manifestations of this friction in the public sphere and 
responses to it have become visible on a number of levels, including in how educational 
institutions (and civic and religious education programs in particular) contribute to these 
debates as arenas of deliberation about coexistence. Youth in Manado and across 
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Indonesia are encountering imaginaries of belonging, acquiring an understanding of how 
they fit in their neighborhoods and in the nation. These frameworks are not exclusively 
channeled by educational institutions, but schools can and do become critical arenas of 
deliberation. While working to fulfill multiple roles, youth draw on ideas of tolerance that 
depend on varying modes of subjectivity, a process which requires ethnographic attention 
in order to uncover how these individual and interpersonal ambiguities can potentially 
have a bearing on the institutions and structures contributing to them. 
 In this final section, I conclude a discussion started in the previous chapter (eight) 
about modes of subjectivity in relation to varying frameworks for coexistence. I argue 
that these insights can provide the basis for a continued conversation about education, 
ethics, and subjectivity. Then, I offer remarks about the connection between interpersonal 
ethical deliberation and public ethical deliberation. Finally, I indicate that this study has 
important points to offer as questions of belonging have become posed with renewed 
vigor in modern plural societies today. 
 
Ethical Frameworks, Modes of Subjectivity, and Pedagogical Processes 
 Overall, this dissertation has taken a multi-centered approach to education 
through its examination of public ethical streams influencing deliberation about religious 
difference in varied school environments and their negotiation by youth. Throughout the 
analysis, I have paid particular attention to how such actions of deliberation take place on 
different levels and scales. The rationale for this approach has been to build up to an 
understanding of how public debates and the constant reworking of a public ethical 
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currents can ultimately become channeled through (or sidelined by) schools and put into 
action in varied ways by youth. While the dissertation began with a discussion of 
incidents that triggered public debate about the conditions of living in a plural society, the 
final chapter has ended with a consideration of what kind of subjectivities these varying 
approaches to difference require. It is the recognition of these multiple levels that allows 
for a conceptualization of education as deliberation, where political realities and their 
shaping of a public ethic impinge on the educational process. At the same time, youth are 
navigating the ambiguous and sometimes contradictory imperatives placed on them, 
figuring out how best to act and move forward while necessarily working within and 
among multiple ethical frameworks.  
 The dissertation has argued that schools are important sites of deliberation about 
the place of religion within the national imaginary, and by extension, the contours of 
national belonging and treatment of religious difference. For example, Muslim students at 
the madrasah MAN discuss the question of whether only Muslims must avoid vices like 
hedonism, or if all people are held to such standards, trying to figure out how their 
religious teachings work in a plural society. Catholics and Protestants come together at 
Lokon to support a multicultural vision for Indonesia where Christian elites can impact 
the future of the country, but struggle with ethnic inclusion. A Protestant student at the 
public school SMA asks how to respond in a Christian way to Muslims in Java protesting 
a church, and a teacher replies with essentialized portraits of Christians as promoting love 
and Muslims as hateful toward kafirs. Some of these instances were impassioned, like the 
teacher’s speech about Christians and Muslims. Others appeared banal, like the Muslim 
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students wondering about the application of religious rules in a plural society, whose 
question was ultimately brushed aside and forgotten. Some emerged from a clear 
administrative directive, like the multicultural educational approach of Lokon, though the 
ethnically-based challenges to the implementation of the vision were certainly not 
anticipated.   
 In each of the three schools studied—the public school SMA, the madrasah MAN, 
and the private Catholic school Lokon—debates about diversity are framed by the 
policies and everyday realities at each of the schools. As the schools implement a 
national curriculum for both civic and religious education, it takes on specific meaning in 
Manado, where public discourses establish the importance of religious harmony for local 
identity without a clear blueprint for how to maintain it. The local context also shapes 
messages about inter-religious diversity while moving toward a public sphere 
characterized by Christian hegemony. 
 The preceding chapter used inter-religious friendship, dating, and marriage among 
youth in Manado as a lens for understanding how religious boundaries become salient in 
different contexts. The analysis located tensions between varied ethical frames for 
dealing with religious difference that, in their most extreme versions, have alternative 
visions about the importance of boundary maintenance in coexistence and tolerance. In 
discussions of inter-religious friendship and marriage in Manado, there is often the 
assumption that ignoring or crossing religious boundaries is an expression of an 
individual disposition of tolerance. These assumptions rely on an individualized mode of 
subjectivity, when the stakes of group-level belonging can supposedly be bracketed out. 
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A community-oriented perspective of subjectivity also figures in making decisions about 
inter-religious mixing, and is influenced by fear of conversion, with the assumption that 
tolerance is only possible through a clear emphasis on and communal recognition of 
boundaries. 
 With this realization in mind, the question of the madrasah teacher to her students 
about how to respect and value diversity as Indonesian citizens takes on new significance. 
It is not surprising that youth who are trying to understand what this means in their own 
lives and relationships have found themselves negotiating between different ethical 
frameworks. As I mentioned in the introduction and revisit here, ethical pluralism is 
central to the human experience (Ewing 1990), and is not always subjectively 
experienced as a moral dilemma. Many of the Muslim students who teased their 
classmate Cita for having a Christian boyfriend also tried to reassure their teachers that 
they have friends of different religious backgrounds as a means to proving their tolerance.  
 The concrete example of inter-religious relationships further underscores that 
living in light of ethical frameworks or an ethical tradition is not about a simple 
internalization of values. It depends, rather on “the ability to manage the conflicts 
between these and other demands through reflective and thoughtful self-direction” 
(Laidlaw 2014:168). Youth in Manado are exposed to seemingly contradictory discourses 
about how to be pious, tolerant individuals and how to approach inter-religious 
interactions and relationships. In other words, to speak of internalization here is 
meaningless. Rather, it is necessary to examine this ethical reflection as part of the 
pedagogical process, in all of its contingency.  
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 Linking the concepts of reflective freedom as part of ethical subject formation 
(Laidlaw 2014) and education as deliberation (Varenne 2007) enriches a discussion about 
how ethical frameworks are socialized. At the same time, it risks projecting the 
assumption of a heavily cognitivized process whereby reflection takes place only as 
rational discourse. As the examples in this dissertation have shown, this need not—and 
should not—be the case. At the public school, perspectives on diversity are asserted 
through the use of space, where the courtyard can be instantly be transformed into a 
Protestant worship space, and Muslims leave school grounds to carry out their worship. 
In each of the three schools, deliberation about moral personhood is mediated through the 
school uniform, rather than through explicit talk about moral shortcomings or behavioral 
deficits. Approaches to inter-religious relationships discussed in the abstract, but they are 
also enacted. Different ethical frameworks co-exist, imbricate, and come to heads through 
discourse, but also through a number of other means that require ethnographic 
observation and analysis. 
 Furthermore, the analysis has demonstrated the importance of attending to 
institutions and their roles in influencing the ethical frameworks that are introduced and 
deliberated. A theoretical approach grounded in ordinary ethics (Das 2010; Lambek 
2010) and its concern with the emergence of ethical frameworks through everyday 
interaction potentially overlooks the streams of ethical traditions socialized by the 
institutions that sustain them. In this case, it would be an oversimplification to assume 
that becoming friends with, dating, or marrying someone of another religion is only a 
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possibility for youth in Manado that arises through individual actions opposing the 
oppressive categories and boundaries imposed by institutions.  
 
Linking Interpersonal Ethical Deliberation to Public Ethical Deliberation 
 This dissertation contains important insights for rethinking how interpersonal 
ethical deliberation connects to the emergence of a public ethical culture. In chapter two, 
debates about plurality and citizenship in Manado’s public sphere evinced an unresolved 
tension about the intent to promote Manado as a place of diversity in harmony as well as 
work to maintain its status as a majority-Christian region. The case studies of particular 
schools demonstrated how aspects of these debates were differentially channeled through 
them. The public high school SMA appears as a microcosm of the public sphere in its 
application of school policies that celebrates religion and diversity in the abstract while 
concretely securing a Protestant hegemony. At the private Catholic school Lokon, 
questions about diversity and cohesion are re-framed as national issues, where students 
are encouraged to become Christian leaders for the nation; yet local and historical 
circumstances contribute to the possibility of the school’s existence. Debates in the public 
sphere impact the strategy of teachers at MAN to give Muslim students the strong 
religious foundation required to remain strong in their faith as a minority in their local 
environment. 
 The analysis of the Catholic school Lokon (chapter five) addressed this question 
about linkages between small-scale deliberation and public ethical culture most directly 
in its critique of post-New Order development projects as decidedly neoliberal in their 
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approach toward producing pious, self-governing subjects (Rudnyckyj 2010). I 
demonstrated how the school’s approach evinces not only an attempt at self-
transformation, but also at commitment and contribution to a multi-confessional 
Indonesia as a certain kind of moral community. Ethnographic insights showed how this 
goal is again deliberated by youth (and teachers) as they run into obstacles implementing 
the school’s multicultural vision alongside Papuan students.  
 While national ideologies and political doctrines can serve as anchoring principles 
and frame the terms of debate, they cannot be assumed to produce a public ethic. Jaffe-
Walter (2016) details how public policies and anxiety about Muslim immigrants are 
channeled through Danish schools and experienced by Muslim students, exploring how 
“technologies of concern” are used to justify the promotion of an exclusivist and 
xenophobic vision of nation within schools. However, citing Asad, she argues that these 
technologies originate from the false promises of Western liberal democracy as able to 
achieve neutrality and secure religious freedom. In the assumption that secularism and 
liberalism have given rise to a public ethical culture, she flattens her important 
ethnographic insights about how policies imposing a particular subjectivity on youth are 
both imposed and negotiated.    
 The strength of analysis in this dissertation lies in the attention to deliberation at 
multiple levels, applying an interactive and processual conception of education 
summarized above. Through this approach, it is possible to arrive at an understanding of 
how certain forms of agency can impact social structures at a number of different levels, 
potentially starting small but causing a ripple effect that can ultimately feedback on and 
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impact a broader public ethic. The case of Manado and Indonesia has important insights 
as the question of cohesion and belonging is raised with increasing vigor in modern plural 
societies, providing a perspective on how to examine the ways in which different visions 
of coexistence and the kinds of subjectivities they require are deliberated, scaled, 
imposed, and shifted.  
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